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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
On October 8, 2009, the Utah Court of Appeals received this case via pour-over 
from the Utah Supreme Court. Jurisdiction is proper in this case under Utah Code section 
78A-4-103(2)Q). See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
ISSUE I: Did the trial court err in entering partial summary judgment on Dr. 
Davidhizar's claims and defenses of fraud and negligent misrepresentation despite 
abundant genuine issues of material fact? 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE: This issue was preserved below in Dr. 
Davidhizar's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Motion in Limine 
Re: Fraud and Negligent Representation and in the trial court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. (R. 1190; 1632.) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Utah appellate courts "review a district court's 
grant of summary judgment for correctness and afford no deference to that court's legal 
conclusions." Afridi v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2005 UT 53, | 5, 122 P.3d 596. 
ISSUE II: Did the trial court err in dismissing Dr. Davidhizar's fraud and 
negligent misrepresentation claims on the eve of trial for failure to plead with 
particularity and for failure to timely amend when those claims had been thoroughly 
litigated by the parties? 
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PRESERVATION OF ISSUE: This issue was preserved below in hearings 
before the trial court on August 23, 2007, and on December 18, 2007, and in the trial 
court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R. 1858: 14; 1861: 28; R. 1632.) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "Because the propriety of a motion to dismiss is a 
question of law, [the appellate court] review[s] for correctness, giving no deference to the 
decision of the trial court." Krouse v. Bower, 2001 UT 28, ^ 2, 20 P.3d 895. 
ISSUE HI: Did the trial court commit multiple errors in its application of rules 
for measuring damages that resulted in an egregiously inflated damages award? 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE: This issue was preserved below in Dr. 
Davidhizar's Closing Brief and in the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. (R. 1436; 1606-28; 1634.) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "Whether the district court applied the correct rule 
for measuring damages is a question of law that [the appellate court] review[s] for 
correctness." Mahana v. Onyx Acceptance Corp., 2004 UT 59, f^ 25, 96 P.3d 893. 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There are no governing constitutional or statutory provisions. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves an attempt to enforce a contract induced by fraud. Dr. 
Davidhizar agreed to invest in a business but was misled about the revenues being 
generated and the status of key contracts for the company's income-producing assets. 
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The fraudulently induced contract was executed by the parties in February 2002. 
Pursuant to that agreement, Dr. Davidhizar, in exchange for the assumption of $180,000 
of the company's debt, was to receive a ninety-percent (90%) ownership interest in 
OMC, ownership of three income-producing medical tables used for the management of 
back pain, and the assignment of existing contracts related to placement of the medical 
tables within medical facilities. 
In entering into the agreement, Dr. Davidhizar relied on Plaintiffs' representations 
regarding the revenues generated by OMC and the status of its contracts. Within days 
after executing the agreement, Dr. Da\ idhizar learned that these representations were 
false and he promptly rescinded the agreement. In response, Plaintiffs sued Dr. 
Davidhizar, among other defendants, for claims both in tort and arising out of the 
agreement. Dr. Davidhizar counterclaimcd for fraud and negligent misrepresentation, 
and asserted the affirmative defense of fraud in the inducement. 
In 2005, after three years of litigation and the completion of extensive discovery, 
Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment seeking, among olhn things, dismissal of 
Dr. Davidhizar's claims and defenses related to fraud. Plaintiffs' summary judgment 
motion addressed in detail the same allegations of fraud that Plaintiffs later claimed had 
not been pled with particularity. Dr. Davidhizar responded to the motion with evidence 
that Plaintiffs had misrepresented the amount of income being generated by OMC and the 
status of the contracts, which, contrary to Plaintiffs' representations, were experiencing 
significant problems at the time the agreement was executed. Based on these facts, the 
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trial court properly denied Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion. Following that denial 
and up to the pretrial hearing in the case two years later, the parties engaged in no 
additional fact discovery. 
On August 23, 2007, the parties attended a pretrial conference. This hearing took 
place more than five years after the Plaintiffs initiated the litigation and Dr. Davidhizar 
filed his Answer and Counterclaim, more than two years after the court denied Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, and just four days before trial was set to begin. At the 
beginning of the pretrial conference, Plaintiffs hand-delivered a motion in limine seeking 
to exclude all evidence of fraud and negligent misrepresentation based on Dr. 
Davidhizar's purported failure to plead such claims with particularity in his Answer and 
Counterclaim. Although Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine had just been submitted the 
morning of the pretrial conference and no response had been filed, the trial court 
immediately heard oral argument on the motion. During the hearing, it became quickly 
apparent that Plaintiffs and the trial court were focused not on whether Dr. Davidhizar's 
claims and defenses had been pled with particularity, but whether Dr. Davidhizar had 
presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment. At the conclusion of the 
pretrial conference, the trial court ruled that Dr. Davidhizar's claims and defenses should 
be dismissed. 
The following day, on August 24, 2007, Dr. Davidhizar filed a motion to continue 
the trial and a motion to amend his Answer and Counterclaim to add detail to the 
allegations of fraud. In response, the trial court indicated that it believed its ruling 
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dismissing Dr. Davidhizar's claims and defenses was proper but that it would allow a 
response in writing to Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine and would consider the Motion to 
Amend. 
A new hearing was held concerning these issues on December 18, 2007, at which 
time the trial court once again affirmed its decision to dismiss the fraud-related claims 
and defenses and denied the Motion to Amend. This erroneous ruling left Dr. Davidhizar 
entirely exposed to Plaintiffs' breach of contract claims. The only issue left for trial was 
the amount of damages. 
At the trial on damages, the trial court adopted wholesale Plaintiffs' erroneous 
calculation of damages without careful examination of the facts and governing law. As a 
result of these errors, Plaintiffs were allowed to turn their $180,000 breach of contract 
claim into a windfall judgment of almost $820,000. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Dr, Davidhizar Signs a Contract Based on Plaintiffs5 Representations 
1 Dr. Davidhizar is a family practice physician living in Soldotna, Alaska. 
(R.21.) 
2. In August 2001, Dr. Davidhizar provided $ 100,000 to assist Plaintiffs in 
financing two therapeutic tables, known as Internal Disc Decompression tables (the 
"Medical Tables"), used in the management of back pain. (R. 22; 378.) 
3. In or around October 2001, a dispute developed between Dr. Davidhizar 
and Fisher, one of two members of OMC, concerning ownership of the Medical Tables 
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financed by Dr. Davidhizar. (R. 367; 378.) 
4. Eventually, the parties discussed resolving the dispute by having Dr. 
Davidhizar assume the remaining debt on OMC's Medical Tables (the two he had helped 
finance and one more) and other OMC debts in exchange for his ownership of OMC and 
the Medical Tables. (R. 378.) 
5. On February 18, 2002, the parties met in St. George, Utah to discuss this 
proposed resolution. Present at this meeting were Dr. Davidhizar, Fisher, H. Eugene 
Coder (the other member of OMC), Robert Nash (Dr. Davidhizar's accountant), and 
attorney Darwin Fisher (Plaintiffs' attorney and the father of David Fisher). (R. 367-69; 
379.) 
6. At the February 18, 2002 meeting, Dr. Davidhizar entered into an 
agreement (the "Agreement") with Plaintiffs, under which Dr. Davidhizar agreed to 
assume $180,000 in OMC debt in exchange for a 90% interest in OMC. This interest 
included the transfer of ownership of the Medical Tables and all OMC contracts related 
to the Medical Tables to Dr. Davidhizar. (R. 1587-90.) 
7. The Agreement was drafted by Plaintiffs' counsel, Darwin Fisher, and does 
not contain an integration clause. (R. 382; 37-38.) 
8. Prior to entering into the Agreement, Plaintiffs made statements to Dr. 
Davidhizar concerning the status of the OMC contracts (which were OMC's primary 
source of income) and the amount of income being generated by these contracts. 
Specifically, Plaintiffs and their representatives indicated that each of the three Medical 
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Tables was the subject of contracts with medical professionals (Dr. Cutler, Dr. Jeppsen, 
and Dr. Ott); all of these contracts were in good condition and standing; nothing had 
changed with the contracts; and all of the contracts were still functioning. (R. 367-70; 
653; 1184.) 
9. Additionally, Plaintiffs admit that prior to signing the Agreement, they 
represented to Dr. Davidhizar that the OMC contracts were "generating between $5,000 
and $7,000" of income each month. (R. 1202: 33-36; 1246-47; 1203: 124.) 
10. In making his decision to invest in OMC and the Medical Tables and in 
deciding to enter into the Agreement, Dr. Davidhizar relied on Lhese statements. (R. 654; 
1188.) 
11. The night before the morning meeting where the parties executed the 
Agreement, Plaintiffs gave Robert Nash some financial cloamicnls I hcsc documents 
were inadequate, "incomplete," and in "horrible form." They did not appear to include 
financial statements, balance sheets, or Profit and Loss. The documents were useless in 
helping to determine the true financial condition of OMC and the Medical Table 
contracts. Dr. Davidhizar testified that he "didn't see any documents before the 
meeting." (R. 1242: 110-12; 1210:28.) 
Dr. Davidhizar Learns Plaintiffs9 Representations Were Untrue and Rescinds the 
Agreement 
12. Immediately following the execution of the Agreement, as Dr. Davidhizar 
drove away, Fisher admitted that he was aware of a problem with the contract between 
OMC and Dr. Michael Cutler. At that time, Fisher told Coder that "Dr. Cutler's contract 
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. . . was going to be changed to a lease agreement - or that he is negotiating to make it a 
lease agreement." (R. 1224: 206.) 
13. The day after the parties signed the Agreement, Dr. Davidhizar learned that, 
contrary to the representations of Plaintiffs, Dr. Cutler planned to terminate his contract 
relating to one of the Medical Tables and that he had informed Fisher of this intention 
several weeks before. (R. 653; 1222: 38; 1211: 53-54.) 
14. On February 24, 2002 (just six days after the Agreement was signed), Dr. 
Cutler sent notice of his intent to terminate his Medical Table contract. (R. 1221: 34.) 
15. Additionally, contrary to Plaintiffs' representations at the time Dr. 
Davidhizar signed the Agreement, there were issues with the Medical Table placed with 
Dr. Jeppsen, another doctor under contract with OMC. Specifically, because of a dispute 
between Plaintiffs and their technician assigned to operate the table, that table had been 
unmanned and had generated no revenue and no new billings for approximately four to 
six weeks immediately prior to the February 18 meeting. (R. 1238-39: 207; 1234-35:79-
81.) 
16. Also, because of problems with a billing company, Plaintiffs apparently 
were not receiving payments for services actually performed using the table placed with 
Dr. Jeppsen. (R. 1204: 29; 1238: 207-08; 1239: 209.) 
17. Additionally, contrary to the representations, Plaintiffs had only received a 
total of $12,742.99 in revenue from all three tables for the approximately five months 
prior to the signing of the Agreement. In other words, the Medical Tables had only 
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generated a gross average of $2,548.60 per month, far less than the $5,000 to $7,000 of 
income represented by Plaintiffs. (R: 1249; 1186-87; 324; 530; 1862: 8.)1 
18. Ultimately, Fisher conceded that prior to the February 18 meeting, he 
"knew that we were paying out more than we were generating" from the OMC contracts. 
(R. 1205: 134-36.) 
19. Had Dr. Davidhizar known that Plaintiffs' representations concerning the 
status of the OMC contracts and the amount of income generated by the Medical Tables 
were false, he would not have entered into the Agreement. (R. 654; 1188.) 
20. Upon learning of Plaintiffs' misrepresentations, Dr. Davidhizar rescinded 
the Agreement. Dr. Davidhizar's rescission occurred on February 27, 2002, only nine 
days after signing the Agreement. (R. 1216: 91.) 
21. After Dr. Davidhizar rescinded the Agreement, Plaintiffs continued to 
operate OMC and collect income from the Medical Tables. For the entire period from 
rescission through trial, the Medical Tables only generated a total of approximately 
The actual revenue amounts set forth here were first presented in Dr. Davidhizar's 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Motion in Limine re: Fraud and 
Negligent Misrepresentation (the "Opposition"). (R. 1186.) In their Reply, Plaintiffs 
never disputed these figures. (R. 1252.) The revenue amounts were calculated by 
reviewing the amounts listed in OMC, LLC's Profit & Loss Detail (provided by Plaintiffs 
during discovery) and adding the amounts listed under "IDD Management Fees" by 
doctor's name (Cutler, Ott, and Jeppsen). The totals by doctor were then totaled to come 
up with the final figure of $12,742.99. The numbers set forth in the Opposition contain a 
slight miscalculation in favor of Plaintiffs because one negative entry of $168 was treated 
as a positive entry during the initial calculation, inflating the total by that amount. The 
discrepancy is small and in favor of Plaintiffs. Accordingly, for purposes of this appeal, 
Dr. Davidhizar has used the figures originally set forth in the Opposition as those were 
the figures before the trial court at the time it dismissed his claims. 
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$31,221 in gross revenue, a small fraction of what should have been received had 
Plaintiffs' representations been true. (R. 1862: 48.) 
22. After rescinding the Agreement, Dr. Davidhizar further learned that Fisher 
had a pattern of entering into business deals on the basis of material misrepresentations, 
including: (i) fraudulently altering a bank statement he provided to a business partner (R. 
1863: 86-87); (ii) brokering first priority loans on already-encumbered property owned 
by him but conveyed to family members for the purpose of obtaining new loans (1863: 
67-72); and (iii) pledging property he did not own by executing a trust deed in favor of a 
lender to obtain a loan for $500,000 (R. 1863: 85). 
Plaintiffs Sue Dr. Davidhizar and Others 
23. On May 13, 2002, Plaintiffs filed suit against Dr. Davidhizar, Robert Nash, 
and Dennis McOmber. (R. 1; 20.) 
24. In their amended complaint, Plaintiffs appeared to assert the following 
causes of action: (1) Breach of Contract (against Dr. Davidhizar); (2) Conversion of 
Property (against all Defendants); (3) Slander (against Nash); (4) Declaratory Judgment 
appointing Fisher as manager of OMC; (5) Interference with Economic Relations (against 
McOmber); and (6) Civil Conspiracy. (R. 20-36.) 
25. The Agreement states that "[i]f any party brings any legal action to enforce 
the terms of this agreement, the prevailing party shall be paid reasonable attorney [] fees 
and costs." (R. 38.) 
26. On July 2, 2002, Dr. Davidhizar filed his Answer and Counterclaim 
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asserting, among other things, the following claims: (1) Fraud; (2) Negligent 
Misrepresentation; (3) Accounting; and (4) Declaratory Judgment seeking to set aside the 
Agreement based on fraud. In addition, the Answer and Counterclaim asserted the 
affirmative defense of fraud in the inducement based on the representations of Plaintiffs 
upon which Dr. Davidhizar relied when he executed the Agreement. (R. 63.) 
27. Following the filing of these pleadings, the parties engaged in lengthy 
discovery involving all four individual parties to the lawsuit and specifically including 
depositions of the following individuals: (1) Dr. Davidhizar; (2) Fisher; (3) Dr. Michael 
Cutler; (4) Eugene Coder; (5) Dennis McOmber; and (6) Robert Nash. (R. 220; 223; 
226; 236; 238; 241.) 
28. During the course of the litigation, Dr. Davidhizar took possession of one 
of the Medical Tables in partial satisfaction for the $100,000 purchase money financing 
he initially provided. The other two tables have at all times remained in the possession of 
Plaintiffs. (R. 1863:9-10.) 
Plaintiffs Move for Summary Judgment on Dr. Davidhizar's Fraud-Related Claims 
and Defenses 
29. On April 19, 2005, after discovery was complete, and almost three years 
after filing their amended complaint, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment 
seeking to dismiss Dr. Davidhizar's counterclaim for fraud and his affirmative defense of 
fraud in the inducement. (R. 250.) 
30. In the memorandum in support of their motion for summary judgment, 
Plaintiffs stated the following: 
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[Dr.] Davidhizar alleges that Fisher fraudulently induced him 
to sign the Agreement by stating that OMC's client contracts 
had a value of $60-80,000.00. In addition, [Dr.] Davidhizar 
claims that Fisher knew prior to February 18, 2002, that Dr. 
Cutler had terminated his client contract with OMC and still 
included Dr. Cutler's client contract in the $60,000.00 -
80,000.00 valuation. 
(R. 320; 322-24.) 
31. Due to a change of counsel, the opposition memorandum was filed late, 
and Plaintiffs moved to strike the memorandum on that basis. The denial of Plaintiffs' 
motion to strike the opposition is one of two grounds upon which Plaintiffs now base 
their cross appeal. (R. 677; Plaintiffs' Docketing Statement, filed Sept. 23, 2009.) 
32. In opposition to Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion, Dr. Davidhizar 
presented evidence that prior to entering into the Agreement, Plaintiffs had 
misrepresented the income the Medical Tables were producing, and had affirmatively 
represented that the OMC contracts were "in good standing," "in good condition," and 
were "still functioning," when, in fact, one of the doctors had informed Fisher prior to the 
February 18 meeting that he was unhappy with his contract and intended to change or 
cancel it. (R. 615-16; 623-24.) 
33. Dr. Davidhizar presented additional evidence that he would not have 
entered into the Agreement had he known the truth concerning these facts. (R. 624.) 
34. On January 31, 2006, the trial court ruled from the bench that Plaintiffs 
were not entitled to summary judgment on Dr. Davidhizar's counterclaim for fraud and 
his affirmative defense for fraud in the inducement. The trial court entered an order to 
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that effect on February 13, 2006. (R. 890; 905.) 
Plaintiffs Move to Dismiss the Fraud Claims at the Pretrial Hearing 
35. For the next two years following the trial court's denial of summary 
judgment, the parties engaged in no additional fact discovery. (R. 1858: 15-16.) 
36. On August 23, 2007, four days before the weeklong jury trial in the case 
was to begin, the trial court held a pre-trial hearing (the "August 23 Hearing") to 
determine "what final polishing . . . the [cjourt [could] help with" prior to trial. (R. 1858: 
3.) 
37. At this hearing, Plaintiffs informed the trial court that they were 
voluntarily dismissing all claims against then-defendants McOmber and Nash and that 
they were dismissing all claims against Dr. Davidhizar except for breach of contract. (R. 
1858: 3-4.) 
38. Additionally, at the beginning of the August 23 Hearing, Plaintiffs' 
counsel hand-delivered to the trial court and served on Dr. Davidhizar's counsel for the 
first time "Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine Re: Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation" (the 
"Motion in Limine"). (R. 1133.) 
39. In the Motion in Limine, Plaintiffs sought to exclude any evidence 
concerning Dr. Davidhizar's counterclaims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation and 
his affirmative defense of fraudulent inducement. (R. 1135.) 
40. Dr. Davidhizar's counsel did not receive and did not know of the Motion 
in Limine until just before the pretrial hearing was to begin. (R. 1858: 13.) 
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41. At the pretrial hearing, in support of the Motion in Limine, Plaintiffs 
argued that because Dr. Davidhizar did not plead his fraud allegations with the requisite 
specificity required under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), the claims should be 
dismissed. (R. 1858: 5, 8-9; 1137.) 
42. Plaintiffs also argued that, as an alternative basis under Rule 9(b), the trial 
court should enter dismissal sanctions against Dr. Davidhizar under Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 37 on grounds that he violated the court's approved scheduling order by not 
filing an amended pleading by the established deadline. (R. 1858: 8-9; 1139.) 
43. The trial court's Fourth Amended Scheduling Order provided that all 
pleadings should be completed by September 15, 2004, and all dispositive motions filed 
by December 3, 2004. [R. 205.] 
44. During the hearing, however, Plaintiffs and the trial court focused on 
whether the evidence of fraud was sufficient to survive a summary judgment analysis. 
(R. 1858: 16-35.) 
45. Plaintiffs asserted that 
[w]ithout an amended pleading and that particularity, at this 
point, a week away from a jury trial, we are moving the Court 
to strike the affirmative defense and the counterclaim and 
essentially renewing a Motion for Summary Judgment on that 
basis that there is no defense to the earlier breach of contract 
findings that the Court has already entered.. . . 
[T]he Court has the discretion and authority through Rule 16 
at this point particularly in the fact of a jury trial and tying up 
jurors for a week of looking at this again under Rule 56. . . . 
[I]f Rule 56 is going to mean anything to us at the end of 
discovery on the eve of trial, we have to have more than just 
14 
an issue of fact. We have to have some evidence. 
(R. 1858:9,24.) 
46. In evaluating Plaintiffs' motion, the trial court directed the parties to 
proffer the evidence they would present to the jury concerning fraud. (R. 1858: 1620-
21.) 
47. Specifically, the trial court stated: 
Okay. Now, the question is, what facts are going to be shown 
to the jury next week that will show clear and convincing 
evidence to that jury that these contracts were no where near 
the value of 5 to 7,000? 
But as this case comes up to trial, I just don't think we've got 
anything here of clear and convincing evidence to give to a 
jury; and yes, I realize that this is mostly a rehash of the 
motion for summary judgment but I feel a lot more 
comfortable in where we stand today. 
(R. 1858: 16,36.) 
48. In response to Plaintiffs' arguments in support of summary judgment and 
to the court's request that Dr. Davidhizar proffer evidence of fraud, his counsel 
attempted, without prior notice, to proffer the evidence that would demonstrate a 
•genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. (R. 1858: 30-35.) 
49. Following oral argument on Plaintiffs' motion, the trial court, ruling from 
the bench, granted the Motion in Limine. (R. 1858: 35.) 
50. The trial court issued this ruling without giving counsel an opportunity to 
thoroughly review the Motion in Limine or to formulate a written opposition and 
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without requiring Plaintiffs to meet the formal requirements set forth in Rule 56(c) 
regarding motions for summary judgment. (R. 1858: 35.) 
51. In granting the Motion in Limine, the trial court thereby effectively 
disposed of Dr. Davidhizar's claims and defenses relating to Defendants' alleged fraud 
as a matter of law. (R. 1860: 5.) 
Dr. Davidhizar Moves to Amend, Continue Trial, and Set Aside the Court's 
Dismissal Order 
52. On August 24, 2007, the day following the August 23 Hearing, Dr. 
Davidhizar filed a motion to amend, a motion to continue trial, and a motion to set aside 
the trial court's August 23 order. (R. 1147; 1174.) 
53. That same day, the trial court held a hearing on Dr. Davidhizar's motions, 
during which it granted his motion to continue the trial and gave Dr. Davidhizar an 
opportunity to respond in writing to Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine. (R. 1860: 5.) 
54. In granting Dr. Davidhizar's motion to continue the trial, the trial court 
stated on the record: 
I still think my basic decision granting the Motion in Limine 
is correct. I don't think you have a cause of action left. So 
the result is a Motion for Summary Judgment. . . . I saw no 
instance where the state of the record as I see it in this lawsuit 
should go in front of a jury on issues of fraud and inducement 
or fraud of any kind. The standard of proof simply is beyond 
what is in the record in this case. . . . I'll let you respond to 
the motion. I don't think I'm going that direction unless you 
can show me something that is absolutely clear as a bell that I 
was wrong. 
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(R.1860:5-6.) 
55. Following this hearing, the parties briefed the Motion in Limine that had 
previously been decided by the trial court. The parties also briefed Dr. Davidhizar's 
Motion to Amend his Answer and Counterclaim to conform to the evidence and to plead 
fraud with particularity. (R. 1183; 1252; 1264; 1271.) 
56. Because the trial court had previously treated the Motion in Limine 
essentially as a motion for summary judgment, Dr. Davidhizar framed his opposition to 
the Motion in Limine as an opposition to a motion for summary judgment and proffered 
evidence with citation to deposition and affidavit testimony demonstrating that there were 
genuine issues of material fact precluding judgment as a matter of law. (R. 1183-88; 
1190-94.) 
The Trial Court Upholds Its Prior Ruling Dismissing the Claims and Defenses 
57. On December 18, 2007, the trial court heard oral argument regarding the 
Motion in Limine and Dr. Davidhizar's Motion to Amend (the "December 18 Hearing"). 
During the December 18 Hearing, the trial court emphasized that its prior ruling was not 
based on Rule 9(b)5s requirement to plead fraud with particularity, but was based on the 
court's view that the evidence was not sufficient to avoid summary judgment: 
Because I really don't have any difficulty in implying into the 
pleadings of fraud in the inducement plan [sic]. It's been 
spoken of for years in this litigation. It has been eluded [sic] 
to either directly or indirectly for years. . . . But even if it was, 
there simply isn't the proof to carry by clear and convincing 
evidence. 
(R. 1861:7.) 
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58. During the December 18 Hearing, the trial court further stated: 
Well, in candor, counsel, one of the things that happened is I 
think the court's focused more specifically on what is needed 
in this case for it to go to trial. And when I focused on the 
fact lhat, yes, we have disputed facts, but those disputed facts 
will not meet the necessary level of proof to make it to clear 
and convincing in order to prevail and I can rule on that as a 
matter of law based upon the record that we have. And so it 
kind of throws us back to summary judgment that I wasn't 
specifically focused enough two years ago, and I think you 
can rightly tell your clients it's the fault of the Court. Maybe 
I should have done this two years ago looking at that evidence 
and then suddenly it was focused for me at the last time when 
[Plaintiffs] filed [their] motion in limine. 
(R. 1861:8-9.) 
59. At the conclusion of the December 18 Hearing, the trial court ruled from 
the bench that the order it had issued during the August 23 Hearing would stand: Dr. 
Davidhizar's claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation and his affirmative defense 
of fraud in the inducement would not be reinstated. (R. 1861: 30.) 
60. On April 17, 2008, the trial court entered its Order Striking Defendant's 
Counterclaim. The content of this Order was later incorporated into the trial court's final 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R. 1293; 1631-34.) 
The Trial Court Awards $819,811.47 in Damages Against Dr. Davidhizar 
61. On December 15, 2008, and on May 11, 2009, with Dr. Davidhizar's 
claims and defenses related to fraud and negligent misrepresentation dismissed, the trial 
court held a trial solely on Plaintiffs' damages resulting from Dr. Davidhizar's purported 
breach of the Agreement. (R. 1862; 1863.) 
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62. Under the Agreement, the OMC debts Dr. Davidhizar was to assume 
totaled $180,000.00. These debts consisted of the following loans: (a) Anderson: 
$35,000; (b) GMAC: $60,000; (c) Far West Bank Line of Credit: $40,000; (d) North 
American Medical Corp.: $45,000 (collectively, the "Assumed Loans55). (R. 1595.) 
63. At trial, Plaintiffs argued they were entitled to the following damages: (a) 
$154,411.95 for the Anderson Loan; (b) $160,968.54 for the GMAC Loan; (c) 
$115,281.93 for the Far West Loan; (d) $28,590.03 for lease payments to Eaglecrest; (e) 
$84,711.07 for the North American Medical Loan; (f) $268,891.94 for attorney fees; and 
(g) $14,346.51 for additional OMC operating expenses. (R. Plaintiffs5 Trial Exhibit No. 
41:001.) 
64. Since the execution of the Agreement, Plaintiffs had just made interest-
only payments on the Assumed Loans or refinanced the principal amounts through other 
loans on which Plaintiffs made interest only payments. (R. 1606-09; 1620-22.) 
65. The trial court's findings reflect that the principal balance on the Assumed 
Loans at the time of trial was still $180,000. (R. 1595; 1598.) 
66. At the conclusion of the damages trial, the trial court entered judgment 
against Dr. Davidhizar in the total amount of $819,811.47. (R. 1634.) 
67. That judgment consisted of the following elements: (a) $154,411.95 
related to the Anderson loan (originally $35,000), which included interest payments made 
and fees paid, prejudgment interest on such payments, principal payments not made and 
prejudgment interest on such amounts; (b) $160,968.54 related to the GMAC loan 
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(originally $60,000), which included interest payments made and fees paid, prejudgment 
interest on such payments, principal payments not made and prejudgment interest on such 
amounts; (c) $115,281.93 related to the Far West Bank loan (originally $40,000), which 
included interest payments made, prejudgment interest on such payments, principal 
payments not made and prejudgment interest on such amounts; (d) $28,590.03 for 
payments to Eagle Crest pursuant to a lease by OMC, which included prejudgment 
interest on such payments; (e) $84,711.07 related to the North American Medical loan 
(originally $45,000), which included interest payments made, prejudgment interest on 
such payments, principal payments not made and prejudgment interest on such amounts; 
(f) $261,501.44 for attorney fees related to legal services provided by Darwin Fisher, 
other family members of David Fisher, and William Ronnow, including prejudgment 
interest on these fees; and (g) $14,346.51 for additional OMC operating expenses. (R. 
1634.) 
68. Despite the fact that judgment was entered against only one defendant on a 
single claim for relief, no effort was made by Plaintiffs or the trial court to allocate 
attorney fees incurred among the three different defendants or among the six or more 
claims that had all been part of the lawsuit for seven years. (R. 1625; 1630-31; 1634; 
1304; 1308; 1312; 1422; 1426; Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit No. 41:001, 098-100.) 
69. In addition to awarding all interest payments and fees related to the 
Assumed Loans, including prejudgment interest on such amounts, the trial court awarded 
Plaintiffs prejudgment interest on all principal amounts, despite the fact that the principal 
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amounts of the Assumed Loans were still outstanding. (R. 1606-23; 1634.) 
70. The trial court granted Plaintiffs $25,257.53 in prejudgment interest on 
the principal amount of the Anderson loan. (R. 1609-10; 1634.) 
71. The trial court granted Plaintiffs $43,298.63 in prejudgment interest on 
the principal amount of the GMAC loan. (R. 1614; 1634.) 
72. The trial court granted Plaintiffs $28,865.75 in prejudgment interest on 
the principal amount of the Far West loan. (R. 1618; 1634.) 
73. The trial court granted Plaintiffs $32,473.96 in prejudgment interest on 
the principal amount of the North American Medical loan. (R. 1622; 1634.) 
74. The trial court's findings state that "[Dr.] Davidhizar is not entitled to 
an offset for the tables." (R. 1634.) 
75. Neither in the judgment itself nor in the damages ruling does the trial court 
address the ownership status of, or the present or future entitlement to, the Medical 
Tables. (R. 1628-34.) 
76. Under the trial court's ruling and entry of judgment, Plaintiffs presumably 
have the benefit (both past and future) of possessing and earning income off two of the 
three tables; Dr. Davidhizar took possession of the third table. (R. 1628-34.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred when it summarily dismissed Dr. Davidhizar's claims and 
defenses without allowing him an opportunity to present such claims to a jury. In so 
doing, the trial court relied on three alternative bases for dismissal, all of which were 
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patently erroneous. 
First, as the trial court explained during several relevant hearings, the principal 
basis for its dismissal ruling was its conclusion that Dr. Davidhizar's claims and defenses 
would not survive summary judgment. But, as discussed below, ample evidence was 
presented to the trial court that, if accepted as true (as the trial court was required to do), 
was more than sufficient to support all the required elements of fraud clearly and 
convincingly. 
Second, as an alternative basis to summary judgment, the trial court relied upon 
Rule 9(b)'s requirement that fraud must be pled with particularity. This reliance was 
erroneous because, at the time of the trial court's dismissal, Plaintiffs were fully aware of 
Dr. Davidhizar's specific allegations of fraud, and such allegations had been thoroughly 
vetted two years earlier when Plaintiffs filed their summary judgment motion. 
Third, as an additional alternative basis to summary judgment, the trial court 
deemed Dr. Davidhizar's failure to seek leave to amend his Answer and Counterclaim 
prior to the deadline for such amendments to be a violation of the trial court's scheduling 
order and therefore subject to Rule 37 dismissal sanctions. This was a clear abuse of 
discretion. Moreover, not only was the court's dismissal of Dr. Davidhizar's claims 
under Rules 9(b) and 37 improper, but the trial court's refusal to allow Dr. Davidhizar to 
amend his Answer and Counterclaim was a clear abuse of discretion and contrary to well-
established law. 
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Compounding its substantial error in dismissing Dr. Davidhizar's claims and 
defenses, the trial court also erred in adopting wholesale Plaintiffs' erroneous methods of 
calculating damages that unfairly inflated the judgment in a manner plainly inconsistent 
with the law. Throughout the proceedings and up until four days before the original trial 
was set to begin, the case proceeded against three defendants (Dr. Davidhizar, McOmber 
and Nash) and on the basis of at least six claims for relief. Only at the last minute were 
the other defendants and claims dismissed, leaving only the breach of contract claim 
against Dr. Davidhizar to be resolved. Yet, not only did the trial court enter judgment for 
the entire amount of attorney fees purportedly incurred by Plaintiffs, without any attempt 
to allocate such fees according to the various claims and defendants as required by law, it 
also granted Plaintiffs almost $50,000 in prejudgment interest on attorney fees. 
Additionally, the trial court not only included in the judgment all interest payments made 
and fees incurred on hard money loans obtained by Plaintiffs to service the OMC debt, 
but also granted almost $130,000 in prejudgment interest on the debts Plaintiffs had not 
paid and for which they had not lost the time value of money. Thus, the damages award 
provides for a double-counting of interest on that portion of the judgment. Moreover, the 
trial court completely disregarded undisputed evidence concerning income received by 
Plaintiffs from the Medical Tables during the relevant time period and gave no credit or 
offset for this income. This error was further compounded by charging Dr. Davidhizar 
with all expenses incurred by OMC during the same time period. Finally, the trial court 
entered no findings of fact or conclusions of law concerning the disposition of the 
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Medical Tables that are currently in Plaintiffs' possession, but that should belong to Dr. 
Davidhizar pursuant to the trial court's ruling that the Agreement is enforceable. 
In other words, the $819,811.47 judgment entered by the trial court not only gave 
Plaintiffs the windfall of receiving, without allocation, all the attorney fees incurred in the 
entire litigation, prejudgment interest on attorney fees, prejudgment interest on amounts 
that Plaintiffs never paid, and all income Plaintiffs received while charging Dr. 
Davidhizar with all expenses incurred in the generation of that income, it also gave 
Plaintiffs the windfall of retaining two of the three Medical Tables, potentially valued at 
over $100,000, while still receiving the complete benefit of the Agreement pursuant to 
which Plaintiffs were supposed to transfer the Medical Tables to Dr. Davidhizar. 
In short, and as evidenced herein, the trial court committed significant errors 
below. If not corrected, these errors will result in extreme injustice to Dr. Davidhizar. 
Therefore, the judgment below should be reversed in every respect. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Erred When It Dismissed Dr. Davidhizar's Claims and 
Defenses Related to Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation. 
On February 27, 2002, only nine days after the parties executed the Agreement, 
Dr. Davidhizar informed Plaintiffs that he was rescinding the Agreement due to 
Plaintiffs' misrepresentations about the facts concerning OMC's income and contracts. 
Dr. Davidhizar has never disputed that he did not (justifiably, in his view) fulfill the 
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terms of the Agreement. Therefore, when the trial court summarily dismissed Dr. 
Davidhizar's fraud claims and defenses on the eve of trial, the court not only took all 
recourse away from Dr. Davidhizar for the financial injury he had suffered as a result of 
Plaintiffs' misrepresentations, but it entirely eliminated his defense to Plaintiffs' breach 
of contract claim. 
As discussed more fully below, the primary basis for the order dismissing Dr. 
Davidhizar's claims and defenses was the trial court's view (articulated clearly on the 
record) that Dr. Davidhizar could not present sufficient evidence at trial to satisfy the 
clear and convincing standard of proof required for him to prevail on his fraud claims. 
Yet, when the trial court entered its final Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it 
adopted two additional bases for its decision to dismiss Dr. Davidhizar's claims and 
defenses prior to trial: (1) failure to state with particularity in the Answer and 
Counterclaim the specific circumstances supporting the elements of fraud as required 
under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b); and (2) dismissal sanctions under Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 37 for failing to amend the Answer and Counterclaim prior to the 
deadlines set forth in the court's scheduling order. (R. 1631-34.) 
Consistent with this fact, the trial court granted partial summary judgment "without 
prejudice" on February 13, 2006, conclusively determining that Dr. Davidhizar had not 
fulfilled the terms of the Agreement. (R. 907.) This ruling had no practical effect at the 
time because Dr. Davidhizar's fraud claims and defenses remained to be adjudicated. In 
fact, as discussed above, on the same day, the trial court entered an order denying 
Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on Dr. Davidhizar's fraud claims and defenses. 
(R. 905.) 
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As demonstrated below, regardless of which of the three asserted bases are 
considered, the dismissal was patently erroneous. Therefore, this Court should reverse 
the trial court's ruling dismissing Dr. Davidhizar's claims and defenses, set aside the 
judgment entered against Dr. Davidhizar, and remand the case for trial on those issues. 
A. The Trial Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment. 
1. The Underlying Basis for Dismissal of the Fraud Claims and Defenses 
Was the Trial Court's Summary Judgment Analysis. 
Even a cursory review of the trial court proceedings reveals that, although the 
motion that prompted the trial court's ruling was characterized as a motion in limine 
based on Rule 9(b), the real basis for the court's ruling was its summary judgment 
analysis. In its Order Striking Defendant's Counterclaim (prepared by Plaintiffs' counsel 
and ultimately signed by the trial court without modification), the trial court 
acknowledged Plaintiffs' original purported basis for their Motion in Limine - namely, 
Dr. Davidhizar's alleged failure to plead his fraud claims with particularity. (R. 1293, 
1299-1301.) But the proceedings reveal that when the trial court addressed the Plaintiffs' 
newly-filed Motion in Limine for the first time on August 23, 2007, the court explained 
the basis for its ruling in the following terms: "[A]s this case comes up to trial, I just 
don't think we've got anything here of clear and convincing evidence to give to a jury; 
and yes, I realize that this is mostly a rehash of the motion for summary judgment but I 
feel a lot more comfortable in where we stand today." (Statement of Facts 147.) 
Similarly, during the December 18 Hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine, the 
trial court was not persuaded that Dr. Davidhizar's claims and defenses should be 
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rejected on the basis of Rule 9(b). In fact, the court noted that it did not "have any 
difficulty in implying into the pleadings" the allegations related to fraud in the 
inducement, since it had "been spoken of for years in this litigation . . . [and had] been 
eluded [sic] to either directly or indirectly for years." (Statement of Facts ^ 57.) Instead, 
the trial court's dismissal of Dr. Davidhizar's fraud claims and defenses was based on the 
court's view that "there simply [was]n't the proof to carry by clear and convincing 
evidence." (Statement of Facts f^ 57.) 
In short, it was the trial court's erroneous conclusion that Dr. Davidhizar could not 
ultimately meet the clear and convincing standard of proof that prompted the court to 
dismiss Dr. Davidhizar's claims and defenses. As demonstrated below, this ruling was 
erroneous. 
2. Genuine Issues of Material Fact Precluded Summary Judgment on Dr. 
Davidhizar's Fraud Claims and Defenses. 
Summary Judgment is only proper when "there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 56(c). This Court "review[s] the trial court's order granting . . . summary 
judgment for correctness and accord[s] no deference to the trial court's legal 
conclusions." Prince v. Bear River Mutual Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, f 14, 56 P.3d 534. "In 
making this determination, [this Court] view[s] the facts and all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Id. In other words, 
"[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be 
drawn in his favor." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., Ml U.S. 242, 255 (1986). "Courts 
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cannot weigh disputed material facts in ruling on a summary judgment motion." Hardy 
v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 763 P.2d 761, 765 (Utah 1988). 
Although a court may consider the eventual standard of proof when evaluating 
summary judgment, this consideration must be made while accepting all evidence 
submitted by the non-moving party as true and drawing all legitimate inferences in its 
favor. See Republic Group, Inc. v. Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d 285, 292 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., Ml U.S. 242, 255 (1986) ("Credibility 
determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences 
from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge . . . . The evidence of the nonmovant 
is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor"' (emphasis 
added)). 
Here, it is apparent that the trial court did not accept Dr. Davidhizar's evidence as 
true and did not draw all reasonable inferences in Dr. Davidhizar's favor. Instead, the 
trial court employed the clear and convincing evidentiary standard as a justification to 
weigh the proffered evidence, make its own credibility determinations, and draw its own 
inferences in order to determine whether, in its view, a jury should return a verdict in 
favor of Dr. Davidhizar. Indeed, during the hearing in which the trial court initially 
announced it would dismiss Dr. Davidhizar's fraud claims and defenses, the argument 
that the trial court solicited from the parties focused, in significant part, on what evidence 
Plaintiffs would present to counter the evidence proffered by Dr. Davidhizar. (R. 1858: 
20-29.) 
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As demonstrated below, Dr. Davidhizar presented a substantial body of evidence 
supporting the elements of fraud. The evidence is indeed clear and convincing; at a 
minimum it creates genuine issues of material fact that should have been presented to a 
jury. 
Under Utah law, the requisite elements of fraud are the following: 
(1) a representation; (2) concerning a presently existing fact; 
(3) which was false; (4) which the representor either (a) knew 
to be false, or (b) made recklessly, knowing that he had 
insufficient knowledge upon which to base such 
representation; (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party 
to act upon it; (6) that the other party, acting reasonably and 
in ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) and 
was thereby induced to act; (9) to his injury and damage. 
Republic Group, Inc. v. Won~Door Corp., 883 P.2d 285, 292 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). In 
the instant case, Dr. Davidhizar presented ample evidence which, if accepted as true, 
would clearly and convincingly support a finding that all the required elements necessary 
to prove fraud have been met. 
First, the evidence shows that Plaintiffs made false representations about presently 
existing facts which they knew to be false and which they made in order to induce Dr. 
Davidhizar to enter into the Agreement. When the parties met on February 18, 2002, to 
discuss a potential agreement, Plaintiffs represented that each of the three Medical Tables 
was under contract with medical professionals (Dr. Cutler, Dr. Jeppsen and Dr. Ott) and 
that such contracts were in good condition and good standing. (Statement of Facts \ 8.) 
Plaintiffs also represented that the OMC contracts were "generating between $5,000 and 
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$7,000" of income each month—a representation that had been previously made by 
Plaintiffs' attorney. (Statement of Facts ^ 9.) 
At the time Plaintiffs made these representations, they knew that the 
representations were false. Dr. Cutler had already informed Fisher that he was unhappy 
with the contract and wanted to change or cancel it. (Statement of Facts ffif 12-13.) Dr. 
Davidhizar learned this directly from Dr. Cutler the day after he executed the Agreement. 
(Statement of Facts f 13.) Moreover, Fisher told another member of OMC, Gene Coder, 
as Dr. Davidhizar was driving away from the February 18 meeting, that Dr. Cutler was 
negotiating to change the contract. (Statement of Facts Tf 12.) Further evidence of the 
falsity of Plaintiffs' statements about the condition of the contracts may be properly 
inferred from the fact that Dr. Cutler actually sent a notice of his intent to terminate the 
contract a mere six days after the Agreement was executed. (Statement of Facts ^ 14.) 
OMC's contract with Dr. Cutler was not the only contract experiencing problems 
at the time Plaintiffs misrepresented the status of the contracts. The Medical Table 
placed with Dr. Jeppsen had been having significant problems for a number of weeks due 
to disputes with the Plaintiffs' technician and with the billing company. As a result of 
these problems, Dr. Jeppsen's table had generated no revenue and no new billings for the 
prior four to six weeks before the Agreement was executed. (Statement of Facts fflf 15-
16.) This evidence, if accepted as true, is sufficient by itself to create a genuine issue of 
material fact concerning Plaintiffs' false representations. 
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Dr. Davidhizar also presented evidence that Plaintiffs' representation at the time of 
the Agreement about the purported $5,000 to $7,000 of monthly income being generated 
by the OMC contracts was false. In fact, the Medical Tables had only generated a gross 
average of $2,548.60 per month and were not producing any profit. (Statement of Facts ^ | 
17.) Significantly, Fisher conceded during his own deposition testimony that at the time 
of the February 18 meeting, he knew OMC was paying out more than it was generating. 
(Statement of Facts 118.) 
Dr. Davidhizar also proffered evidence of other frauds perpetrated by Fisher that 
demonstrated intent and a pattern of misrepresentations in business deals, including: (i) 
fraudulently altering a bank statement he provided to a business partner; (ii) brokering 
first priority loans on already-encumbered property owned by him but conveyed to family 
members for the purpose of obtaining new loans; and (iii) pledging property he did not 
own by executing a trust deed in favor of a lender to obtain a loan for $500,000. 
(Statement of Facts f 22.) In short, the evidence presented by Dr. Davidhizar was more 
than sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact concerning the first five elements 
of fraud. 
The evidence proffered by Dr. Davidhizar, with all reasonable inferences drawn in 
his favor, was also sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact concerning the 
remaining elements of fraud; namely, that he was ignorant of the falsity of Plaintiffs' 
representations and reasonably relied on such representations when he decided to execute 
the Agreement. Dr. Davidhizar testified that he did not know Plaintiffs' representations 
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were false and that he would not have entered into the Agreement if he had known of 
their falsity. (Statement of Facts fflf 19-20.) 
In their Reply Memorandum in support of their initial motion for summary 
judgment on Dr. Davidhizar5s fraud claims, Plaintiffs asserted that Dr. Davidhizar did not 
reasonably rely on their false statements because "he had received OMC's financial 
information which showed that the [Medical T]ables had lost $29,021.20," implying that 
Dr. Davidhizar should have analyzed the data in a mass of incomplete and facially 
indecipherable financial records that had been given to his accountant the night before, or 
performed independent research to discover that Plaintiffs' representations were false. 
(R. 808.) 
Aside from the fact that this statement essentially constitutes an admission that 
Plaintiffs' statements about OMC's income were misrepresentations, Dr. Davidhizar did 
not receive OMC's financial information prior to February 18, 2002. (Statement of Facts 
Tf 11.) Moreover, Dr. Davidhizar's accountant, who received some financial information 
the night before the February 18 meeting, testified that because the records he received 
from Plaintiffs were in such "horrible form" and because critical documents were 
missing, the financial condition of OMC and its contracts was not readily identifiable 
from the records. (Statement of Facts f 11.) 
Further, even if he financial records had plainly shown the truth about monthly 
revenues (which they did not), nothing in those records would have disclosed the truth 
about problems with the contracts, which had been falsely described as in good condition. 
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At the time of the Agreement, Dr. Davidhizar had no reason to question Plaintiffs' 
representations as to information with which they were intimately familiar, and Dr. 
Davidhizar had no reason to believe that Plaintiffs were deceiving him. "In general, a 
plaintiff may justifiably rely on positive assertions of fact without independent 
investigation." Robinson v. Tripco Investment, Inc., 2000 UT App 200, ^ 20, 21 P.3d 
219. "It is only where, under the circumstances, the facts should be apparent to one of his 
knowledge and intelligence from a cursory glance, or he has discovered something which 
should serve as a warning that he is being deceived, that he is required to make an 
investigation of his own." Conder v. A.L. Williams & Assocs., Inc., 739 P.2d 634, 639 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); see also Robinson, 2000 UT App 200 at \ 20. 
Accordingly, drawing all inferences in his favor, the evidence proffered by Dr. 
Davidhizar was sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact as to whether he reasonably 
relied upon Plaintiffs' misrepresentations when he executed the Agreement. See Conder, 
739 P.2d at 638 ("Reasonable reliance must be considered with reference to the facts of 
each case, and is usually a question for the jury to determine."). 
In sum, accepting the proffered evidence as true and drawing all reasonable 
inferences in favor of Dr. Davidhizar, both of which must be done for purposes of 
summary judgment, there can be no serious question that genuine issues of material fact 
exist concerning the elements of fraud, even under a heightened evidentiary standard. 
Indeed, the evidence proffered by Dr. Davidhizar is much more abundant and 
compelling than the evidence proffered in other cases where this Court reversed the trial 
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court's decision to dismiss fraud claims on summary judgment. See, e.g., Robinson, 2000 
UT App 200 at fflf 4-8, 15-23 (reversing summary judgment on fraud claim based on pre-
agreement representation regarding structure of unsound building even where agreement 
included an integration clause (unlike the agreement at issue in this appeal) and expressly 
provided that plaintiff was buying building "as is" and not based on any prior 
representation); Republic Group, Inc. v. Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d 285, 292-93 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994) (reversing summary judgment where the plaintiffs evidence, when 
accepted as true, was sufficient to create material issue of fact on fraud claim); Condas v. 
Adams, 388 P.2d 803, 804-05 (Utah 1964) (reversing trial court's sua sponte dismissal of 
fraud claim during pretrial conference where viewing the record in the light most 
favorable to defendants the evidence was sufficient that defendants should have been 
granted the opportunity to present their claim to the jury); Territorial Savings & Loan 
Ass'n v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452, 456 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (reversing summary 
judgment on fraud claim and holding that the trial court's statements regarding burden of 
persuasion, if relied upon to dismiss fraud claims, would have been erroneous because "it 
is well settled thai a party opposing a motion for summary judgment need not 'prove' its 
theory or theories, but rather it need only establish facts that 'create a genuine issue of 
material fact'" (citations omitted)); Conder, 739 P.2d at 638-40 (reversing trial court's 
dismissal of fraud in the inducement and finding trial court's conclusion that the 
plaintiffs claims failed as a matter of law could not be supported by the facts before the 
court in case where employee testified that current employer had misrepresented the 
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nature of its company inducing employee to quit his former employment); Reliable 
Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guaranty Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 398 P.2d 685, 688 (Utah 
1965) (reversing trial court's dismissal of fraud claim on summary judgment during 
pretrial conference where appellate court could not "conclude with such certainty as to 
justify ruling as a matter of law that there was no . . . fraud practiced upon the plaintiff in 
obtaining the release in question"). 
In the instant case, Dr. Davidhizar has presented more than sufficient evidence, if 
accepted as true, to allow his claims and defenses to be presented to a jury. Likewise, 
and for the same reasons, Dr. Davidhizar has presented more than sufficient evidence, if 
accepted as true, to allow his claim for negligent misrepresentation to be presented to a 
jury. This is particularly true given that negligent misrepresentation requires a showing 
of a lesser mental state than fraud ("carelessly and negligently55 versus "negligently and 
recklessly55). Under Utah law, "a claim for negligent misrepresentation requires a party 
to demonstrate that (1) a party carelessly or negligently makes a false representation 
'expecting the other party to rely and act thereon,' (2) the plaintiff actually relies on the 
statement, and (3) suffers a loss as a result of that reliance." Moore v. Smith, 2007 UT 
App 101,1| 36 n. 12, 158 P.3d 562 (quoting Smith v. Frandsen, 2004 UT 55, \ 9, 94 P.3d 
919). 
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B. The Trial Court Erroneously Relied on Rules 9(b) and 37(b) as Grounds to 
Dismiss Dr. Davidhizar's Claims and Defenses and Improperly Denied the 
Motion to Amend. 
The alternative bases for dismissal included in the trial court's order-Rules 9(b) 
and 37(b)--were likewise improper. Furthermore, the trial court abused its discretion in 
refusing Dr. Davidhizar's request to amend. 
First, the trial court erred in dismissing under Rule 9(b) where Plaintiffs waited 
until the eve of trial to assert that the fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims had 
not been pled with sufficient particularity. Dr. Davidhizar filed his Counterclaim for 
fraud and negligent representation in 2002. For five years thereafter, Plaintiffs raised no 
objections to the sufficiency of the Counterclaim or the affirmative defense. In fact, in 
2005, following extensive discovery, Plaintiffs actually moved for summary judgment on 
Dr. Davidhizar's fraud claim and affirmative defense. In this motion, Plaintiffs made no 
mention of Rule 9(b) pleading deficiencies and, in fact, addressed Dr. Davidhizar's 
specific allegations of fraud. It was not until the parties' pre-trial hearing in August 
2007, four days before trial, that Plaintiffs first asserted that Dr. Davidhizar's 
Counterclaim and affirmative defense were defective under Rule 9(b) and that the trial 
court should therefore preclude evidence at trial in support of these claims. 
"The purpose of Rule 9(b) is to assure that defendants are apprised of the 
allegations against them in sufficient detail to frame an adequate responsive pleading." 
Prakash v. Pulsent Corp. Employee Long Term Disability Plan, No. C-06-7592, 2008 
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WL 3905445, at * 2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2008)3; see also U.S. ex rel McCready v. 
Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 251 F.Supp.2d 114, 116 (D.D.C. 2003) ("The main 
purpose of Rule 9(b) is to ensure that defendants have adequate notice of the charges 
against them to prepare a defense.").4 Thus, "[w]here, as here, [Plaintiffs] ha[d] 
extensively litigated the Counterclaim [as demonstrated by their motion for summary 
judgment], any concern that [they] did not adequately understand the allegations against 
them is unwarranted." Prakash, 2008 WL 3905445 at * 2. 
Furthermore, courts have commonly rejected belated objections under Rule 9(b). 
See, e.g., United Nat'I Records, Inc. v. MCA, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 33, 38-39 (N.D. 111. 
1984) ("A party who fails to raise a [r]ule 9(b) objection normally waives the 
requirement.55); Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 181 F.Supp.2d 1256, 1263 (D. 
Kan. 2002) (rejecting belated objections under Rule 9(b)). A Rule 9(b) objection raised 
after filing for summary judgment is considered belated. See, e.g., Davsko v. Golden 
Harvest Prods., Inc., 965 F. Supp. 1467, 1474 (D. Kan. 1997) ("[A] rule 9(b) objection is 
waived unless made as a separate motion prior to or concurrent with the filing of a 
responsive pleading.55); Prakash, 2008 WL 3905445 at * 2 ("By waiting until after they 
filed both a Rule 12 motion and a summary judgment motion, [the p]laintiffs waived their 
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 30(f), a copy of Prakash v. Pulsent Corp. 
Employee Long Term Disability Plan, No. C-06-7592, 2008 WL 3905445 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 20, 2008), is included in the Addendum attached hereto. 
4
 "Rule[] 9 (b ) . . . of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure [is] substantially identical to 
rule[] 9(b). . . of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, federal case law, though 
not binding, may guide [the Court's] interpretation of the[] rule[].55 Armed Forces Ins. 
Exck v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, If 23 n.5, 70 P.3d 35. 
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objections under Rule 9(b)."); Broadleaf, Inc. v. Price, 445 So.2d 308, 310 (Ala. Ct. App. 
1984) ("By failing to raise th[e 9(b)] pleading defect until after his own summary 
judgment motion, [the defendant] has allowed [the plaintiff] the opportunity to 
supplement its fraud pleadings with affidavits and other evidentiary materials which cure 
the pleading defect by supplying evidence of several false representations."). 
In short, Plaintiffs should not have been allowed on the eve of trial to invoke Rule 
9(b) as a technical pretext to seek dismissal of Dr. Davidhizar's claims and defenses, and 
the trial court should have rejected Plaintiffs' dilatory request to dismiss Dr. Davidhizar's 
claims for reasons of defective pleading. 
Second, the trial court erroneously determined that, as an alternative to Rule 9(b), 
dismissal of Dr. Davidhizar's fraud and negligent representation claims was an 
appropriate sanction under Rules 16 and 37 because Dr. Davidhizar had failed to amend 
prior to the court's scheduling order deadline. To begin, simply because the scheduling 
order permitted the parties to amend pleadings up to a certain deadline, does not mean 
Dr. Davidhizar was required to amend his pleadings. Additionally, although Dr. 
Davidhizar sought leave to amend in response to Plaintiffs' Rule 9(b) objections, the trial 
court denied that request, as evidenced by this appeal, so Dr. Davidhizar never actually 
filed an amended pleading that could have been construed as violating the scheduling 
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order. See Utah R. Civ. P. 16(d) (allowing courts to award sanctions where a party "fails 
to obey" a scheduling order).5 
Finally, even if dismissal of Dr. Davidhizar's fraud and negligent representation 
claims could be justified under Rules 9(b) or 37(b), the court abused its discretion in 
denying Dr. Davidhizar's motion to amend. Under Utah law, "the trial court is obligated 
to freely allow motions to amend." Armed Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, f^ 
23, 70 P.3d 35. This is true even when the trial court has previously entered a pretrial 
scheduling order. See 62A Am. Jur. 2d Pretrial Conference § 66 ("The entry of a pretrial 
order does not prevent the trial court from permitting an amendment to the pleadings, and 
such an amendment cannot be affected by the order."). And it is especially true when the 
reason for amendment is to satisfy the Rule 9(b) particularity requirement. See Harrison, 
2003 UT 14 at If 23; Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda, 209 F.3d 130, 138 (2d Cir. 2000) 
("Leave to amend should be freely granted, especially when dismissal is based on Rule 
9(b)."), overruled on other grounds by Universal Reinsurance Co. v. St. Paul Fire & 
Marine Ins. Co., 312 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2002); Hart v. Bayer Corp., 199 F.3d 239, 248 
n.6 (5th Cir. 2000) ("Although a court may dismiss the claim [under Rule 9(b)], it should 
not do so without granting leave to amend, unless the defect is simply incurable or the 
plaintiff has failed to plead with particularity after being afforded repeated opportunities 
5
 It is the height of irony that the trial court dismissed Dr. Davidhizar's claims for 
violating the court's scheduling order when Plaintiffs filed their motion asking the court 
to dismiss Dr. Davidhizar's claims only four days before trial. This was a clear violation 
of the December 3, 2004 scheduling order deadline for filing dispositive motions. 
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to do so."); Anderson v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 221 F.R.D. 250, 253 (D.D.C. 2004) 
("Where a pleading does not satisfy the heightened requirements of Rule 9(b), the court 
should freely grant leave to amend."). 
Here, Dr. Davidhizar's request to amend was proper under Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 15(b): "When issues not raised by the pleading are tried by express or implied 
consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the 
pleadings." Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b). That rule "provides for amendment of 
the pleadings to conform to the evidence." Harrison, 2003 UT 14 at f 24. Here, the 
parties had been litigating the issue of Dr. Davidhizar's fraud and negligent 
representation claims throughout the entire case. 
Although Utah courts have not specifically addressed the issue, other jurisdictions 
have held that "[w]here the evidence presented at a summary judgment hearing would 
justify an amendment to the pleadings, [the court] will consider the pleadings amended to 
conform to the evidence raised at the hearing." Stephenson v. Warren, 525 S.E.2d 809, 
811 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000); see also In re Zweibon, 565 F.2d 742, 748 n.20 (D.C. Cir. 
1977) ("[I]t is now settled that the process of amendment may be initiated by presentation 
of an issue for the first time in a motion for summary judgment."); In re Bennett Funding 
Group, Inc., 220 B.R. 743, 752 (Bkrtcy. N.D. N.Y. 1997) ("Rule 15(b) also applies at the 
summary judgment stage of proceedings."). And Utah courts have stated that "[a]n 
amendment of the pleadings to conform to the evidence can be made by either party at 
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any time " Cowley v. Porter, 2005 UT App 518,1f 36, 127 P.3d 1224 (emphasis 
added). 
Furthermore, the rationale behind Rule 15(b)—of ensuring notice and an 
opportunity to address all issues— was fully satisfied in this case. It is obvious, based on 
Plaintiffs5 own summary judgment motion and the discovery that occurred that Plaintiffs 
had more than adequate notice of the specifics of Dr. Davidhizar's fraud and negligent 
misrepresentation claims. See Cowley, 2005 UT App 518 at j^ 40 (explaining that the 
defendants' "own submissions to the trial court reveal that [they were] on notice" of 
issues not raised in pleadings). Accordingly, Plaintiffs were not prejudiced by any 
technical defects in Dr. Davidhizar's Counterclaim, and Plaintiffs should not be allowed 
to prevail on this basis. See Harrison, 2003 UT 14 at 124 (holding that because the 
defendant had notice and an opportunity to respond, she was not prejudiced by "technical 
failings" of the plaintiffs pleadings). 
II. The Trial Court Applied Incorrect Rules When Measuring Damages at Trial. 
In awarding damages to Plaintiffs, the trial court compounded its already 
unmitigated error of dismissing Dr. Davidhizar's claims and defenses, by accepting 
wholesale Plaintiffs' incorrect and unlawful damages calculation. In indiscriminately 
accepting Plaintiffs' damages calculation, the trial court ended up awarding Plaintiffs 
damages for unallocated attorney fees, for prejudgment interest on attorney fees, for 
prejudgment interest on amounts that Plaintiffs never paid, and without consideration of 
assets Plaintiffs improperly retained. Because of the trial court's acceptance of these 
41 
improper calculations, Plaintiffs' were able to inflate their $180,000 breach of contract 
claim into a final judgment of almost $820,000 against Dr. Davidhizar. 
A. The Trial Court Erred Both By Granting Attorney Fees Where Plaintiffs 
Failed to Allocate Such Fees in Accordance with Utah Law and By Awarding 
Prejudgment Interest on Attorney Fees. 
In awarding $261,501.44 in attorney fees below, the trial court failed to properly 
apply the law in several significant respects. First, the trial court should not have 
awarded fees to Plaintiffs where they failed to allocate their fee request according to the 
various claims and defendants. Utah law is well established that a 
[p]arty must categorize time and fees expended for "(1) 
successful claims for which there may be an entitlement to 
attorney fees, (2) unsuccessful claims for which there would 
have been an entitlement to attorney fees had the claims been 
successful, and (3) claims for which there is no entitlement to 
attorney fees." 
Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 1998) (quoting Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 
P.2d 266, 269-70 (Utah 1992)). "Claims must also be categorized according to the 
various opposing parties." Id. 
Utah law is also clear that in reviewing a claim for attorney fees, the trial court 
"must make an independent evaluation of the reasonableness of the requested fees in light 
of the parties' evidentiary submissions." Id. "The trial court should also document its 
evaluation of the requested fees' reasonableness through findings of fact." Id. "These 
findings should mirror the requesting party's allocation of fees per claims and parties and 
should support any award issued." Id. "The findings of fact, furthermore, should detail 
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the factors considered dispositive by the trial court in calculating the award." Id. The 
trial court failed to comply with any of these mandates. 
For a majority of the litigation in this case, Dr. Davidhizar was only one of three 
named defendants. Specifically, from 2002 until just prior to the original trial date in 
August 2007, the named defendants were Dennis McOmber, Robert Nash, and Dr. 
Davidhizar. (Statement of Facts Tf 23.) On August 23, 2007, Plaintiffs informed the trial 
court that they were dismissing all claims against McOmber and Nash, leaving Dr. 
Davidhizar as the only remaining defendant. (Statement of Facts <[} 37.) Despite the 
existence of these other two defendants for most of the litigation, Plaintiffs' attorney fees 
request and the trial court's fee award based on that request failed to allocate Plaintiffs' 
fees between the various party defendants. (Statement of Facts ^ 68.) Consequently, Dr. 
Davidhizar was erroneously and unfairly charged with all $261,501.44 in attorney fees 
incurred by Plaintiffs for the entire litigation. As explained by the Utah Supreme Court, 
"[w]hen a plaintiff has a substantial claim against one defendant, he should not have a 
free ride to assert claims against other defendants with the expectation that the target 
defendant will end up paying all attorney[] fees." Turtle Mgmt. v. Haggis Mgmt., 645 
P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982). 
This failure to allocate between the various defendants was even more egregious 
given that the basis of the fees was the Agreement, under which only Dr. Davidhizar, 
Fisher, and Coder were parties. Moreover, the fact that the only basis for fees in this case 
was the Agreement exposes an additional error in the fee award as to allocation. For 
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much of the case, Plaintiffs litigated other claims, in addition to breach of contract, 
against Dr. Davidhizar and the other defendants. As set forth in their Verified Complaint, 
Plaintiffs alleged claims against Dr. Davidhizar, McOmber, and Nash for conversion, 
slander, abandonment, tortious interference with economic relations, and civil 
conspiracy. (Statement of Facts ffl[ 23-24.) But Plaintiffs' fee request, and the court's 
award of fees, does not allocate fees between these various claims. (Statement of Facts ^ 
68.) This was a significant error. See Foote, 962 P.2d at 55. The Agreement, under 
which Plaintiffs claim they are entitled to attorney fees, does not provide for fee recovery 
for Plaintiffs' tortious claims against any of the defendants. Consequently, "[i]t would 
violate the contract to require [Dr. Davidhizar] to pay attorney fees accrued in pursuing 
these claims when the work done did not tangibly relate to the breach of contract claim." 
Id. at 56. 
Second, in awarding attorney fees, the trial court erroneously awarded 
prejudgment interest on Plaintiffs' incurred fees. This award was contrary to long-
standing Utah law holding that a party is not entitled to prejudgment interest on its 
attorney fees except where the fee amount is fixed by a valid attorney fee agreement. See 
James Constructors, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 888 P.2d 665, 672 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994). The reason for this rule is that until the trial court determines the requested fee 
amount is reasonable, the attorney fee award is not fixed. See id. at 672-73. And an 
award of prejudgment interest is only proper if "the loss is fixed as of a definite time and 
the interest can be calculated with mathematical certainty." Id. at 671. 
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Here, there was no attorney fee agreement fixing the amount of the fee award. 
Instead, there was a contractual provision providing for reasonable fees incurred in 
enforcing the terms of the Agreement. 
B. The Trial Court Erred By Awarding Prejudgment Interest on Amounts 
Plaintiffs Never Paid. 
The trial court erred when it granted Plaintiffs prejudgment interest on principal 
loan amounts that Plaintiffs never actually paid. Pursuant to the Agreement, Dr. 
Davidhizar was supposed to assume $180,000 in OMC debt. After Dr. Davidhizar 
rescinded the Agreement, Plaintiffs either made interest-only payments on the Assumed 
Loans or simply replaced the Assumed Loans with new loans. Accordingly, at the time 
judgment was entered, the principal amounts on the Assumed Loans were still 
outstanding and had not been paid by Plaintiffs. Nonetheless, the trial court awarded 
Plaintiffs damages for all amounts they actually paid in interest and fees related to the 
loans, and then granted prejudgment interest on the principal amounts of the loans which 
the Plaintiffs had not yet paid. This resulted in an unfair windfall to Plaintiffs in the 
amount of $129,895.87. 
The general rule under Utah law is that '"where the damage is complete and the 
amount of loss is fixed as of a particular time, and that loss can be measured by facts and 
figures, interest should be allowed from that time.'5' Kraatz v. Heritage Imports, 2003 
UT App 201,1J78, 71 P.3d 188 (additional quotations and citations omitted) (quoting 
Trail Mt Coal Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 921 P.2d 1365, 1371 (Utah 
1996)). The purpose of prejudgment interest "is to restore to the plaintiff the time value 
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of money lost through a defendant's breach." Id. Thus "[u]nless [the plaintiff] actually 
paid money, thus losing the benefit of the use of that money over time, the purpose of 
prejudgment interest would not be served and [the plaintiff] would receive an unfair 
windfall." Id. ?A^19\ see also Woolardv. JLGIndus., Inc., 210 F.3d 1158, 1176 (10th 
Cir. 2000) (relying on Oklahoma law that "[t]he purpose of prejudgment interest is to 
make the plaintiff whole by repayment of interest for loss of use of the money to which 
the plaintiff was entitled"). 
To justify prejudgment interest on the principal amounts of the loans, it was 
Plaintiffs' burden to prove that they actually paid those amounts prior to judgment. See 
Kraatz, 2003 UT App 201 at \ 80 (holding that it was the plaintiffs burden of producing 
evidence that he actually paid fees prior to judgment before he was entitled to seek 
prejudgment interest on such amounts). Not only did Plaintiffs fail to prove that they 
actually paid the principal amounts prior to judgment, but the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law prepared by Plaintiffs demonstrate that the principal amounts of the 
loans were still outstanding and had not been paid by Plaintiffs. By erroneously granting 
Plaintiffs $129,895.87 in prejudgment interest on the principal amounts of loans that 
Plaintiffs did not pay, the trial court consequently granted Plaintiffs an unfair windfall 
and put Plaintiffs in a better position than they would have occupied if Dr. Davidhizar 
had not rescinded the Agreement. 
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C. The Trial Court Erred By Failing to Address the Medical Tables and Related 
Income. 
Despite the fact that Plaintiffs retained the ownership and benefit of two of the 
three Medical Tables that were supposed to be conveyed pursuant to the Agreement 
enforced by the court, the trial court failed to make any findings or conclusions related to 
these substantial assets. The undisputed evidence presented at trial was that the Medical 
Tables were purchased for a total of approximately $240,000, $100,000 of which was 
funded by Dr. Davidhizar. (1863: 87-88.) Yet the trial court accepted without revision 
the findings and conclusions drafted by the Plaintiffs, which included only a single 
unsupported conclusion as to the status of the Medical Tables: "Davidhizar is not entitled 
to an offset for the tables.55 (Statement of Facts ^ 74.) This resulted in yet another unfair 
windfall to Plaintiffs. That is, not only did the trial court enter a judgment that gave 
Plaintiffs the entire benefit of the Agreement, but the trial court allowed Plaintiffs to 
retain two of the three most substantial assets that were supposed to be transferred to Dr. 
Davidhizar pursuant to the Agreement. The trial court's failure to make any findings or 
conclusions concerning the status of the Medical Tables was erroneous, as was the trial 
court's unsupported and unjustified conclusion that Dr. Davidhizar was not entitled to 
any offset for the value of the Medical Tables. 
Further, the trial court completely failed to account for the income Plaintiffs 
received from the Medical Tables after rescission of the Agreement. Although the 
undisputed evidence shows that Plaintiffs received $31,221 of income from the Medical 
Tables after February 18, 2002 (Statement of Facts at }^ 21), the trial court did not apply 
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this amount as a credit against the judgment. The trial court did, however, include the 
entire amount of Plaintiffs' operating expenses for the same period in the judgment 
against Dr. Davidhizar. This is just another example of the impropriety of the 
proceedings below. 
In short, not only did the trial court erroneously dismiss Dr. Davidhizar's claims 
and defenses based on Plaintiffs' misrepresentations, it also accepted wholesale 
Plaintiffs' unfairly inflated damages calculation, which resulted in a judgment that was 
over four times the amount of Plaintiffs' original claim. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Dr. Davidhizar respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse and remand both the trial court's ruling dismissing his fraud and negligent 
representation claims and defenses and the trial court's damages award based on that 
dismissal. 
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ST. GEORGE, UTAH;. AUGUST 23, 2 0 07 
JUDGE JAMES L. SHUMATE 
(Transcriber's note: speaker identification 
may not be accurate with audio recordings.) 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Thank you everyone. We're back on the 
record for the 23rd of August, 2007 and it's 10:00 and this 
is the pretrial hearing of Fisher v. Davidhizer. Mr. Ronnow, 
you are here. Mr. Olson for the defense. 
Counsel, what final polishing can the Court help 
with here? 
MR. RONNOW: Your Honor, if I may and Mr. Olson can 
jump in there whenever and however. As is often the case 
with these things, motions in limine in the eleventh hour. I 
have a motion and memorandum. That's the original. The 
Court can work from the original for now I assume. 
THE COURT: I can, counsel. 
MR. RONNOW: And counsel has a copy and we also 
have a pretrial order which I will come to. Let me do a 
little housekeeping and then you can give us some direction. 
Last Tuesday we told you that we were talking, 
trying to streamline this thing and it went from streamlined 
to too big for five days to back down into 5-day trial and so 
you have pending, a Motion to Strike Mr. McOmber, Defendant 
McOmber's answer and counterclaim. That is now moot because 
1 we have agreed to drop all claims against Mr. McOmber. He 
2 has in turn agreed to drop his claim for commission. So — he 
3 will be a witness, he is out of the action as a party and our 
4 pretrial order, whatever we land on will reflect that. 
5 Last weej^ the plaintiffs were going to try the 
6 intentional interference with business relations and 
7 conversion based on a taking of one of these treatment tables 
8 and defend the fraud that grew out of the Court's summary 
9 judgment order. That is the defendant's counterclaim and 
10 affirmative defense of fraud and inducement. Defendant's 
11 have a few loose end claims as well. 
12 We are now down to Your Honor, fraud. That is the 
13 defendant's affirmative defense and counterclaim for fraud as 
14 the defense to their defendant's breach of contract. That 
15 also means that we are down to one party defendant, that is 
16 Lavern Davidhizer. So we have - we'll dismiss in our 
17 pretrial order and now that I'm thinking about it, I think I 
18 dropped that paragraph out. So we'll file a pretrial order 
19 later. 
2 0 We are dismissing defendant, McOmber as I told the 
21 Court; Robert Nash, any claims against Robert Nash; and that 
22 leaves only Lavern Davidhizer. All right? Now then, and as 
23 I said, the Motion to Strike with regard to McOmber is now 
2 4 moot. 
2 5 I've given the Court this morning a plaintiff's 
1 Motion in Limine that is, I think, what we have to discuss 
2 here. In the context of the fraud defense and a combination 
3 of the interplay of — 
4 THE COURT: Breach and fraud -
5 MR. RONNOW: - Rule 9 -
6 THE COURT: Okay. 
7 MR. RONNOW: - 9-B and plea with specificity and 
8 then what we will argue some options for the Court under the 
9 Sanctions Provisions under Rule 16 and under Rule 37. In 
10 essence, Your Honor, what we have argued in that Motion in 
11 Limine is that the - a verified complaint, an amended 
12 verified complaint was filed in May of 2002. No other 
13 amended complaint was ever filed. In July of 2 0 02, 
14 defendants filed an amended answer, counterclaim and demand 
15 for jury trial. Defendants did not file any other amended 
16 pleading with regard to either their defenses or their 
17 counterclaim. In relation to - the defendants pled fraud and 
18 inducement as both an affirmative defense and then again as 
19 an affirmative claim under the counterclaim. 
2 0 In the answer under the affirmative defense, the 
21 parties, the defendants made only this statement, that 
22 defendant was guilty of fraud upon defendants as more 
23 specifically pled in the counterclaim. Now when you get to 
24 the counterclaim, first in fact Paragraph 10 of the 
25 counterclaim, the defendants pled "Based on certain financial 
1 representations to Davidhizer, Davidhizer was induced by 
2 Fisher to purchase OMC and enter into the alleged Settlement 
3 Agreement. The representations by Fisher as to the bills and 
4 in come of OMC were material to Davidhizer's decision." And 
5 then under the cause of action itself, the defendants pled 
6 that uPlaintiffs owe to defendants such damages as shall be 
7 proven at trial for fraudulent inducement entered into 
8 alleged Settlement Agreement based on misrepresentation of 
9 facts including but not limited to the assets and liabilities 
10 of OMC." 
11 Now then, as the Court will recall in 2005, it 
12 dealt with two Motions for Summary Judgment, one for the 
13 breach of contract and one for summary judgment against the -
14 as to the affirmative defense and counterclaim of fraud and 
15 the Court allowed - denied the summary judgment as against 
16 Davidhizer and that's why we are here. 
17 It is our position that after all of the discovery 
18 and the close of the fact discovery investigation and 
19 multiple depositions, there has been no amendment to the 
20 allegation of what the material misrepresentation is, when it 
21 occurred, where it occurred, who said what, etc. 
22 THE COURT: Nor even anyone who relied upon said 
23 material representation? 
24 MR. RONNOW: There is not a statement as to 
25 defendant, Davidhizer, the only defendant remaining asserting 
1 that claim, no. Now then, what we have is an affidavit of 
2 Mr. Davidhizer as submitted into court of the - in opposition 
3 to the summary judgment. That was in November I believe of— 
4 THE COURT: 2 0 05? 
5 MR. RONNOW: Yes or 2 0 04. 
6 THE COURT: Four. 
7 MR. RONNOW: That's when -
8 THE COURT: I didn't rule until 2005. 
9 MR. RONNOW: — that pleading, that series of 
10 pleadings began. 
11 THE COURT: Okay. 
12 MR. RONNOW: And essentially, Your Honor, what we 
13 would argue is first of all, that's well past the fact 
14 discovery cutoff. Let me find it here. And it is essentially 
15 a backdoor attempt to amend the complaint. In it Mr. 
16 Davidhizer asserts two statements as to fraud that have 
17 evolved or morphed into what has been discussed and kicked 
18 around in our discussions with regard to what goes into the 
19 pretrial order. It is been the discussions of this pretrial 
20 order that has shapely focused this issue because we couldn't 
21 focus on what we were suppose to be dealing with as to the 
22 fraud. 
23 THE COURT: Up until this time you've not been able 
24 to focus with any specificity on the elements of fraud in the 
25 inducement. 
1 MR. RONNOW: That's correct, Your Honor. Now, it's 
2 important to note that Mr. Davidhizer's affidavit raises 
3 issues that were not raised in terms of testimony in his 
4 deposition and/or are contrary to sworn statements in his 
5 deposition. That's kicks up over into the case law on 
6 summary judgment that we can't create an issue of fact in an 
7 affidavit that contradicts an earlier deposition and by 
8 analogy, it's the same policy we're dealing with here under 
9 Rule B. We are entitled in dealing with fraud to 
10 specificity. That's why it has its own rule. Pleading is a 
11 special matter. The eases that we've cited in our memorandum 
12 there, Your Honor, Utah cases and a Utah Federal case, all 
13 stand for the proposition that if it is not pled with 
14 particularity it is either subject to a Motion to Dismiss or 
15 Summary Judgment, but dismissal for failure to comply with 
16 Rule 9-B. Now, at this point it's important to note the 
17 interplay of the revised Rule 9, 16 and 26 or excuse me, 9, 
18 16, 26 and 37, those primary discover rules and the interplay 
19 or their sanctions. Under 9 we have a requirement of 
20 pleading with specificity. Under 26 we have a requirement of 
21 disclosures and update of disclosures. We have a requirement 
22 of an approved scheduling order that includes among other 
23 things, cutoffs for amending pleadings and cutoffs for the 
24 end of fact discovery, both of which ran by stipulation 
25 without any amended pleading. Then you have in relationship 
1 to through the sanctions in Rule 16 under this Court's trial 
2 management authority, particularly as focused in these recent 
3 amendments to allow the Court to hold people to the fire, so 
4 to speak, the Court through 16 can reach into 3 7 for the 
5 sanctions there and strike answers and dismiss affirmative 
6 pleadings or can prevent the — 
7 THE COURT: Introduction of evidence. 
8 MR. RONNOW: — presentation of evidence, exactly, 
9 in the Motion in Limine context has those options. And so 
10 that's what we have pled and suggest to the Court by virtue 
11 of the fact that no amended pleading for Mr. Davidhizer has 
12 ever been filed that asserts with any particularity, with any 
13 level of particularity as expressly, you know, talked about 
14 in these various cases, Utah cases like the Williams vs. 
15 State Farm Insurance, 1982 case that outlines the 
16 particularity. Without an amended pleading and that 
17 particularity, at this point, a week away from a jury trial, 
18 we are moving the Court to strike the affirmative defense and 
19 the counterclaim and essentially renewing a Motion for 
2 0 Summary Judgment on the basis that there is no defense to the 
21 earlier breach of contract findings that the Court has 
22 already entered. Now — 
23 THE COURT: But -
24 MR. RONNOW: — there's one more thing — 
25 THE COURT: - counsel, let me make sure I've got 
this setup 
deposition 
Davidhizer, 
was 
that 
right. Through all you processes of discovery, 
of Mr. Davidhizer, interrogatories 
it was only unt 
filed in opposition to 
these 
inducement 
that right: 
claimed issues c 
were ever either 
) 
il you got to this 
to Mr. 
affidavit that 
your Motion for Summary Judgment 
)f fact, elements of fraud in 
* pled or testified to. I've 
the 
got 
MR. RONNOW: Let me modify that just slightly, Your 
Honor. Pled, yes. Testified to, the problem is that we have 
vague testimony that's all over the park. Let me give you 
the factual scenario which would be the focus for the alleged 
fraud as we're now discussing it in a pretrial order. Do you 
need to take care of that, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Actually counsel, you need to take care 
of it. Judge Ludlow wants you in courtroom C briefly and so 
I'll break right now and rather than have the unseemly scene 
of two judges playing tug-a-war with you being the rope, 
we'll just be still and let you go talk to Judge Ludlow about 
whatever is cooking in there. I'll take a break. 
MR. RONNOW: What is cooking in there? 
THE COURT: I have no idea but we'll... 
(Whereupon a recess was taken) 
THE COURT: Please be seated. Thank you everyone. 
Now having settled much ado about nothing, Mr. Ronnow, we'll 
let you go ahead with your arguments regarding your Motion in 
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1 Limine. 
2 MR. RONNOW: I was able to wrangle a stay of the 
3 contempt order, Your Honor, so I have time to finish this. 
4 Gather my thoughts again. 
5 The affidavit sounds in pleading, the issues in 
6 discovery - sound as if it were pleading raising two issues, 
7 misrepresentation as to what has been referred to by various 
8 witnesses as the value of OMC contracts and then a 
9 representation or alleged representation as to the status of 
10 those contracts, that they are in "good standing." As to the 
11 second one, in the discovery there is no evidence, no 
12 testimony from Davidhizer in his deposition, in his 
13 disclosures or in his interrogatories that runs to any 
14 statement as to the status of contracts — 
15 THE COURT: Or the standing of contracts. 
16 MR. RONNOW: — or standing of contracts or uses the 
17 phrase, puts the phrase uin good standing" into the 
18 plaintiff's mouth at any time or anyplace. Now, I started to 
19 say before I got called into the other courtroom, the 
20 affirmative fraud arises out of a negotiation session that 
21 occurred on February 18, 2 0 02 that took several hours on a 
22 Sunday afternoon and some communication that led up to that 
2 3 meeting and as a result of that meeting there was a contract 
24 that is characterized as a Settlement Agreement for the 
2 5 purchase of OMC. 
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1 Now then, as I said in answer to your question, 
2 Your Honor, in the discovery, we were with all various 
3 witnesses, we were all over the park as to numbers and who 
4 said it and how it was said and what was said and I'll say 
-5 one more thing and then leave it to the Court and Mr. Olson 
6 to respond to that. 
7 In trying to focus that statement for purposes of 
8 the pretrial order, and in turn for purposes of weeding out 
9 exhibits as we weeded out parties and claims and what not, it 
10 came down to a reference to what will become an exhibit, is a 
11 document called Reconciliation that contains on it a 
12 statement that the value of OMC contracts and then range, 
13 5000 times 12 for $60,000, $7,000 times 12 for $84,000. 
14 That's all it says. All right? 
15 In discussion with counsel the question was simply, 
16 what is the statement, where in our last discussion was - and 
17 frankly it's what prompted this motion at the late hour was 
18 that he was going to rely on or at least as of yesterday -
19 and again Mr. Olson can explain where they are now - rely on 
20 this Reconciliation as a statement of fraud. In followup 
21 question as to — 
22 THE COURT: As a statement of material fact which 
23 was relied upon, which was knowingly and intentionally 
24 misrepresented? 
2 5 MR. RONNOW: Bingo. That's right, Your Honor, and 
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1 that's why we're here in a Motion in Limine. That's where we 
2 are. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Olson, let me give you a 
4 chance to respond. You've obviously got another side of it 
5 or there wouldn't be a lawsuit. 
6 MR. OLSON: Sure, Your Honor and, Your Honor, I 
7 just read this motion of the first time about an hour ago. 
8 I'm going to apologize if I'm a little scattered here but I 
9 think I've got some thoughts on it. I think what's important 
10 to notice is that although it's characterized as a Motion in 
11 Limine, it's a really a Motion to Dismiss. Motion in Limine 
12 would go to what evidence I'd be presented and — 
13 THE COURT: And if it cuts out the heart of your 
14 lawsuit, it might as well be dismissed. 
15 MR. OLSON: - basically a Motion to Dismiss. The 
16 only other issue remaining is the damages on breach of 
17 contract. 
18 THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
19 MR. OLSON: But yeah, it's basically a Motion to 
2 0 Dismiss the fraud claim. Now Mr. Ronnow was correct that 
21 there were amended scheduling orders in this case that pretty 
22 much everything was cutoff back in, I want to say x03, many 
23 years ago; in fact, before I even got into this case, the 
24 discovery deadline had run. But along with that as did the 
25 motion deadlines. This is essentially a Morion to Dismiss, 
13 
1 dispositive or otherwise, it was due years ago. And what's 
2 curious is, this case has been pending since 2002. They've 
3 gone through extensive discovery. We've gone through summary 
4 judgment and the Thursday before Monday trial is the first 
5 time we're coming to, heh, you didn't plead fraud with 
6 particularity five years ago. 
7 The problem with that argument is that the issues 
8 really have been tried through the (inaudible) of the 
9 parties. So at this time, if the Court is going in that 
10 direction, I would make a motion that the pleadings be 
11 amended to conform with the evidence under Rule 15-B, 
12 THE COURT: What evidence would they conform with, 
13 counsel? That's why I want to look at that. 
14 MR. OLSON: Yeah, let's go to that because I think 
15 what's important in showing that these issues have been tried 
16 at the implied consent of the parties is we go back to the 
17 motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs filed a motion for 
18 summary judgment on the issues of fraud, negligent 
19 misrepresentation, all of those issues, not once mentioning 
20 failure to plead with particularity,- rather, in their 
21 statements of undisputed facts they go through and state the 
22 very representations that we're talking about. Their 
23 statement of undisputed fact, Paragraph 15, talks about the 
24 representations, the financial representations that the 
25 contract were valued at $60,000 to $80,000 per year. 
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1 They go through - I'm going to try to circle some 
2 here - I'm missing a page - Paragraph 23 was a statement by 
3 David Fisher that the contracts were in good standing. When 
4 we came back to my reply and we go through a number of these 
5 issues, we say, Nope, look here in the deposition record. 
6 These were the representations that were made, they're not 
7 true. The representation was made that the contracts were in 
8 good standing. That's not true. The representations were 
9 made that these things were making $5,000 to $7,000 monthly. 
10 And that's not true. They came back and reply and said, no, 
11 look at these depositions where this was said, this was said. 
12 Ultimately the Court came to the conclusion, well, we've got 
13 disputed issues of fact. And all of those disputed issues of 
14 fact are the very representations that we're talking about. 
15 They were all flushed out through discovery and up until 
16 today, you know, I think everybody has had a pretty good 
17 handle on what this fraud claim is all about. In looking at 
18 Rule 15-B, it's really not even permissive by the Court - it 
19 says shall - uThe Court shall allow an amendment to conform 
2 0 to the evidence when issues have been tried by the implied 
21 consent of the parties." It's been, been two years since we 
22 were in summary judgment, maybe longer and those issues were 
23 thoroughly argued and discussed in summary judgment and 
24 summary judgment was denied and we've had no discovery since 
25 that time. In fact, all we've done is prepare for trial a 
15 
1 couple of times when it's been bumped. We were, I think, two 
2 weeks away from trial last November and this issue was never 
3 brought up. 
4 So I think that it's too little too late at this 
5 point in time. I think the Court does have to allow an 
6 amendment to conform to the evidence and as we look through 
7 the undisputed facts and the facts in both their motion for 
8 summary judgment, my response, their reply, it's clear the 
9 parties are arguing about those very representations. At the 
10 meeting on February 18, 2 0 02, a representation was made that 
11 contracts are making $5,000 to $7,000 monthly. 
12 THE COURT: Is that reconciliation document Mr. 
13 Ronnow just pulled out, was that on the table at the time of 
14 that meeting? 
15 MR. OLSON: Yes. 
16 THE COURT: All right. And those were the 
17 representations that your client relied upon in order to 
18 purchase OMC? 
19 MR. OLSON: Correct. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. Now, the question is, what facts 
21 are going to be shown to the jury next week that will show 
22 clear and convincing evidence to that jury that these 
23 contracts were no "where near the \falue at 5 to 7,000? 
24 MR. OLSON: The accounting documents themselves are 
25 going to show that. I mean, we've got an accounting of OMC 
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1 from 2 00 0 - I mean I've seen tax returns through 2 0 05. The 
2 very accounting records that make up the backbone of this 
3 entity are going to show the contracts were not making that. 
4 THE COURT: How much were they making? 
5 MR. OLSON: I'd probably have to have the document 
6 in front of me to give you a definitive answer on that but 
7 the other issue of evidence that goes to that, again this 
8 kind of goes to the second representation as to the status of 
9 the contracts and I think we can look at this two ways, 
10 whether, you know, it was represented in the meeting that 
11 hey, the contracts with all the doctors are good or if after 
12 the facts my client finds out the contracts were in trouble, 
13 that certainly goes to what are these things making. It 
14 maybe evidence of the falsity of that representation. The 
15 fact pattern, the testimony that's going to come out is that 
16 the day after signing this contract, my client visited with a 
17 doctor up north who my client will testify said, "Hey, I've 
18 terminated that contract," and that's what kind of led to the 
19 downfall, just the day after the signature of this agreement. 
20 So there's going to be testimony by not only my client but by 
21 two other witnesses that that was the representation of the 
22 doctor. The doctor will be on the stand as well. 
23 So I think that there is plenty of evidence in the 
24 record of discovery, in the record we get from che summary 
2 5 judgment, that we've known what the issues of this case are 
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1 for a number of years. There's no real surprise today as we 
2 get ready to prepare this case for trial. Everybody knows 
3 that we're talking about, everybody has disputes as to what 
4 the representations were, whether they were urue or false and 
5 those are the issues that the jury needs LO decide. 
6 This late in the game it's inappropriate to come 
7 forward and have the case dismissed for failure to plead with 
8 particularity and we've already been through all of those 
9 issues. It would be my motion to the Court to allow 
10 amendment to the pleading to 15-B to conform with the 
11 evidence. 
12 THE COURT: Counsel, if I were to allow your 
13 amendment to the pleading the only way I can possibly 
14 reasonably do it is to include these issues in the pretrial 
15 order with just kind of a summary, the pleadings are amended 
16 to conform with this order in that fashion. I mean, going 
17 back and using up all the trees to redo your counterclaim and 
18 affirmative defenses would be kind of brainless at this stage 
19 but that would be a sensible way of doing it, wouldn't it, 
20 counsel? 
21 MR. OLSON: Sure. I think the case law that 
22 follows 15-B is pretty clear that an actual amended document 
23 is not required. 
24 TTIE COURT: Well, that's true. vlhat do you say to 
25 the Rule 16 and 27 concerns though, that none of these things 
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1 carry the weight that you get them beyond Mr. Ronnow's 
2 motion? His real concern is that your burden of proof is 
3 going to be clear and convincing evidence which is short of a 
4 criminal case, the highest burden that we have and if we have 
5 one document that gives a range and accounting that gives a 
6 lesser range I'm presuming, and a doctor saying, "Well, my 
7 contract was non-existent at the time this sold because I'd 
8 terminated it." This has all been on the table throughout 
9 the discovery process. 
10 MR. OLSON: Yeah, absolutely, and I think there's 
11 more. If we want to sit down and discuss what each witness 
12 is going to say, it's not just that. There is plenty of 
13 evidence from a number of witnesses, most of the parties that 
14 were at this meeting, that are going to be contrary to those 
15 representations. So I think it really comes down to, you 
16 know, we probably ought to have a finder of fact decide 
17 whether it's clear and convincing. I think there's certainly 
18 enough on the table for the judge today to say, yeah, we 
19 probably ought to let a jury decide whether we've met that 
2 0 burden. 
21 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Ronnow, let me give you 
22 a chance to respond to this basically timeliness argument 
23 but-
24 MR. RONNOW: If I may, Your Honor. 
25 THE COURT: — it goes to the heart of it. 
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1 MR. RONNOW: First of all, Rule 15 as to amending 
2 pleadings to include evidence or claims that are tried by 
3 consent is a rule that is applied after the trial. We have 
4 not tried issues in discovery. We don't discover issues in 
5 discovery. There has been no trial and indeed, the very 
6 operation by the Court under Rule 16 or the very application 
7 of motions in limine is to preclude and prevent just such an 
8 occurrence. We are not trying this issue by consent, so I 
9 would — 
10 THE COURT: In fact, your heels are being drug into 
11 the ground over that threshold. 
12 MR. RONNOW: Screaming and yelling, and so I would 
13 say that Rule 15 does not apply to the circumstance. Now 
14 going through Rule 16, Paragraph 5 and 6, the Court's 
15 authority to facilitate settlement of the case which I think 
16 includes resolution without settlement, but resolution; and 
17 6, considering all matters that may add in the disposition of 
18 the case, we come not to a motion to dismiss but I think the 
19 Court has the discretion and authority through Rule 16 at 
20 this point particularly in the face of a jury trial and tying 
21 up jurors for a week of looking at this again under Rule 56. 
22 THE COURT: Counsel, let me put the burden on you 
23 that the Appellate Court would often do so and apparently 
24 according to my colleagues on the appellate bench, they get 
25 criticized for this a great deal, if you were to marshal all 
20 
1 the evidence supporting Mr. Olson's client's claim for fraud, 
2 you would have the reconciliation sheet, you would have the 
3 testimony of the doctor that he didn't think his contract was 
4 in good standing and what else? If you had to do the 
5 marshaling what else have you seen on the other side? 
6 MR. RONNOW: Let me marshal it but as I do, also 
7 marshal a little bit of what would stand along side of that, 
8 all right, Your Honor? 
9 THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
10 MR. RONNOW: Using that standard of review, it 
11 would also, or it should and I would argue to the Court of 
12 Appeals, be marshaled and reviewed through the lens of clear 
13 and convincing, all right? And so the issue is going to be 
14 did the finder of fact have sufficient evidence to reach a 
15 conclusion of fraud, for example — 
16 THE COURT: By the requisite burden of proof. 
17 MR. RONNOW: — by the requisite burden of proof? 
18 Now, let's go to Dr. Cutler that has been mentioned here. 
19 His name is Dr. Cutler. His testimony actually is that I 
20 can't recall for sure if I told Mr. Fisher before February 
21 18th that I was dissatisfied with the contract, I may have. 
22 That was after a series of badgering questions by the defense 
23 counsel over objections and so the flip side of that is also 
24 implicit in that testimony is, I may not have. He filed a 
25 Notice of Termination not before as required under this 
21 
contract, not before February 18, but a week after, after he 
had been visited by the defendant here, Dr. Davidhizer, and 
part of his testimony is he didn't want another doctor 
managing his practice, all right? 
Now, in addition, there will be facts marshaled 
that indeed he continued in the contract. Then he 
renegotiated the contract and continued working with OMC on 
that table in an arrangement for months after this. There 
will also be evidence marshaled that the contracts that the 
Defendant Davidhizer had in his hands as part of what we'll 
characterize as a due diligence kind of review, provide right 
in them a unilateral right to terminate the contract with 3 0 
days written notice. So no matter what, under reliance in 
the fraud standard, he had - Dr. Davidhizer has facts that he 
has to rely on or that he has to deal with in relying on and 
he's got a contract that gives him a unilateral right to 
terminate in 3 0 days. So regardless of the status of 
February 18, the fact that Dr. Cutler actually terminates 
this contract after that, is part and parcel of his burden of 
inquiry before he signs that contract and cannot be pointed 
to as reliance, evidence of reliance on any material 
misrepresentation of a currently existing fact that he 
reasonably relied on. 
In addition Your Honor, we have - back to the 
particularity, we have statements that go all over the board 
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1 as to what was and. wasn't said even among these witnesses 
2 that Mr. Olson was — 
3 THE COURT: Were at the February meeting. 
4 MR. RONNOW: — referring to regarding the February 
5 meeting. For example, Dr. Davidhizer himself at one point in 
6 his deposition under oath says, after going through the terms 
7 of the contract Mr. Fisher asks him, says a leading question 
8 or asks him, "Did you fulfill the terms of the agreement?" 
9 "No." 
10 "Why not?" 
11 "Because the information I used that was given to 
12 me to induce me to make this agreement was false." 
13 "What specific information was that?" 
14 "That the machines were generating $60,000 to 
15 $80,000 a year." 
16 "Any other information?" 
17 "No." 
18 Now then, that's exactly what the statement says — 
19 THE COURT: Reconciliation says. 
2 0 MR. RONNOW: — in part or at least that number is 
21 there. 
22 THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
23 MR. RONNOW: The reconciliation says OMC contracts, 
24 plural. Now in trying to clarify this, Dr. Davidhizer says 
25 that the reasons - the question is leading, "That's the 
23 
1 reason why you say $60,000 to $80,000 was not correct?" 
2 uYeah. It says on the sheet of paper" referring to the 
3 reconciliation, "that we had at the meeting" that Dr. Cutler -
4 You okay? 
5 THE COURT: No, but we'll get through it counsel. 
6 MR. RONNOW: I've never had such an affect. 
7 — that the paper, he's referring to this 
8 reconciliation, the paper we have at the meeting, uThat Dr. 
9 Cutler was doing $80,000 a year." It doesn't say that 
10 anywhere uAnd I assumed the other one, Dr. Jepson was doing 
11 $60,000 a year." 
12 So on a clear and convincing standard, let's - let 
13 me just set that much out there under the review standard of 
14 the Court of Appeals. 
15 Now, let me suggest to the Court another way to 
16 view this and that is in relationship to a summary judgment 
17 but under some cases from the Federal Supreme Court that have 
18 said that if Rule 56 is going to mean anything to us at the 
19 end of discovery on the eve of trial, we have to have more 
2 0 than just an issue of fact. We have to have some evidence. 
21 In this case, we have to have some evidence that clears the 
22 bar of clear and convincing. We've got a jury on tap, all 
23 right? And we've got this situation here where again, as 
24 we're looking at exhibits, and the question, for example, 
2 5 yesterday, counsel, do you mean to say that we have, that 
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1 this is the value of OMC contracts? Or is it the value of 
2 two contracts out of three for the table without regard to 
3 multiple contracts that run to collecting and billing that 
4 have nothing to do with the tables but are OMC contracts? 
5 And again, in terms of marshaling, depending on where the 
6 Court lands on what this statement is, we would say that we 
7 will present ample accounting evidence that has those numbers 
8 within range. Now — 
9 THE COURT: That was my next question, counsel. 
10 Mr. Olson says that he's got accountings that will show that 
11 the $5 to $7,000 range is grossly overstated I would presume 
12 in order to make that clear and convincing. What does the 
13 accounting evidence show? 
14 MR. RONNOW: Well, Your Honor, let me explain that. 
15 First of all, we're all using the same accounting 
16 information. Secondly, in relationship to the operation and 
17 billing of these three therapy tables, they had only been 
18 online for a very short time. Now here is another critical 
19 aspect of this review that grows out of Rule 9 and the 
2 0 elements of fraud in our case law in terms of reasonable 
21 reliance. Dr. Davidhizer is a DO, osteopath. He has one of 
22 these tables in his own practice. He has - we will show in 
23 evidence - a history of involvement with the tables at issue 
24 in our case as well as the receipc and access to ongoing 
25 documentation and accounting long before he gets to the 
25 
1 February meeting. So the whole issue of reasonable reliance 
2 is going to be ratcheted way up on clear and convincing 
3 because of all the information that he has. 
4 Now then, what led to this is another exhibit which 
5 we will be presenting to the jury which I have come to call 
6 the February 7-11 letter because the first page is dated the 
7 7th, the next two page are dated the 11th. In it Mr. Darwin 
8 Fisher, representing as counsel for OMC, puts together a 
9 letter saying, we've got this disputed issue of a 
10 partnership. Here's what you are saying - meaning the 
11 defendant's camp - and what you want. This is what we are 
12 saying and he knocks out a bunch of numbers. Now what he 
13 takes is all that is available in the accounting. On one of 
14 these tables less than two months history and on one of them 
15 two months history. On all three tables, about two months to 
16 six weeks of history of billing but very little in the way of 
17 collecting because of such a short time the pipeline hadn't 
18 been filled. In that letter Mr. Fisher suggests, listen, 
19 here are the numbers. We'll give you the numbers. This is 
2 0 my formula. We may not agree as to the value of these things 
21 but surely we agree that there should be some value. If you 
22 have some other formula, some other number, bring it to the 
23 table and let's discuss it on February 18. 
24 On that basis, chat accountsag information doesn't 
25 even rise to the level of data or as summarized in this 
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1 reconciliation as data that can be relied on in fraud. It 
2 really is firsu, an approximation; second, an opinion; and 
3 third, am open invitation for a settlement discussion. 
4 Now in addition to the marshaling — 
5 THE COURT: And it's your position that Dr. 
6 Davidhizer in coming to that settlement discussion would have 
7 brought his own experience with his own table. 
8 MR. RONNOW: That's right, and in that vein, Your 
9 Honor, again, back to our appellate marshaling... 
10 THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
11 MR. RONNOW: ...Dr. Davidhizer is there with his 
12 own insider, a man by the name of Eugene Coder who had been 
13 the manager for OMC up until December prior to this February 
14 meeting and who had on his own computer all kinds of 
15 documents, accounting records that reflected all the same 
16 information. That's one advisor. 
17 He had a second advisor by the name of Robert Nash 
18 who had served as his own accountant and tax accountant and 
19 financial advisor in other entrepreneurial business ventures 
2 0 who was at that table. The night before the February 18 
21 meeting, both the - the plaintiffs deliver a comprehensive 
22 packet in large part which will become one of our exhibits, 
23 of current accounting data to Mr. Nash, the accountant, to 
24 Mr. Coder at Mr. Coder's residence, the insider, former 
25 manager. While there's a dispute as to whether they looked 
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1 at it, they start off by saying, Oh no, we didn't look at it. 
2 Nash comes to an admission in his deposition that yes, we 
3 did. They make their own projections which will be exhibits. 
4 They come in the next morning, February 18 and ask for 
5 additional documentation and information clearly showing that 
6 they had reviewed the documents if they wanted to see more. 
7 And the request was focused by Mr. Coder based on his 
8 experience with the accounting reports that could be 
9 generated. Therefore, all of this information in summary, 
10 however, it gets defined as a statement or a 
11 misrepresentation — 
12 THE COURT: Has to be overlaying with all that 
13 other context. 
14 MR. RONNOW: — and weighed under the clear and 
15 convincing standard as to reliance, reasonable reliance 
16 between this group at arms length with their own, if not 
17 expertise, at least facility for these numbers; availability 
18 of the numbers; duty under the case law if they have 
19 information they simply cannot rely on other statements; and 
2 0 therefore again under clear and convincing marshaling, I 
21 don't think they're going to get there. 
22 Back to Rule 56 and Rule 16, on the eve of hauling 
2 3 jurors into the courtroom to spend a week away from their 
24 businesses, I chink we are clearly within che realm of Rule 
25 16 if the Court chooses based on this evidence and a clear 
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1 and convincing standard to say it isn't there. Now, before -
2 let me say one more thing and then I'll sit down and shut up. 
3 If in the alternative we're moving forward with 
4 trial, we simply have to have some sort of focus on what: 
5 these statements are back to Rule 9. Rule 9 requires 
6 particularity because of the jury instructions that will go 
7 with that and the clear and convincing standard. They simply 
8 aren't allowed to throw a shovel full of gravel at the jury 
9 saying one of those rocks is fraud. We aren't required to 
10 assume the burden of defending against that flock shot. 
11 That's why Rule 9 is there. 
12 THE COURT: Mr. Olson, I'm going to give you a 
13 chance to respond because Mr. Ronnow and I got into some 
14 areas that I think you need to give me your take on, counsel. 
15 MR. OLSON: Thank you, Your Honor and I guess the 
16 first issue that I wanted to point out to the Court, Mr. 
17 Ronnow said we've never consented to try these issues, we 
18 haven't gone through trials so under the Rule 15-B analysis 
19 there's no implied consent to try these issues — 
2 0 THE COURT: I read Rule 15 much broader than that, 
21 counsel. 
22 MR. OLSON: That's my question, why did they seek 
23 summary judgment if we didn't consent to trying these issues? 
24 He sought summary judgment on those very facts. They didn't 
25 seek a morion to dismiss at that time because we didn't plead 
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1 with particularity; rather they said, we've got all these 
2 issues of fraud, we warn: summary judgment: on uhem. So 
3 they've consented to try these issues. I don't think there's 
4 any question of that. 
5 Now given the amount of, 1 guess marshaling that 
6 we've gone through, it almost puts me in a position where I 
7 need to sit down with you, Judge, and go witness by witness, 
8 this is what they're going to say and I'm happy EO do that. 
9 But essentially we've got Dr. Davidhizer at the meeting. 
10 He's going to testify with regard to the representation of 
11 value that was made. Robert Nash was at the meeting. He's 
12 going to testify as to the representations that were made. 
13 Eugene Coder was at the meeting. He's going to testify as to 
14 the representations that were made. Dr. Davidhizer is also 
15 going to testify and I've already alluded to that the next 
16 day he goes to one of the doctors that has one of the 
17 contracts, I already told Fisher I'm not moving forward with 
18 this thing, I'm done with it. Dennis McOmber was at that 
19 meeting as well. He's going to say the same thing. Gene 
2 0 Code talked to Dr. Cutler after the fact and he's going to 
21 say the same thing. Gene Coder talked to David Fisher after 
22 the meeting who admitted there was a problem with the Cutler 
23 contract. That's what he's going to say. 
24 So we come out of the meeting, the representation 
25 as to, Hey, these machines are making this kind of money and 
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1 some of those witnesses also say, a representation that the 
2 contracts are in good standing, when they in fact are not. 
3 THE COURT: Counsel, how long had Mr. Coder been 
4 away from OMC? I see it as a maximum of two and a half 
5 months and maybe a minimum of about six weeks by the 18th of 
6 February meeting? 
7 MR. OLSON: It's a very good question. In fact, at 
8 the time of the February 18 meeting,' he was still a member of 
9 OMC. This is an LLC, he still held a membership interest. 
10 There's some question as to, you know, at what point in time 
11 he quit acting officially and calling him president capacity 
12 but the evidence is also going to show from testimony from 
13 Eugene Coder and testimony from Robert Nash who was the 
14 accountant assisting Davidhizer, that Gene Coder was not 
15 sophisticated in financial affairs. In fact, it was David 
16 Fisher who was the chief financial officer. Gene Coder 
17 didn't know a balance sheet from an income statement. So 
18 it's unfair to say that they had an insider with all this 
19 financial information that was going to bring it to 
2 0 Davidhizer and make sure he understood everything that was 
21 going on. I don't think Coder knew what was going on and 
22 he'll testify to that. 
23 Robert Nash will testify that yeah, they brought 
24 some accounting documents over the night before they had this 
25 meeting, but quoting Robert Nash, he says they were in 
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1 horrible form. They weren't according to generally accepted 
2 accounting principles, I couldn't make heads nor tails from 
3 them. So as we come into a meeting the next day — 
4 THE COURT: Mr. Nash does have the sophistication 
5 to make that judgement? 
6 MR. OLSON: He does. He's got the education, 
7 background. He's worked as a tax accountant, certainly 
8 understands the field and they're going to come in the next 
9 day and say, they gave us representations we had to rely on. 
10 We didn't have sufficient data to look at it and make a 
11 conclusion for ourselves to prove or disprove that 
12 representation. 
13 I'm trying to think who else we need to deal with 
14 here. And yeah, Dr. Cutler is going to say, I don't 
15 remember. I may have told them beforehand, I may not have. 
16 But we're going to have two witnesses that meetings with them 
17 in which Dr. Cutler said, I told David Fisher already I'm 
18 terminating this contract. We've got a third witness who is 
19 going to say I talked to — 
2 0 THE COURT: Now, -
21 MR. OLSON: — him a couple of days later — 
22 THE COURT: — let's talk about those two witnesses 
23 that said I cold David Fisher I'm going to terminate this 
24 contract. What will those witnesses tell the jury? 
25 MR. OLSON: They met with Dr. Cutler the day after 
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1 the contract was signed. 
2 THE COURT: Okay. 
3 MR. OLSON: They met with him for the purpose of 
4 okay, we've made a shift in OMC7 we're now in charge, we're 
5 going to be moving forward on this thing. And Dr. Cutler's 
6 response was, I already told David Fisher I'm terminating 
7 this contract, I'm not moving forward with it. 
8 THE COURT: Now, who are those witnesses? 
9 MR. OLSON: Lavern Davidhizer and Dennis McOmber. 
10 THE COURT: Okay, those two. Thank you. 
11 MR. OLSON: It's Gene Coder who talked to Dr. 
12 Cutler on the telephone a couple of days later and confirmed 
13 that veiy same story. 
14 THE COURT: And then shortly thereafter - if I get 
15 the facts right - shortly after Gene's call to Dr. Cutler, 
16 the actual letter came to OMC, uI'm terminating the 
17 contract." 
18 MR. OLSON: That's correct. It was within about 
19 four da;ys, somewhere in that ballpark. 
2 0 THE COURT: All right. 
21 MR. OLSON: And then the other evidence of that, 
22 although it's not language of termination, but Darwin Fisher 
23 is going to be on the stand and on cross examination he's 
24 going to agree with what Dr. Cutler said, UI wasn't: happy 
25 with it," or at last informed David Fisher, "I wasn't happy 
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1 with the contract." Although that's not quite termination, 
2 there's certainly some suggestion there that there was a 
3 problem with the contract. Now at this meeting they're 
4 sitting down and saying these contracts are making $5 to 
5 $7,0 00 a month but they're not saying, but we've got a 
6 problem with Cutler's contract, he's not going to be doing 
7 that any more. 
8 There's also going to be evidence from Dennis 
9 McOmber regarding the Jepson contract, that that contract 
10 hadn't generated anything in months because of the 
11 combination of they had no tech to run the table and they 
12 were having billing problems through some other billing 
13 company up in Park City. So the Jepson contract was in 
14 jeopardy which we didn't know about until well after the 
15 fact. 
16 The other issue - and again see where they're 
17 coming from in saying we've got accounting that says 
18 contracts were making what we represented, I'm saying we've 
19 accounting saying they weren't and here's the discrepancy. 
2 0 Their figures are what the doctors billed. My figures are 
21 what was actually being collected, what was actually being 
22 done. 
23 Now the reality of the fact is that the collection 
24 of what was billed was in jeopardy at the time of this 
25 meeting and it was, in fact, never actually collected. So 
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1 it's easy to say, yeah, the doctors billed all kinds of money 
2 on this thing when after the fact the reality is, well, it 
3 wasn't going to come in. So we're basing it on apples and 
4 oranges. 
5 And again, Your Honor, we've got a lot of money 
6 issues here. There's obviously a lot of evidence going both 
7 directions. There's a lot of dispute between witnesses that 
8 are going to be on the stand. There's issues as to 
9 credibility, as to who knows what. They're all issues that a 
10 jury needs to take care of. Again, I would just reiterate 
11 that if the issue is that they don't have enough information 
12 to understand what the particular pleadings of fraud are, if 
13 they don't have enough information to go forward to trial, 
14 then it's curious this was not brought up two years ago when 
15 asked for summary judgment on the issue. I think they had 
16 plenty of information, they knew what the issues were, they 
17 moved forward on it. Thank you. 
18 THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. 
19 Mr. Ronnow, your motion is granted. 
2 0 MR. RONNOW: Thank you, Your Honor. 
21 THE COURT: Counsel, with that, still going to 
22 bring in a jury on Monday? 
23 MR. RONNOW: The only thing left, Your Honor, was 
24 reserved in the Court's order on — 
25 THE COURT: Summary judgment. 
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1 MR, RONNOW: — the summary judgment was a 
2 discussion thar would allow or a statement that would allow 
3 rhe defendants to put on evidence with regard to che numbers 
4 that are already part of the summary judgment on breach of 
5 contract damages in the way of offset. So perhaps that 
6 question is, we did not request the jury. We would have been 
7 here without a jury to try to squeeze into a 3-day setting 
8 here a long time ago. So, we don't need a jury. We're 
9 talking - about the only thing that could possibly be left is 
10 some offset or some sort of proof that the payments were not 
11 received. 
12 THE COURT: Well, Mr. Olson, I'm going to give you 
13 a chance to mull that over. I'm not going to ask you right 
14 now whether you need a jury or not because I think your 
15 client is entitled to that much in terms of offset arising 
16 out of the Court's prior order. But as this case comes up to 
17 trial, I just don't think we've got anything here of clear 
18 and convincing evidence to give to a jury; and yes, I realize 
19 that this is mostly a rehash of the motion for summary 
2 0 judgment but I feel a lot more comfortable in where we stand 
21 today. 
22 So counsel, I'll recess this case at this point. 
2 3 We are ready to start up Monday morning. Let us know by noon 
2 4 tomorrow if you need a jury. 
2 5 MR. RONNOW: We will, Your Honor. 
36 
THE COURT: Thank you counsel. 
And you'll prepare the order, Mr. Ronnow? 
MR. RONNOW: I will, Your Honor, thank you. 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
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(Video goes off and on.) 
THE COURT: -continue the trial setting and find out 
where you are now. 
MR. OLSON: Let me tell you, Your Honor, I filed two 
motions for you. I'm sure you had nothing else to do today but 
read through those. 
(Audio goes off and on.) 
MR. OLSON: - Your Honor, these motions go back and 
forth and if we could move as quickly in the first (inaudible) 
of the trial as we do in the last four or five days we could 
crank up the revolutions of the wheels of justice. 
THE COURT: Probably so. 
MR. OLSON: Your Honor, I just need to address a 
couple of things. The main reasoning for my motions this 
morning is to make sure I have a clear record of the objections 
and the procedures that happened yesterday and part of the 
problem yesterday is, of course, I had a motion before the 
Court that I had one hour to review, to try to absorb and 
respond to and argue. So my first position is I simply, you 
1 know, had inappropriate time to prepare and properly argue the 
2 motion for the Court. Technically it wasn't even before the 
3 Court yesterday. The purpose for the hearing yesterday was 
4 simple pretrial order problems. So the point of my motion and 
5 again I don't think I'm going to persuade the Court today to 
6 see the error of its ways as I see it but nonetheless — 
7 THE COURT: You would like to have at least some time 
8 to respond to that and deal with whether or not we should go to 
9 trial at all on Monday. 
10 MR. OLSON: And here's where I'm going with it. 
11 Essentially the point of motion to continue is, let me respond 
12 to this Motion in Limine. I understand the Court has already 
13 granted it but let me have some proper response to the Motion 
14 in Limine. As a part of that motion I do point out why I think 
15 the Court is in error as far as the motion yesterday and 
16 frankly, you know, as I walked away from the hearing yesterday, 
17 I've got to be honest with the Court and I'm still not 
18 completely sure what happened. As I see it, essentially what 
19 happened was summary judgment. We had a Motion in Limine but 
20 what essentially happened was summary judgement. 
21 THE COURT: In effect it was the same. 
22 MR. OLSON: Yeah, and I guess we need to in any event 
23 just to have a proper record, we need to have an understanding, 
24 was it a grant of a Motion in Limine saying I can't put on 
25 evidence of fraud? Was it a summary judgment? Was it an order 
1 dismissing my claims? You know, what was it? So I'm still a 
2 little foggy on that. But again, the purpose, the main purpose 
3 of my motions which I'm not sure the Court is going to give 
4 much deference to, I also filed a Motion to Amend my Pleading, 
5 is just to properly respond to what happened yesterday. The 
6 only purpose for continuing would be to give me the opportunity 
7 to respond. 
8 THE COURT: And your motion is granted, counsel. I'm 
9 not going to take this case to trial next Monday after having 
10 pulled the legs out from underneath the table without giving 
11 you a chance to respond to it, counsel. I still think my basic 
12 decision granting the Motion in Limine is correct. I don't 
13 think you have a cause of action left. So the result is a 
14 Motion for Summary Judgment. But the only thing that remains 
15 now is whether or not there were any set offs or counterclaims 
16 - well, any set offs, not even counterclaims left, any set offs 
17 at all against the motion earlier granted under the contract 
18 action and I want to give you a chance to review that and 
19 respond to it but I saw no instance where the state of the 
20 record as I see it in this lawsuit should go in front of a jury 
21 on issues of fraud and inducement or fraud of any kind. The 
22 standard of proof simply is beyond what is in the record in 
23 this case. So I will grant your Motion to Continue. Jury 
24 trial setting is stricken, 
25 And counsel, where we stand now is I want to 
1 immediately and I do mean immediately get this back to the 
2 Court for final argument and then give you whatever time you do 
3 need to have a resolution of whatever facts remain in the case. 
4 MR. OLSON: Your Honor, just so I can clarify, is the 
5 Court's continuance solely to prep on this damage issue or is 
6 the Court saying, yeah, go ahead and respond to the Motion in 
7 Limine and I'll consider it, but I don't think I'm going that 
8 direction? 
9 THE COURT: That's what I'm saying, counsel. I'll 
10 let you respond to the motion. I don't think I'm going that 
11 direction unless you can show me something that is absolutely 
12 clear as a bell that I was wrong. I don't think I am but if 
13 that's the case, then all we need to do is bring the damage 
14 issue back before the Court and that's not going to take any 
15 five days. 
16 MR. OLSON: No, I don't think it will either but I 
17 think we could use some clarification on that issue. That's 
18 one of the other reasons we asked to meet with you today. As 
19 we were looking at what are we trying next week? As this Court 
20 entered its summary judgment on the issue of breach of 
21 contract, again, when that motion was filed we kind of came in 
22 and stood in this courtroom that, you know, we don't disagree 
23 we didn't perform the contract. What we're arguing is we have 
24 justification. Now the Court also had before it a number of 
25 figures including the debt my client was suppose to take on in 
1 the contract. So we don't dispute that those are the figures. 
2 There were also some figures of what David Fisher had paid in 
3 interest (inaudible) and things and the Court basically said, 
4 you can put on evidence that he didn't pay it. 
5 The other issues as I see it that are before the 
6 Court are off sets and mitigation of damages. 
7 THE COURT: Counsel, mitigation of damages, if there 
8 are things that Mr. Fisher did not do that increased his 
9 damages in some fashion, I can see some argument about that but 
10 mitigation of damages does not go back and reopen the box of 
11 fraud or inducement or those kinds of things. 
12 MR. RONNOW: I understand that. Your Honor, 
13 mitigation of damages is an affirmative defense required to be 
14 pled, it was not pled, that's why it's not included in the 
15 order. There is no pleading, not even in a generic catch-all 
16 pleading in defendant's answer regarding mitigation of damages. 
17 The Court's order from April 10, 2006 says on that, damage 
18 issues are very narrow. The defendant, Davidizer, may present 
19 evidence at trial or other hearing that Fisher did not pay. 
20 All right? Mitigation of damages is a little bit different 
21 than non-payment and it's an affirmative defense and it has not 
22 been pled, was not pled at the time the Court entered summary 
23 judgment. So I think it's (inaudible) and it is not any longer 
24 before the Court. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. Well, I want you to have a chance 
1 to brief things, see where we stand now and if there's anything 
2 (inaudible) that would take me away from ruling yesterday 
3 morning, I don't mind being corrected on it, but we're going to 
4 bring this one to a head within the next 60 days. 
5 MR. OLSON: Your Honor, the only other issue that I 
6 guess I would like to address, I'm not sure it needs a whole 
7 lot of help here but as we were preparing for Monday we were 
8 discussing the possibility of, if we're only going to try 
9 damages, letting the Court try those issues and not bringing 
10 them before a jury. My primary concern is if I say, yeah, 
11 that's okay, I don't want to waive my jury right should this 
12 matter be appealed and come back on remand. So I -
13 THE COURT: I don't think you could, counsel. I 
14 think you can reserve that, try this issue that way and if it 
15 comes back on a remand (inaudible) get a jury on your fraud 
16 claims, you'd be entitled to do that. 
17 MR. OLSON: My only concern is in looking at the case 
18 law with regard to waiver and jury demands it doesn't take 
19 much. I mean, there's a handful of cases where you come to 
20 pretrial, the Court says okay we're going to try it before the 
21 bench and nobody says anything about it and it was being waived 
22 and then the guy stands up and says, Wait a minute, wait a 
23 minute, I didn't catch that. 
24 THE COURT: Well, counsel -
25 MR. OLSON: It doesn't take much is my concern. 
1 THE COURT: Counsel, I want to make sure that the 
2 record is clear that you would not be waiving that because I 
3 don't see that the Court's order puts you in any position 
4 except that you have to reserve that right and even if we 
5 decide to go to trial without a jury on what remains in the 
6 lawsuit now, and you appeal the judgment arising out that, 
7 based upon the Court's ruling of the Motion in Limine, if we 
8 were remanded you have not waived your right to a jury trial 
9 and I'll put that in the form of a written order if that will 
10 help. 
11 MR. RONNOW: And Your Honor, the April 10 order gives 
12 defendant the option of either hearing which would be before 
13 the bench or trial. So our position is he would not waive it 
14 by opting for the hearing. 
15 THE COURT: I think that's a reasonable way to deal 
16 with everything. All right, thank you counsel. 
17 MR. OLSON: Thank you, Your Honor, 
18 J (Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 I -c-
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1 ST. GEORGE, UTAH - DECEMBER 18, 2007 
2 JUDGE JAMES L. SHUMATE 
3 (Transcriber's note: speaker identification 
4 may not be accurate with audio recordings.) 
5 P R O C E E D I N G S 
6 THE COURT: Thank you, we're back on the record for 
7 the 18th of December, 2007. The matter before the court is 
8 Fisher v. Davidhizer. The parties are not - well, actually 
9 we have the plaintiff here. We don't have the defendant 
10 here, but Mr. Olson, you are here on behalf of Mr. Davidhizer 
11 and you're the moving party, Mr. Olson. You have a motion to 
12 amend and there's opposition to that. And then you want to 
13 deal with the motions in limine. So I shall be still and 
14 listen to you, counsel. 
15 MR. RONNOW: Your Honor, if I might just clarify 
16 and just understand the procedure because we kind of - it was 
17 real fluid and fast there for a minute just before trial. We 
18 filed a motion in limine to which Mr. Olson filed the quick 
19 hearing essentially to set it aside, and then the Court said 
20 let's go ahead and brief that, plus his motion to amend. And 
21 so while these - it would seem to me that these two are part 
22 and parcel, so if I understand what you're saying, we're just 
23 going to put the contiguous arguments, so to speak, on the 
24 table from -
25 THE COURT: We are, counsel, because it's really -
1 it's become an entire fabric throughout the litigation. I 
2 mean, the competing theories that we have going here are in 
3 the entire - every single question in the lawsuit bears on 
4 those competing theories. And I really think what we ought 
5 to talk about is the motion to amend first, because if that 
6 amendment is given, then the motion in limine may take some 
7 more attention to see where we go with it. 
8 MR. OLSON: If I may, Your Honor, address that 
9 understanding that, you know, let's talk about procedures, 
10 but nonetheless I think it's key. As I went back and reviewed 
11 the fraud cases specifically in the context of the motion in 
12 limine. Rule 9 is distinguished from a Rule 56 summary 
13 judgment that there's a Utah case that - in which the Court 
14 of Appeals addressed that specific issue and affirmed a 
15 dismissal of a fraud case for failure to plead with 
16 specificity under Rule 9, and then denied the motion to 
17 amend. So I would urge the Court to reconsider and ask that 
18 we argue the fraud issues that are the basis for the motion 
19 to amend. And I'll just give you a quick heads up, it is our 
20 contention that even in the proposed - the proposed amended 
21 complaint or counterclaim rather is not sufficient -
22 THE COURT: Still fails -
23 MR. RONNOW: Yes, Your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: I see your point, counsel, but Mr. 
25 Olson does get to talk about his case and Mr. Olson, let me 
1 make sure I understand it. Your fraud theory goes to fraud 
2 in the inducement. 
3 MR. OLSON: Correct. 
4 THE COURT: That is the broad label to put with 
5 this. Specifically your client claims that 
6 misrepresentations were made with respect to the status of 
7 the various accounts that were being purchased, the income 
8 derived from those accounts and that because of those 
9 misrepresentations upon which your client relied, your client 
10 suffered damage at least $10,000 and perhaps more according 
11 to the proof. But let me give you a chance to expand upon 
12 that, counsel. 
13 MR. OLSON: I think you've done that in a nutshell, 
14 Your Honor, that is - that is these fraud claims. And I 
15 guess if I understand the direction we're going here, you 
16 want to hear the motion to amend first. They are very 
17 intertwined issues, no question, that the whole purpose of 
18 the motion to amend is based upon the motion in limine was 
19 made seeking to keep those issues of fraud out. That's the 
20 whole point of my motion to amend. What we're asking for is 
21 - is an amendment to conform with the evidence under Rule 
22 15(b). That's appropriate when the parties have expressly or 
23 impliedly consented to try the unplead matters. 
24 Now, the reason I would suggest that that's 
25 I happened in this case is that two years ago this Court heard 
3 
1 summary judgment. It was the plaintiffs' motion for summary 
2 judgment asking this court to grant them summary judgment on 
3 our issues of fraud, on those very issues of the income 
4 representations, the status and the contract representations. 
5 This Court ruled that there were genuine issues of material 
6 fact, we're going to trial. That was two years ago. And 
7 really nothing's changed since then. We haven't done any 
8 discovery. We haven't found any new facts. We haven't 
9 deposed any witnesses. Nothing's changed. 
10 Now it was the plaintiffs that put those issues 
11 before the court in summary judgment. They submitted 
12 affidavits attacking the very representations arguing that 
13 they were opinions, not representations, that no, I didn't 
14 say this about the status of the contract. They put before 
15 the Court depositions, you know, certainly this is what whs 
16 said when, this is what was said then. They put the issue 
17 before the Court of, hey, their fraud claim is no good. They 
18 didn't ever say they didn't plead with particularity. 
19 Rather, they said we want summary judgment on the fraud claim 
20 because it's no good. They put that issue before the Court. 
21 Now, looking at the case law in the State of Utah, 
22 there's a couple of cases that deal with implied consent for 
23 purposes of Rule 15(b). I've cited these cases in my 
24 memorandum. The Archuleta vs. Hughes case deals with this 
25 very issue. In that case, the Utah Supreme Court - well, 
1 actually let me back track a little bit. The argument the 
2 defendants are going to make is that Rule 15(b) only applies 
3 to issues that actually go to trial, that are in a trial -
4 and at the end of the trial you say, hey, wait a minute, you 
5 never plead it. And you say, well, no, you implied the 
6 consent - you implied the consent to us, we're having a trial 
7 on that. 
8 My argument is it doesn't require trial. It 
9 requires interjection of those issues before the court by 
10 consent in going on about the process of litigation. The 
11 Archuleta vs. Hughes case deals with that very issue. The 
12 Utah Supreme Court never says in that case it has to go to 
13 trial. The issue before the court was something brought up 
14 in a motion. Now, the court in that case did rule that it 
15 wasn't implied to consented to just because it wasn't as 
16 sufficient interjection, but they never said that it had to 
17 be something that went to trial and that was a summary 
18 judgment case. "Whether they say implied consent may be 
19 found where one party raises an issue material to the other 
20 party's case, and where evidence is introduced without 
21 objection, where it appears that the parties understood the 
22 evidence must be aimed at the unpleaded issue." 
23 J That's exactly what's happened in this case. 
Plaintiffs interjected those issues, sought summary judgment 24 
25 on fraud, they understood that those issues were before the 
1 court, they understood that those issues were the very basis 
2 upon which we were going to trial. And they went into great 
3 detail as to what those misrepresentations were and argued 
4 why they're not misrepresentations. 
5 So, you know, it's our position that, you know, 
6 actually I do have one other case, the - the Holstrom vs. 
7 Viewer case that I've cited. Now in that case, we have the 
8 Utah Supreme Court actually looking at is something raised in 
9 summary judgment sufficient implied consent under Rule 15(b) 
10 where it doesn't have to go to trial. And they kind of say, 
11 you know, we're really not going to rule upon can be brought 
12 on summary judgment or does it have to go trial. In fact, 
13 they didn't rule either way on the issue. But they did 
14 uphold summary judgment on damages that were never plead in 
15 the original complaint. In that case, the trial court issued 
16 summary judgment, they granted damages -
17 THE COURT: And the Supreme Court impliedly 
18 approved implied argument? 
19 MR. OLSON: Exactly. They said we're not going to 
20 say the trial court was wrong in including those damages. It 
21 looks like it was before the court, it was put before the 
22 court by the parties, we're not going to overturn it. They 
23 never really got to the issue of does it actually have to be 
24 tried in court, could it be summary judgment. But the 
25 reality in that case was summary judgment, they didn't go to 
1 trial. 
2 THE COURT: The outcome came out the way that the 
3 party advocated those damages wanted. 
4 MR. OLSON: Exactly. So it's really the exact 
5 situation we have before us here. Issue brought before the 
6 court in summary judgment, and now we're on the eve of trial, 
7 are we going to say that the issue can't go to trial. Again, 
8 that issue was tried by the implied consent of the parties 
9 and two years passed without anybody saying a thing about us 
10 not going to trial on these issues. 
11 THE COURT: Counsel, again it's the fabric of this 
12 case that becomes so difficult for us to get our heads around 
13 logically. Because I really don't have any difficulty in 
14 implying into the pleadings of fraud in the inducement plan. 
15 It's been spoken of for years in this litigation. It has 
16 been eluded to either directly or indirectly for years. And 
17 even if I grant your motion to amend, I'm still stuck with 
18 the problem of looking at the arguments that Mr. Ronnow's 
19 client is making that even if this were plead with 
20 specificity, even if it were there within the pleadings and 
21 all four corners, and I know they're not conceding that it is 
22 and they're going to fight that nitch too. But even if it 
23 was, there simply isn't the proof to carry by clear and 
24 convincing evidence. And yeah, there might be a justiciable 
25 issue of fact as it goes to a preponderance test, but fraud 
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1 is clear and convincing and that's the next step that I 
2 conceptually leapt to, and maybe I shouldn't have. But 
3 that's why I see the flavor of the case changing between the 
4 time that we had summary judgment and the time we heard the 
5 motion in limine. Can you help me around that concern? 
6 MR. OLSON: Well, I can certainly try and that kind 
7 of moves into the area of their motion in limine. But again, 
8 Your Honor, we came before you two years ago, almost to the 
9 month, on summary judgment. I guess maybe I'm not 
10 understanding completely where the court is going in saying 
11 that the flavor has changed in the last two years. The only 
12 thing that's happened in two years is we're waiting for a 
13 trial date. 
14 THE COURT: Well, in all candor, counsel, one of 
15 the things that happened is I think the court's focused more 
16 specifically on what is needed in this case for it to go to 
17 trial. And when I focused on the fact that, yes, we have 
18 disputed facts, but those disputed facts will not meet the 
19 necessary level of proof to make it to clear and convincing 
20 in ocder to prevail and I can rule on that as a matter of law 
21 based upon the record that we have. And so it kind of throws 
22 us back to summary judgment that I wasn't specifically 
23 focused enough two years ago, and I think you can rightly 
24 tell your clients it's the fault of the Court. Maybe I 
25 should have done this bwo years ago looking at that evidence 
and then suddenly it 
Mr. Ronnow filed his 
MR. OLSON: 
was focused for me at the last time when 
motion in limine. 
Okay. And I guess I see where the 
court's going with this - obviously, that position is two 
years ago we had an issue of fact, we still have an issue of 
fact. 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. OLSON: And I understand that the Court's 
essentially saying, well, maybe I changed my mind and I 
understand that. But I guess I would also assert that, you 
know, assuming that I can amend, that we can get this issue 
properly before the court, I would strenuously disagree that 
there is not sufficient facts to put before a jury in this 
case that they could find for the defendant. 
In my memorandum in opposition, I essentially 
treated their opposition to limine, I've essentially treated 
it as an opposition to summary judgment and I've gone through 
and I've laid out all the facts with citation deposition that 
I would put before the jury in this case. Now those facts 
need to be construed in favor of my client. The Court needs 
to look at it saying let's assume that all of these facts are 
correct, that all of them are going to come out before the 
jury in this case, then make my decision. Do I have or do I 
not have rather enough to get us anywhere close to -
THE COURT: And that's the kind of focus that I 
1 need, counselor, it really truly is. 
2 MR. OLSON: Okay. That being the case, I think 
3 it's important that we look at - we look at the standard that 
4 we're dealing with here. I cited to Reliable Furniture case 
5 that says summary judgment is drastic, especially when 
6 granted in the pretrial stage. It states, the trial court 
7 should not weigh evidence or assess credibility, but only 
8 grant if facts construed in favor of defendant or in summary 
9 judgment. 
10 Now as we go through the memorandum, I can 
11 certainly go through all the facts I'm going to put - put 
12 before the Court. There's kind of this period of leading up 
13 to February 18, 2002 where the parties sit down and they sign 
14 the contract. It's the subject matter of this case. The 
15 facts that we have deposition references to are as follows: 
16 that at the meeting, Mr. Fisher stated that each of the 
17 tables were subject to contracts with certain medical 
18 professionals; that he stated that all the contracts were in 
19 good condition at standing; that nothing changed with the 
20 contracts; the contracts were still functioning. 
21 THE COURT: I'm sorry to interrupt, counsel, but 
22 you're reading from pleading. Can you give me a page number 
23 so I can -
24 MR, OLSON: Sure. 
25 THE COURT: - kind of get into it? 
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1 MR. OLSON: I'm looking at my memorandum of points 
2 and authorities in opposition to motion in limine, starting 
3 on page two with my numbered paragraphs, wherein it says -
4 essentially I'm just reciting a statement of facts. 
5 THE COURT: All right. And this is from the 
6 depositions? 
7 MR. OLSON: It is from the depositions. Each of 
8 these facts have a deposition reference. 
9 THE COURT: Uh-huh (affirmative). 
10 MR. OLSON: Official representative Davidhizer at 
11 the meeting and prior to the meeting by letter from his 
12 attorney, the tables were generating between $5,000 and 
13 $7,000 in income each month. The meeting culminated in an 
14 agreement to purchase the entity and take on substantial 
15 debts. Prior to the February 18th meeting, Dr. Cutler had 
16 informed Mr. Fisher that he wanted to change the contract, 
17 that specifically he wanted to cancel or that he would not be 
18 continuing the contract. Mr. Fisher knew that Dr. Cutler 
19 wanted to change or cancel his contract prior to that 
20 February 18 meeting, but didn't tell Davidhizer, rather, he 
21 represented that the contracts were in good standing. Fisher 
22 kn ew that Dr. Cutler was not happy with his contract, he knew 
23 that Dr. Cutler had no tech hired to operate the table at his 
24 place. 
25 Immediately after the February 18th meeting as my 
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client's driving away from the meeting, Mr. Fisher tells Gene 
Coder that Dr. Cutler's contract was in trouble, that he 
wants to be changed to a lease agreement, or that he's 
negotiating to become a lease agreement. Fisher never told 
Dr. Davidhizer any of these issues with Dr. Cutler's 
contract. Davidhizer didn't learn about the issues of Dr„ 
Cutler's contract until he met with Cutler in the next day or 
so after signing the contract, wherein Cutler informs him of 
this. In that meeting, Dr. Cutler states that he'd already 
talked to Fisher regarding the contract. He's already been 
engaged in preliminary negotiations in maybe setting up a new 
contract that would be necessary if he's going to continue 
operating this table. 
There is a dispute between plaintiffs and the tech 
that was assigned to operate Dr. Jepson's table, went onto a 
different contract. That table became unmanned for a 
significant period of time right before the signing of this 
contract. There was no tech to operate it, it was sitting 
essentially latent doing nothing. Rather than representing 
to Davidhizer that there was a problem with Dr. Jepson's 
table that it wasn't generating any income because there was 
no tech to operate it [inaudible] for generating this amount 
of income. 
Because of billing problems or because of problems 
with the billing company, the plaintiff was not receiving 
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1 payments actually due and owing on the Dr. Jepson table. 
2 There was a third-party billing company that was operating 
3 the billing of that table. They were having a dispute 
4 between the two of them, and OMC never got paid on many of 
5 the billing on Dr. Jepson's table. And they were actively 
6 dealing with billing problems on that table prior to this 
7 contract being signed. They said nothing to Davidhizer about 
8 those problems. In Fisher's deposition, he states that he 
9 knew that OMC was paying out more money than they were 
10 generating. 
11 The statement of facts go on to talk about the 
12 actual monies generated by each of the tables leading up to 
13 this February 18th time. The table was placed with Dr. 
14 Cutler in mid-August of 2001 and the five months between that 
15 and the time the contract was signed, they'd only deposited 
16 $6,450 into its bank accounts from that contract with Dr. 
17 Cutler, or approximately $1,300 a month. 
18 Placed a table with Dr. Ott in October of 2001. In 
19 the four months time between that and the time of the 
20 contract, they had deposited $5,000 in the bank account from 
21 Dr. Ott. Approximately $1,200 monthly. They placed a table 
22 with Jepson in November of *01, and in the three months of 
23 time that that was there before the contract was signed, 
24 they'd only deposited almost $1,300 for an average of about 
25 $425 a month. 
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1 So in looking at these averages from the time those 
2 three tables were placed with each of those three doctors and 
3 coming up to the point of signing the contract,- they averaged 
4 $2,548 per month. They weren't averaging anywhere close to 
5 the $5,000 to $7,000 monthly that they claimed they were 
6 averaging. 
7 The accounting documents, although the plaintiffs 
8 claim they provided accounting documents to Davidhizer prior 
9 to this meeting, they had every opportunity to investigate 
10 it, to look at it and determine what the income was. The 
11 testimony from the accountants who reviewed those documents 
12 is they were in horrible form. We couldn't make heads or 
13 tails of it. They were useless. He didn't receive any 
L4 accounting records that were sufficient to make any real 
15 analysis until after that February 18 meeting. 
16 So at the time of the meeting, Davidhizer had no 
17 information to either prove or reject the claims that were 
18 being made by plaintiffs with regard to the income or the 
19 status of the contracts. He had to rely on the 
20 representations. 
21 The testimony would be that had Fisher informed 
22 Davidhizer about Dr. Cutler's intent to change or cancel the 
23 contract or that the profits were not actually $5,000 to 
24 $7,000 monthly, Davidhizer wouldn't have entered into this 
25 agreement. So as a direct result of those representations 
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regarding the profitability and the status of the contracts, 
he entered in to a contract tl lat was i lot what it "was 
represented to be. Those are the facts all supported by 
depositioi 1 testj mony of Davidhizer, Fisher, Gene Coder, 
Robert Nash, Dr. Cutler, many witnesses that will come before 
the Com;l \o support: those very facts. Now" while the Court 
can sit here and review those facts and try and mull over and 
do we have enougl i to get us to clear and convincing, the fact 
of the matter is there are sufficient facts there that :i f we 
construe those in favor of ray client, we assume that they 
actually happened, there''' s no question iciat a reasonable jury 
coi il d find in favor of defendant on this case. It's got to 
go before a jury. My c] lent deser ves his d.iy in cmirL 
Wer ve been 1 itigating 1:his case f or six years . And he 
d e s e r v e s 11 i e o p p o r 11 11 i j f y t o p i i1 :i t before a ) i i r y o f • a i i d 
determine whether he can succeed on his claims. 
THE COI JRT: Tl lai lk yoi it coi m s e l . 
MR. OLSON: T h a n k y o u . 
THE COI JRT: I appreciate that insight with 
specificity. 
Mr. Ronnow. 
MR. RONNOW: Your Honor, I'I n going to ask ror some 
indulgence as we go back through [inaudible]. Rut 1 want to 
first of all focus the Court. Counsel has made this a 
summary judgment argument because he gets to a different 
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1 standard, and if he gets to an issue of fact, he argues or -
2 I'm sorry, I don't want to personalize this, defendant has 
3 made that argument, gets to the jury, okay? 
4 Now then we did not, despite the fact that our 
5 motion has the same result as a summary judgment, we did not 
6 plead or argue or ask for summary judgment. All right. So I 
7 submit to the Court from the get go that reviewing this from 
8 the standard and under the cases of summary judgment is a 
9 mistake. It's not where we are in this case. Indeed, where 
10 we are is in construing the interaction of four rules of 
11 civil procedure, all of which are - vest the Court with broad 
12 discretion. And those rules are first of all Rule 16, the 
13 pretrial rule, and the - and particularly under the 
14 amendments, the recent amendments, is 16 expanding the 
15 flexibility of Rule 16, and expanding the remedies that the 
16 Court has under the Court's broad discretion to apply the 
17 requirements and sanctions from Rule 26 through Rule 37 - 37 
18 being the sanctions, Rule 26, of course, being the discovery. 
19 Now for starters as we put those - and then 9(b), 
20 of course, with regard to specificity. We're going to set 
21 9(b) aside for just a minute. This is one of those 
22 statements that goes without saying and then here I'm going 
23 to say it. The Court has broad discretion in managing a 
24 trial at the pretrial setting under Rule 16 to marshal and 
25 inquire and discuss evidentiary issues, witnesses, exhibits, 
16 
etc. And the cases that we cited in our memorandum clearly 
give the Court authority to strike answers and defenses that 
have the net effect of a summary judgment, but are indeed 
procedural remedj es i mcler Rule 16, 2 6 and 37= All right. 
Now, that's where our motion is. Nov/ that's important 
because it's a different standard. First of all, the Court 
has broad discretion in managing, exercising the Court1' s 
authority to manage under those three rules so that the 
standard :i n review is abuse of , diseretion . Dif f erent t:1 Ian 
summary judgment, 
THE COURT: W< ul ]
 t 1:1 le s tai idarc I c )f re view my 
decision would be abuse of discretion- But your analysis, as 
I I 11 i d e r s t a i i d :i t, c o i 11 I s e ] , t a k e s m e a w a y f r o in 11 I e R I i ] e 5 6 
analysis drawing all inferences :i n favor of the party against 
whom I in- ifit;f in i,') niadn,, That takes me :i n a different 
direction, doesiV t: i I , Mr. Ronnow? 
MR- RONNOW: Yes, and that's where we go to next, 
Your Honor. Ai id that brings us to Rule 9» First of a J 1, in 
the cases that we cited, just a quick summary, Rule 9 applies 
to aid circumstances of misrepresentation covered by fraud :i i i 
its broadest context. That's the Williams vs. State Farm 
case at hbb f,/!d lJbb which we rih'il in out i aemo a. t page 3. 
Counsel has added in the eleventh hour as part of our 
d i s c u s s i o n s r e g a r d i n g 1: h e p r e t r i a 1 o r d e r n e g 1 i g e n t 
misrepresentation that wasn't expressly plead. So I want to 
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1 make sure - and much of the discussion here, if you go 
2 through these facts that the defendant just went through, 
3 most of those statements of fact are not statements of 
4 representations or misrepresentations. 
5 THE COURT: Hang on a second, counsel. 
6 MR. RONNOW: That's quite all right. 
7 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
8 (Off the record briefly) 
9 MR. RONNOW: All right. So first of all if we look 
10 at those facts, I'm going to come back to those in a minute, 
11 much of what was just recited to the Court is - is 
12 information developed through other witnesses as to what they 
13 believe Mr. Fisher knew for the basis of a negligent 
14 misrepresentation should have disclosed. Okay? All right. 
15 So Williams vs. State Farm says Rule 9 encompasses 
16 that as well, that the - that the negligent misrepresentation 
17 and negligent misrepresentation is fraud encompassed under 
18 Rule 9. That case is Smith vs. Frandsen, 94 P.3d 919, which 
19 we cited in our memorandum and that brings us in, pulls us 
20 away from the kind of negligence quagmire back into Rule 9 
21 that even - even if we plead - even if the defendant pleads 
22 in the counterclaim negligent misrepresentation, they don't 
23 avoid the application of Rule 9. 
24 In Derby vs. Noble this is - and this is important. 
25 Derby vs. Noble states that the general rule that allegations 
18 
:i ii complaints should be liberally construed does not apply to 
fraud.,. Now 11 iat' s :i i nportant even when we come back to these 
statements of fact -
THE COURT: Is that becai ise of the high standard of 
proof in a fraud case, counsel? Is that the justification? 
MR. RONNOW: That's absolutely why and it's, I 
believe, Your Honor, although courts have kind of started 
with the text of Rule 9 p] ead with particularity, and have 
focused on what is required to meet that standard without 
talking a whole ] ot about policy that gave rise to Rule 9 in 
the first place, bi it the allegation of fraud :I i I the 
inducement j n a commercial setting has - has some serious 
o n i i s t o :i I:, Y o \ :i 3 : I I o i I o r P. .i l d f o r 11 I a t r e a s o i I , i t' s e a s :i 1 y 
made but not necessarily easily proved bi it it's a litt] e bit 
J :i k e c :i : y r a p e ' '! i< - • • • • • d - •; t h e c 1 i a r g e , t h e r e i s 11 i a t 
s 1 1 gma 1: h a t a 11 aches particular I y i n a c omme r c i a 1 c ommu n i t y, 
ai id so 11: Ie pub.1 i c poJ icy :i s t: 1 ia I: :i f y o i i' re going to throw 
those allegations around, you're going to have to plead it 
with particularity and have some - some serious evidence, 
clear and convincing, before we put that in front of a jury., 
So that, and i inder the - the Derby vs. Noble case, it also 
talks about that the pleadings mus L state wi th par Licu 1.arity 
the circumstances supporting each element of fraud. In other 
w o r d s, the c i r c ui n s t a n c e s o f t h e w 1: i o I e p u n c h ] i s t, 
misrepresentation, knowledge of falsity, made with intent to 
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1 rely, the actual reliance, damages, the other part of this 
2 recitation of facts that we just went through from 
3 defendant's memo is that much of that information is not 
4 developed or received from the plaintiffs in this case. It 
5 comes from other sources., And so the issue of reliance on 
6 these alleged misrepresentations needs to be plead with 
7 particularity, and it simply has not been done. 
8 Now, Your Honor, I want to focus on a case that I 
9 think is - is right on point that we have cited, and I've 
10 provided a copy - this isn't the West copy, Your Honor, so 
11 citations are a little bit tricky* This is Carrols vs. 
12 Sabey, it's 79 P.3d 974, Ct. App. (2003). And first of all, 
13 it's important to note that this was a motion to dismiss, but 
14 it was a motion to dismiss that had come down the road. 
15 There had been some - some work done on this case, and it was 
16 after a lengthy hearing and the court dismissed at the 
17 conclusion of the hearing the fraud charges on the basis that 
18 they failed to comply with Rule 9. And then in addition, in 
19 memorandum opinion that was prepared by the court after the 
20 hearing, dismissed all the other claims that were raised by 
21 the moving party in that case, and denied the motion to 
22 amende All right. Denied the motion to amend. 
23 Now in our situation, we have had, as counsel 
24 pointed out, we have had years in this litigation. And we 
25 have had years since - since defendants hired current 
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1 counsel.. We have had a long period of time following the 
2 close of the discovery order, 11 ie cutoffs :i i I 11 Ie d:i scovery 
3 order, which was•an order of the court which has never been 
4 amended, And now we seek :i i I tl le eleventh 1 101 ixy .1 it era.] ly oi i 
5 the Friday before 'a Monday trial to amend the complaint and 
6 effect! v e 1 y a IT L e i i d 11 I e o r d e r s o f 11 I e d 1 s c o v e r y o r d e r entered 
7 by the Court, you know, without any real justification as to 
8 wt Iy 11 Iere was 11 lat 1 eng11 Iy de] ay :i i i determining what had to 
be done under; Rule 9. 
Cn r. r o i s f:ar>(! goes on and states that the 
1i mere recitation of the elements of fraud are simply 
i',u;i ,•::<.. '•! '] • 'uu look at paragraph 27, Yoi ir Honor, 
]
 - | you begin a discussion that real h< outlines the details tl la 1: 
.. * ' 'luired by the Court of Appeals under Rule 9. It states 
1!.) that the relevant surrounding facts, excuse xnei j i I Ri iJ e -
16 paragraph 26 is the statement that mere recitation of Hie 
] 7 elements oL f hind is not 2oes nni r^ii isty the i *'< )u i t ement „ 
18 It goes on to say that the relevant - in paragraph 27 - the 
J 2 relevant surroi n idii ig fac ts need In 1;HJ plead in sin h ,i m,inner 
2D that it is evident what facts are claimed to constitute the 
2 1 fraud cl larges. , 
22 Now even if you go back to this recitation of facts 
22 in the memorandum that was just discussed with the Court, 
2 4 there are no specific statements in there, save one, 
2 5 paragrapl I 9, tl lat as Davidhizer was driving away, Plaintiff 
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Fisher told Gene Coder that Dr. Cutler's contract was going 
to be changed to a lease agreement or that he is negotiating 
to make it a lease agreement. That does not change the 
material contact - contract terms under the agreement that 
they had discussed., 
THE COURT: Well, counsel, let me follow you up 
with that because changing this from a prior contract, which 
I believe was a sale contract, -to a lease agreement may not 
have had any material impact upon the cash flow from this 
asset. Is that really what you're telling me about it? 
MR„ RONNOW: No, hidden in that statement and 
question is the implication that somehow a lease term is a 
material change over a contract term. In fact, all of the 
contracts were terminable at will by these doctors. So 
that's - that's an important factor that gets lost. We 
haven't gone into that detail. But so his - Mr. Fisher's 
statement that we're changing this to a lease agreement does 
not constitute fraud by clear and convincing standard that -
that somehow that statement or that change in status 
materially undermines all of the discussions leading up to 
that agreemento 
THE COURT: Okay. I follow you. 
MR. RONNOW: The discussions and details that are 
never articulated by defendant. Now Carrols goes on to say 
in paragraph 27 on the following page, that and continuing 
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into paragraph 28, that the relevant surrounding facts must 
be plead in such a mannei; thai is iwi.deni whaL the facts are 
that constitute fraud. We've said that and it simply isn't 
apparent what the factual statements are that constitute 
fraud. They - :i t requires that it describe the material 
misrepresentatioi 1 wi 11 1 par t:icu 1 ar:i ty. This recitation of 
facts does not describe any representation, save the one we 
jus t spoke aboi i t:, w:i 11 I ai Iy particu 1 arity at a 1J If goes on 
j i i paragraph 28 to say that whi 1 e this :i s not ii i 1:ei Ided to be 
,J11 exl laustd ve J i s t, we point oi it two further deficiencies in 
the complaint. First a section :i i i tl le complai i i t tl lat 
purports to describe a material misrepresentation that 
defendants made to piaintifts tall, shoM. o I. doing 'o wiMi 
particularity. For the most part, plaintiffs used a passive 
voice failing to i den t i f y ex a c f ] y wi I o ma d e 11 i e a ] ] e g e d 
misrepresentations. 
N o w i f w e s t o p t h e r e f o r j i i s t a rn :i i I u t e a i i d even 
pick up the first amended complaint, Your .Honor, in paragraph 
1 ^
 r win rli i » Mii; oiil/ paragj dph MiaL attempts to plead fraud, 
the statement :i s, representations by and through OMC, David 
F:i si ler ai id Darwj i i E ' i sher, and their officers, directors, 
agents and employees that OMC had been making profits on the 
tab] es of at least the amount of $5, 000 to $7 f000 per month, 
and that the contracts w i t h d o c t o r s 1: o w h o in t i: i o s e t a b 1 e s w e r e 
being leased were ii I good standing. The statement that we 
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1 are negotiating a modification from a contract to a lease by 
2 itself is not evidence that the contract was not in good 
3 standing. And there is no other - there is no other - even 
4 in the amended pleading, Your Honor, there is no statement 
5 with specificity as to the how, what, where and why. Let's 
6 turn over, Your Honor, if you would, to footnote 15 and in 
7 J the copied case it's on page 12 of 15. For some reason they 
don't paginate the footnotes. So we've got five pages of 
9 I footnotes with no page numbers. But if you look at the upper 
10 right-hand corner, page 12 of 15, we have the footnote in 
11 that case in which the court goes on to add some further 
12 detail. 
13 Furthermore, the allegation fails to provide other 
14 relevant surrounding facts regarding misrepresentations such 
15 as time, location in which it was uttered. It cites a case 
16 for that requirement. Requiring that the alleged fraud 
17 conclude the who, what, where, when, and how. The first 
18 paragraph of a newspaper story in the allegations. And then 
19 cites to a federal case in the District of Utah, Cook vs. 
20 Zions 1st National Bank, for the proposition that plaintiffs 
21 failed to set forth in specific terms the time, place, 
22 content and manner of each defendant's alleged material 
23 misrepresentations or otherwise fraudulent conduct. Now -
24 THE COURT: The allegation of fraudulent conduct 
25 toward all the classes of the plaintiff we the people is not 
24 
adequate. 
MR. RONNOW: That's correct, Your Honor. Ai id we go 
back to the metaphor I i ised in August. We are 01 1 the eve of 
trial with a j ury, ' not a bench t r ia1, bi 11 a j ury. So we're 
scrambling to do everything that has to be done in way of 
jury instructions, special ii i terrogatories, 11 ie ji ] J :y verd i ct 
form, al] of which require specific, express knowledge of 
these kinds of issues :i i i order for i is to fairly present 01 lr 
case, prepare our case for a jury, otherwise it's like 
throw i n g a s 1 i c > v e ] f i i ] 1 < ::) f g r a v e ] i i I : 1 1 I < * j i I r y a n d s a y i n g, 
somewhere in there is a nugget of gold and leave tl: le jury to 
sort i t oi i t or ] eave i is :i i I tl le week we have allocated for 
trial to sort it all out as we go.. That again is a policy 
11 ia 1: I 11 I:i i I ] : i Ii iderp:i i Is Ri I 1 e 9. T1 iat is why Ru 1 e ] 6 has been 
broaden to give the court's authority to sift through this 
. : . " ) - - , motion in limine on the eve before a jury 
trial, Wa.i L a nJnute, We've been years at this thing and 
plaintiffs' counterclaim defendants, Fishers are now standing 
here, they sti 11 do i iot have an express statement as to wI: iei i, 
where, 'who, how, what on each of those elements of fraud in 
order to prepar.e an ef.fecti.vc: defense, and JIIOSI- CJ iLlcal.Ly, 
Your Honor, in order to prepare effective cross-examination' 
o(" i he d(3 fondant t:i ninterclaimants' w.i tnesses,, That's wl ry 
this Court has such broad authority in that pretrial setting, 
M<\ Yorn. IIOIKU",. you - WIHMI you look at tl lat, this 
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1 case in argument as I said in the beginning is not a summary 
2 judgment case. This isn't a summary judgment case. But even 
3 if it were, defendants' own summary judgment case that they 
4 cite is interesting, it has some interesting language, this 
5 is Republic Group, Inc. vs. One Door Corp., 883 P.2d 285 at 
6 291. The court there says - and this is the Court of Appeals 
7 - in order to grant summary judgment claim - judgment on this 
8 claim, the trial court had to determine that Republic failed 
9 to supply evidence which if accepted as true would clearly 
10 and convincingly support each element of fraud - each element 
11 of fraud. 
12 THE COURT: Who, what, where, when, how. 
13 MR. RONNOW: So even if we look at this thing in a 
14 summary judgment in a fraud case, in connection to Rule 9 
15 requiring particularity, the standard is clear and convincing 
16 each element with particularity, or this Court has the 
17 discretion to grant summary judgment, and under Rule 16 has 
18 discretion to do it in a pretrial hearing without further 
19 expanded notice. That's what happened, Your Honor. We're in 
20 the same place we were that Friday before trial in August and 
21 we still do not have with any particularity any evidence or 
22 any specified pleadings as to each element of fraud. That 
23 isn't just misrepresentations or omissions. That is if we're 
24 doing - if we're doing a straight up fraud, that's the 
25 misrepresentations, that's the knowledge that they were 
26 
1 inaccurate, that's the intent to induce reliance, that's the 
2 actual reliance, that's the damages. Clear and convincing as 
3 to each one of those elements.. If we add negligent 
4 misrepresentation, then we have to have clear and convincing 
5 evidence with regard to duty and the failure to discharge 
6 that duty as well as the other elements of fraud. That 
7 burden, even under the summary judgment standard applicable 
8 to fraud, has simply not been met, and this Court has the 
9 discretion to grant and now affirm the order striking the 
10 answer and counterclaim under Rule 9, 16, 26 and 37, which 
11 the Court did before trial. We submit that that is 
12 appropriate and should be affirmed, Your Honor. 
13 THE COURT: Mr. Olson? 
14 MR. OLSON: Yeah, real briefly, Your Honor. I 
15 guess if the analysis is that we're not talking about summary 
16 judgment here today. We're purely talking about Rule 16 and 
17 the motion in limine. If that's the analysis - well, the 
18 first issue is if the Court's going to grant the motion to 
19 amend, then we no longer have an issue on the motion in 
20 limine now. We move forward. So I think the court still has 
21 to go through a two-part analysis is am I going to grant the 
22 motion to amend? If yes, then the motion in limine is really 
23 of no further issue. We move forward based upon the amended 
24 pleading. 
25 With regard to the representations and the reasons 
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1 for the motion in limine on the eve of trial seeking to 
2 prohibit evidence of the issues of fraud, it's curious to me 
3 that the argument would be made that we had no way to move 
4 forward with trial because we didn't have the details of the 
5 representations all of the elements of fraud. We didn't have 
6 that- It wasn't particularly plead, we didn't have it. But 
7 yet two years prior in a motion for summary judgment, they 
8 stated with some very good specificity that, Hey, that letter 
9 from my lawyer was just his opinion. You know, my 
10 representations in that meeting were just my opinion. You 
11 know, I thought the contracts were in good standing. This 
12 and that. They discussed all the issues with particularity. 
13 So it's certainly not an issue of we got to the eve of trial 
14 and we didn't have sufficient information to move forward and 
15 base it on. That's just not the case in this case. They 
16 knew for two years prior to trial exactly the representations 
17 that we were talking about. You know, it's not fair to come 
18 before the court and suggest that we can't prepare for trial 
19 the Friday before the Monday. 
20 Your Honor, the details, again, the recitation of 
21 facts as we go through my opposition to the motion in limine, 
22 I disagree that we don't have an argument of the 
23 misrepresentations. The plaintiffs have suggested that, Hay, 
24 all they have is all of this stuff gleaned after the fact 
25 through discovery to support the misrepresentation. They 
28 
1 went out and they talked to Cutler and they talked to Coder 
2 and all these other people, and that's where they're getting 
3 their stuff. They didn't have misrepresentations they relied 
4 upon before the fact. Well, that's really not the case here, 
5 Your Honor. Rather, saying very specifically Fisher stated 
6 in the meeting that the contracts were in good standing. His 
7 lawyer stated in a letter attached to the proposed amended 
8 complaint before the meeting that the contracts were making 
9 $5,000 to $7,000 monthly- Those representations were made. 
10 They were made by Fisher, they were made by his attorney. 
11 That's exactly what those statements of fact say. 
12 Now we did go out and we did do discovery and that 
13 was to prove the falsity. That's one other thing I have to 
14 do is prove the falsity of the representation. Obviously, we 
15 didn't go out and get that from whoever we can get it from. 
16 I don't have to rely on my own client for the falsity. I can 
17 rely on Coder, I can rely on Cutler, I can rely on anybody to 
18 show that the representation made that my client relied upon 
19 was false. So we do have sufficient statement of what the 
20 misrepresentations are. 
21 Again, Your Honor, I would urge this Court that 
22 summary judgment - the effective summary judgment at this 
23 stage is a drastic remedy. My client should be granted bhe 
24 opportunity to put the case before the jury and see how it 
25 comes out. 
29 
1 THE COURT: Thank you, counsel. 
2 Counsel, I really appreciate the quality of 
3 lawyering that has been brought to this matter today. It's 
4 really just an excellent, excellent, intellectual effort that 
5 both of you have put in on this. But I am still persuaded 
6 where I was back in August. Mr. Ronnow was right, and the 
7 order from there will stand. 
8 You can draft that in whatever form you wish, Mr. 
9 Ronnow, but we still stand where we were back on that Friday 
10 in August. 
11 MR. RONNOW: All right, Your Honor. In the spirit 
12 of the Christmas plates, could I have two weeks to submit the 
13 order? 
14 THE COURT: At least, counsel. Take 21 days. 
15 MR. RONNOW: Thank you. 
16 THE COURT: All right. 
17 MR. OLSON: Thank you, Your Honor. With that, Your 
18 Honor, I'm assuming that the order includes denying my motion 
19 to amend? 
20 THE COURT: It does, counsel. 
21 MR. OLSON: Okay. 
22 THE COURT: All right. Thanks everyone. Mr. 
23 Olson, you're going to get all that stuff back for a recycle 
24 credite Mr. Ronnow can take his too. 
25 MR. RONNOW: Thank you, Your Honor. 
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1 THE COURT: Thanks everyone. We'll be in recess 
2 until 1:30. 
3 I (Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
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riFTH DISTRICT COURT 
2QB9J0128 PH2--58 
V^SHINGTOH COUNTY 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN A^DFOR 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID FISHER, individually and on behalf 
of OFFICE MANAGEMENT 
CONSULTANTS, L.C., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
LAVERN DAVIDHIZER, an individual; 
ROBERT NASH, an individual; DENNIS j 
McOMBER, an individual, \ 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 020500856 
Judge James L. Shumate 
The above entitled and numbered case came regularly for trial on October 9,2008 and May 
7, 2009. The parties having waived the jury, the matter was tried to the Court, with D. William 
Ronnow, of Jenkins Ronnow Jensen & Bayles, LLP. and Darwin C. Fisher appearing as the attorneys 
for David Fisher and Office Management Consultants, L.C., and Brian L. Olsen of Gallian, Wilcox, 
Welker & Olsen, LC. appearing as the attorney for LaVern Davidhizer. The Court heard the 
testimony of the parties and received the exhibits offered at trial. The Court then directed counsel 
for each side to submit closing arguments and proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
in written form and in compact disc. The Court received Plaintiffs pleadings in that form on June 
10, 2009, and the matter was then under advisement 
After considering the evidence, the arguments of counsel and being fully advised herein, the 
Court makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
PARTIES 
1. Plaintiff David Fisher (hereinafter "Fisher") is a resident of Washington county, State 
ofUtah. 
2. Plaintiff Office Management Consultants, L.C. (hereinafter "OMC"), is a Utah limited 
liability company having its principal place of business in Washington County, State of Utah. 
3. Defendant LaVern Davidhizer (hereinafter "Davidhizer") is an individual residing 
in Soldotna, State of Alaska. 
4. Defendant Robbie Nash was dismissed prior to trial. 
5. Defendant Dennis McOmber was- dismissed prior to trial 
Jurisdiction 
6. The written contract which is the subject of this lawsuit was negotiated and signed 
in St. George, Washington County, Utah. 
7. Jurisdiction is proper in this court pursuant to UCA § 78A-5-102(l). 
8. Venue of this action properly rests in this Court pursuant to UCA § 78B~3-304(2) and 
UCA§78B-3-205(l)&(3). 
HISTORY 
9. On April 10,2000, OMC was organized. 
10. OMC was in business to provide billing services and DRS tables to medical providers 
2 
for disc decompression treatments. 
11. Fisher and H. Eugene Coder ("Coder") were the only members of OMC. 
12. Coder was the managing partner of OMC until he resigned and ceased to perform any 
services for OMC in December 200L 
13. In approximately October 2001, Defendant Robert Nash, Davidhizer? s accountant and 
business advisor, created a dispute by claiming that Davidhizer was a partner in two DRS tables 
owned by OMC. 
14. On February 18, 2002, a meeting was held to resolve the dispute. 
15. In attendance at the meeting were Fisher, Coder, Nash, Davidhizer, and attorney 
Darwin Fisher who represented OMC. 
THE AGREEMENT 
16. On February 18, 2002, a written Settlement Agreement ("Agreement") was drafted 
and signed by the parties. 
17. The Agreement provided: 
a. That Fisher would transfer all of his ownership in OMC to Davidhizer; (See 
Exhibit L at %l) 
b. That Coder would transfer all but 10% of his ownership in OMC to 
Davidhizer leaving Coder with a 10% ownership interest in OMC; (See 
Exhibit!, at fQ 
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That Fisher would transfer his ownership of the DRS table he personally 
purchased and on which he was personally paying the purchase price, to 
Davidhizer; (See Exhibit 1, at «||2) 
That OMC would transfer its ownership in the two DRS tables it purchased 
to Davidhizer; (See Exhibit , at T[3) 
That in exchange for the ownership of OMC and the DRS tables, Davidhizer 
agreed to assume and pay the following loans which represented debt 
incurred by OMC and Fisher in the purchase of the DRS tables and debt 
incurred in the operation of OMC; 
1) Far West Bank Line of Credit in the in amount of $40,000.00; 
2) North American Medical Corp. loan in the amount of $45,000.00; 
3) GMAC loan in the amount of $60,000.00; 
4) Anderson loan in the amount of $35,000.00; 
5) The Eagle Crest Partnership building lease past due balance and 
future payments; and 
6) Wells Fargo Bank, Anchorage, Alaska loan in the approximate 
amount of $99,000.00. (See Exhibit 1, at ff) 
That Davidhizer shall make arrangements to have Fisher and Coder removed 
as parties to any contracts, lines of credit and loans that Davidhizer is 
4 
assuming, and substitute security for any securiiy pledged by Fisher or Coder, 
and/or obtain new lines of credit, and/or obtain new loans, and/or enter into 
contracts to remove both Fisher and Coder from all liability; (See Exhibit 
I,at1f5) 
That Fisher shall retain ownership of the following equipment: 
1) one computer; 
2) 1 Acer monitor; 
3) 1 Microsoft keyboard; 
4) 1 HP 3200 printer; and 
5) a copy of all of the software. (See Exhibit 1, at ^  6) 
That Fisher shall retain ownership of and collect all outstanding accounts 
receivable except the accounts receivable for the Boise office; (See Exhibit 
1, at 1(7) 
That Fisher would continue to operate OMC through February 28,2002, for 
which he would be paid 7% of all monies generated by OMC through 
February 28, 2002, that he would be paid for all technician work he 
performed through February 28,2002, and that he would be paid all expenses 
of the operation for OMC through February 28,2002; (See Exhibit 1, at ^  8) 
That Davidhizer would assume and pay all debts incurred by OMC after 
5 
February 18,2002; (See Exhibit 1, at % 9) 
k. That Davidhizer would receive the equipment listed on Exhibit A attached to 
the Agreement, which includes: 
1) 2 computers with disc burner, Tower, and screen; 
2) 1 fax machine; 
3) 1 file cabinet; 
4) " 5 office chairs; 
5) HCFA forms and envelopes; and 
5) Lytec software, Flash Code software, Suite 2000 software. (See 
Exhibit 1, at flO) 
1. That Fisher shall retain all other equipment, fixtures, supplies, etc. (See 
Exhibit 1, at % 10) 
m. That the Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of Utah. (See 
Exhibit 1, at ^ 11) 
n. That if suit were to be brought to enforce the terms of the Agreement, that the 
prevailing party "shall be entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs." (See 
Exhibit 1, at fl2) 
18. Fisher agreed to pay OMC's remaining debt in the approximate sum of 
$20,000.00 from the monies he collected from the accounts receivables, even though that 
6 
obligation was not contained in the written Agreement. 
19 After signing the Agreement, Fisher did operate OMC through February 28, 2002 
as required by the Agreement. 
20. On or about l/ebvnnry 1 o, 2002, Coder, on behalf of Davidhizer, took possession 
of the equipment, software, and supplies in accordance with the terms of the Agreement. Neither 
Coder nor Davidhizer ever fuimvti m- rn\>c» »iv >o Fisher. 
21. On February 22, 2002, Fisher provided Davidhizer with all the information 
Davidhizer needed to assume the debts he agreed to assume under the temis of the Agreement. 
22. On February 27, 2002, Davidhizer informed Fisher that he v\
 (*• J i ( . : v. ' , M > r n, > 
terms of the Agreement. 
23. On February 28, 2002, Fisher notified Davidhizer in.wriun^ IIUL ih-. *. - w-ii'^ •«? 
and able to complete his performance i: • •^ « <k; i-. >-u>s of the Agreement, by transferring the 
operation of OMC to Davidhizer, by transferring his ownership in his DRfr UIDic iu • /,i vi< ihi -. • r, 
and by transferring his ownership in » -AK " u> 1 Javidhizer. 
]
 4 I Javidhizer did not assume or pay the loans and building lease, the operating 
expenses of OMC, and failed to assume control ;:P- » ops: r ition of OMC. 
)n or about April 12,2002, Davidhizer took the DRS table at Dr. Jeppson'. • >i ilce 
without the knowledge or permission of Fisher. (See Exhibit 25) 
'' i» Davidhizer, Coder, and McOmber formed a new business to compete with OMC and 
7. 
placed the table with Dr. Boyer, a client of OMC. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS 
27. On April 19, 2005, Fisher file a Motion for Summary Judgment on Defendant's 
Counterclaim and Affirmative Defense of Fraud, and a Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs 
Cause of Action for Breach of Contract with supporting memoranda. 
28. On April 25, 2005, Defendant's attorney filed aNotice of Withdrawal of Counsel. 
29. On August 16,2005, the Court ruled that counsel for Defendants may withdraw and 
that the Court will rule on Fisher's motions for summary judgment. (Minute entry, dated 8/16/05) 
30. On September 7,2005, the Court entered an order allowing Defendants' attorney to 
withdraw. 
31. On September 12, 2005, Fisher filed a Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel. 
32. On October 31, 2005, a hearing is set for December 1, 2005 to rule on Fisher's 
motions for summary judgment. 
33. On November 10,2005, Mr.Brian Olsen filed a Notice of Appearance as counsel for 
Defendants. 
34. On November 25,2005, Mr. Olsen filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs Cause of Action for Breach of Contract and a 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on Defendants' 
Affirmative Defense and Counterclaim of Fraud. 
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3 5. Fisher filed a Motion to Strike Defendant Davidhizer' s Mem oranda in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs Cause of Action for Breach of Contract and 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on Defendants3 Affirmative Defense and Counterclaim 
of Fraud, claiming that the memoranda is untimely. 
36. On February 1,2005, the Court entered an order denying Fisher's Motion to Strike 
Defendant Davidhizer's Memoranda in Opposition to Plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Plaintiffs Cause of Action for Breach of Contract and Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
on Defendants' Affirmative Defense and Counterclaim of Fraud. 
37. On February 13, 2006, the Court entered an order denying Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment on Defendant's Affirmative Defense and Counterclaim of Fraud. 
38. On April 10, 2006, the Court entered its Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment on Plaintiffs Cause of Action for Breach of Contract granting Fisher partial summary 
judgment. 
39. In its Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court found that there 
were no genuine issues as to any of the following facts: 
a. On April 10,2000, Office Management Consultants, L,C, was organized. 
b. David Fisher and H. Eugene Coder ("Coder") were the only members of 
OMC. 
c. Coder was the managing partner of OMC until he resigned and ceased to 
9 
perform any services for OMC in December 2001. 
OMC was in business to provide billing services and DRS tables to medical 
providers for disc decompression treatments. 
In approximately October 2001, Defendant Robert Nash ("Nash"), Lavera 
Davidhizer's ("Davidhizer") accountant and business advisor, created a 
dispute by claiming that Davidhizer was a partner in two of the three DRS 
tables employed by OMC. 
On February 18, 2002, during the meeting a Settlement Agreement was 
drafted and signed by the parties. 
In attendance at the meeting were, Fisher, Coder, Nash, Davidhizer, and 
attorney Darwin Fisher who represented OMC. 
The Agreement provided: 
1) That Fisher would transfer all of his ownership in OMC to 
Davidhizer; 
2) That Coder would transfer all but 10% of his ownership in OMC to 
Davidhizer leaving Coder with a 10% ownership interest in OMC; 
3) That Fisher would transfer his ownership of the DRS table he 
personally purchased and on which he was personally paying the 
purchase price, to Davidhizer; 
10 
4) That OMC would transfer its ownership in the remaining two DRS 
tables to Davidhizer; 
5) That in exchange for the ownership of OMC and the DRS tables, 
Davidhizer agreed to assume payment of $180,000.00 of debt owed 
by OMC and Fisher for the purchase of the DRS tables and of debt 
incurred in the operation of OMC. The debts are: 
a) Far West Bank Line of Credit in the in principal amount of 
$40,000.00; 
b) North American Medical Corp. loan in the principal amount 
of $45,000.00; 
c) GMAC loan in the principal amount of $60,000.00; and 
d) Anderson loan in the principal amount of $35,000.00. 
6) That Davidhizer would pay the remaining balance of the Boise office 
lease; 
7) That on all loans or lease agreements Davidhizer assumed, he would 
have Fisher and Coder removed as parties, substitute security for the 
security pledged by Fisher or Coder, obtain new lines of credit, obtain 
new loans, and remove Fisher and Coder from all liability; 
8) That Fisher would receive certain equipment and would collect and 
11 
retain all the accounts receivables except the accounts receivable for 
the Boise office; 
9) That Fisher would continue to operate OMC through February 28, 
2002, for which he would be paid 7% of all monies generated by 
OMC through February 28, 2002, that he would be paid for all 
technician work he performed through February 28, 2002, and that 
he would be paid all expenses of the operation for OMC through 
February 28, 2002; 
10) That Davidhizer would assume and pay all debts incurred by OMC 
after February 18,2002; 
11) That Davidhizer would receive the following equipment: 
a) two computers with disc burner, tower and screen; 
b) one fax machine; 
c) File cabinet; 
d) 5 office chairs; and 
e) software including Lytec, Flash Code, Microsoft Suite 2000, 
and PC Anywhere. 
12) That if suit were to be brought to enforce the terms of the Agreement, 
that the prevailing party "shall be entitled to reasonable attorney fees 
12 
and costs." 
Fisher agreed to pay OMC's remaining debt in the approximate sum of 
$20,000.00 from the monies he collected from the accounts receivables. 
On February 18,2002, Fisher received the equipment he was to receive under 
the terms of the Agreement. 
On February 18,2002 or shortly thereafter, Coder, on behalf of Davidhizer, 
took possession of the equipment and software he was to receive under the 
terms of the agreement which included a computer, monitor, fax machine, 
Lytec software, Flash Code software, Microsoft Suite 2000 software, and PC 
Anywhere software, in accordance with the terms of the Agreement. 
Fisher did not breach the Agreement. 
After signing the Agreement, Fisher did operate OMC through February 
28, 2002 as required by the Agreement. 
On February 22,2002, Fisher provided Davidhizer with all the 
information Davidhizer needed to assume the debts he was compelled to 
assume by the Agreement. 
On February 28, 2002, Fisher notified Davidhizer in writing that he was 
willing and able to complete his performance under the terms of the 
Agreement, by transferring the operation of OMC to Davidhizer, by 
13 
transferring his ownership in his DRS table to Davidhizer, and by 
transferring his ownership in OMC to Davidhizer. 
On February 27, 2002, Davidhizer terminated the Agreement. 
Davidhizer did not fulfill the terms and conditions of the contract by 
failing to assume and to pay the loans and building lease of OMC, by 
failing to pay the operating expenses of OMC, and by failing to assume 
control and operation of OMC. 
As a direct result of Davidhizer's breach of the Agreement, David Fisher 
has incurred the following damages: 
1) Fisher has paid: 
a) $ 10,893.27 Operation expenses for OMC. 
b) $ 31,450.00 Interest payments on the Anderson Loan. 
c) $ 4,368.70 Interest payments on the GMAC and 
Anderson loans. 
d) $ 2,289.50 Interest payments on the Far West Bank 
Line of Credit. 
e) $ 14,676.36 Payments to Eagle Crest 
f) $ 4,387.50 Interest payments to North American 
Medical Corp. 
g) $ 8,979.00 Monies paid by Fisher for operating 
expenses of OMC. 
h) $77,044.59 TOTAL 
2) The remaining balances on the loans are: 
a) $40,000.00 Far West Bank Line of Credit 
b) $45,000.00 North American Medical Corp. loan. 
c) $60,000.00 GMAC loan. 
d) $35,000.00 Anderson loan. 
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e) $180,000.00 TOTAL 
3) Therefore, Fisher has been damaged in the amount of $257,044.59, 
plus prejudgment interest in the sum of $31,466.30 for a total of 
$288,510.89. Fisher will incur additional interest and principal 
payments from March 1,2005 to the date of judgment, which 
amount plus pre-judgment interest will increase his damages. In 
addition, Fisher has incurred attorney fees and costs and is entitled 
to an award in the amount of the attorneys fees and costs he has 
incurred in prosecuting this action, if Defendant Davidhizer is not 
successful on his affirmative defense of fraud. 
40. The Court further ordered that Davidhizer may present evidence at trial or other 
hearing that Fisher did not pay: 
a) $ 10,893.27 ' for OMC operation expenses 
b) $ 31,450.00 for interest payments on the Anderson Loan 
c) $ 4,368.70 for interest payments on the GMAC and Anderson loans. 
d) $ 2,289.50 for interest payments on the Far West Bank Line of Credit. 
e) $ 14,676.36 to Eagle Crest 
f) $ 4,387.50 for interest payments to North American Medical Corp. 
g) $ 8,979.00 for the operating expenses of OMC. 
41. The Court also ordered "that, as none of the facts have been controverted by any 
opposition to the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, the Plaintiffs Statement of 
Undisputed Material Facts in Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff s Motion for 
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Partial Summary Judgment are deemed admitted...55. The additional facts contained in the 
Memorandum are: 
a. Davidhizer admits that he breached the Agreement. 
MOTION IN LIMINE 
42. A trial to determine the amount of damages to be awarded Fisher was scheduled 
for August 27, 2007. 
43. On August 23, 2007, Fisher filed a Motion in Limine Re: Fraud and Negligent 
Misrepresentation. 
44. On August 24, 2007, the Court granted Davidhizer the right to file a memorandum 
in opposition to Fisher's Motion in Limine and continued the trial date. 
45. On September 5,2007, Davidhizer filed a Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
in Opposition to Fisher's Motion in Limine Re: Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation. 
46. On April 11, 2008, the Court entered an Order Striking Defendant's 
Counterclaim. 
47. The Court found the following facts to be uncontested: 
a. On May 13, 2002, Plaintiff filed a complaint commencing this action. 
b. On May 22, 2002, Plaintiff filed an amended verified complaint. 
c. On July 2, 2002, Defendant filed an answer, counterclaim, and demand for 
jury trial, Defendant pled as an affirmative defense and counterclaim fraud in the 
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inducement in regard to the Settlement Agreement entered into between the parties on or 
about February 18,2002, providing for the sale of Office Management Consultants, LC 
and a number of therapy tables used for medical treatment. 
d. On April 15,2004, a fourth amended stipulated scheduling order was filed 
with the Court. 
e. The Fourth Amended Scheduling Order required that all pleadings shall be 
completed on or before September 15,2004. 
f On or about April 19, 2005, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment 
on plaintiffs cause of action for breach of contract. 
g. On or about April 10, 2006, the Court signed an order granting Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment for Breach of Contract, finding that Defendant Davidhizer 
had breached the Parties' Settlement Agreement. 
h. On or about April 19,2005, Plaintiff filed a separate Motion for Summary 
Judgment on Defendant's Affirmative Defense and Counterclaim of Fraud. 
i. On or about April 10, 2006, the Court entered its order granting Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment Dismissing Defendant's Affirmative Defense and 
Counterclaim of Fraud as to Defendants Dennis McOmber and Robert Nash; and denying 
the Plaintiffs Summary Judgment as to Defendant LaVern Davidhizer's Affirmative 
Defense and Counterclaim of Fraud, reserving such for trial. 
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j . On June 13,2006, the Court gave notice scheduling a jury trial to begin on 
November 27, 2006, with the final pretrial conference to be held on November 7,2006. 
k. On November 21, 2006, the jury trial was cancelled due to a conflict with 
the criminal calendar. 
1. On February 19,2007, the Court gave notice of a rescheduled jury trial to 
begin August 27, 2007. 
m. On August 23, 2007, the final pre-trial conference was convened at which 
Plaintiff filed the Motion in Limine requesting that the Court preclude Defendant from 
presenting any claims or defenses asserting fraud in the inducement or from offering any 
evidence in support of those claims and defenses on the basis that they had not been 
properly plead under URCP 9. In the alternative, Plaintiff requested the Court to strike 
Defendant's defenses and counterclaim for fraud in the inducement under URCP 
37(b)(2)(B) for failure to comply with the Court's Fourth Amended Scheduling Order. 
n. Defendant made no attempt to amend Defendants' Answer and 
Counterclaim or file a motion for leave to amend until August 24, 2007, the last business 
day before trial, after Plaintiff filed the Motion in Limine, only then did Defendant file a 
Motion to Amend Answer and Counterclaim. 
o. The only allegations Defendant set forth in his original Answer and 
Counterclaim in support of Fraud are as follows: 
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1) (10.).. . based on certain financial representations to Davidhizer, 
Davidhizer was induced by Fisher to purchase OMC and to enter into the alleged 
Settlement Agreement. The representations by Fisher as to the bills and income 
of OMC were material to Davidhizer's decision to sign the alleged Settlement 
Agreement. Plaintiff Fisher knew, or reasonably should have known, that the 
representations being made were false when made. In reasonable reliance thereon, 
Davidhizer executed the agreement, which has caused him damages as shall be 
proven at trial herein... (Defendant's Answer and Counterclaim, FACTS, 
TflO at 5). 
2) (2.) Plaintiffs owe to the Defendants such damages as shall be 
proven at trial for the fraudulent inducement to Davidhizer for the DRS tables and 
for fraudulent inducement in entering into the alleged Settlement Agreement 
based upon misrepresentations of facts, including but not limited to, the assets and 
liabilities of OMC (Defendant's Answer and Counterclaim, COUNT I-FRAUD. 
1J2at7). 
3) (2.) Plaintiff Fisher made representations to the Defendants which 
a person of reasonable and prudent care would not have made thereby breaching 
his duty of reasonable care to the Defendants. (Defendant's Answer and 
Counterclaim, COUNT SD(-NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION. \2 at 9). 
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4) (3) Based upon said misrepresentations the Defendant Davidhizer 
entered into an alleged Settlement Agreement. (Defendant's Answer and 
Counterclaim, COUNT SIX-NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION. %3 at 9). 
p. Defendant cited to various statements in support of fraud in the 
inducement taken from the depositions of David Fisher, LaVern Davidhizer, Eugene 
Coder, Michael Cutler, M.D., Dennis McOmber, and Robert Nash, together with 
statements from the Affidavit of LaVern Davidhizer, which were attached as exhibits to 
Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion in Limine regarding fraud and 
negligent misrepresentation. 
q. Defendant's Motion to Amend the Answer and Counterclaim was filed 
three years and ten months after the discovery cutoff established in the Fourth Amended 
Scheduling Order, and five years, one month after filing Defendant's original Answer and 
CouBterclaim. 
TRIAL 
48. The remaining issues in the lawsuit were set for trial 
49. On January 13,2009, the parties filed a Stipulated Pretrial Order. 
50. The parties stipulated to the facts regarding the background of the case, the 
formation of the business entities and the Agreement as set forth above. 
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51. The Stipulated Pretrial Order provided that at trial the contested issues of fact 
would be: 
a. The amount paid by Fisher on the loans. 
b. The amount of interest accrued since February 27,2002. 
c. The value of the tables in Fisher's possession. 
d. Fisher's actions or lack thereof in mitigation of his damages. 
e. Whether Coder, on behalf of Davidhizer, took possession of a computer, 
monitor, fax machine, and software including Lytec, Flash Code, 
Microsoft Suite 2000, and PC Anywhere. 
52. The Stipulated Pretrial Order further provided that at trial the contested issues of 
law would be: 
a. Whether Davidhizer is entitled to offset the value of the equipment in 
Fisher's possession. 
b. Whether Davidhizer is entitled to an affirmative defense of failure to 
mitigate damages. 
c. Whether Fisher failed to mitigate his damages. 
d. Whether the refinanced interest is a consequential damage. 
e. What is Plaintiffs measure of damages that can earn pre-judgment interest 
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as a matter of law. 
f. Whether Plaintiffs attorneys fees, as claimed, are reasonable as a matter 
of law. 
53. Trial was held on October 9,2008 and on May 7, 2009. 
54. Davidhizer agreed and the Court finds that he failed to assume the debt to 
Anderson. 
55. The principle amount of the Anderson loan on February 18, 2009 is the sum of 
$35,000.00. 
56. Since February 18, 2002, Fisher has made interest only payments to Anderson in 
the amount of $39,950.00 as follows: 
Year 
2002 
Anderson Payment History 
3/6/02 
4/3/02 
5/3/02 
6/6/02 
7/10/02 
8/8/02 
9/12/02 
10/14/02 
11/14/02 
12/13/02 
$850.00 
$850.00 
$850.00 | 
$850.00 | 
$850.00 J 
$850.00 1 
$850.00 j 
$850.00 j 
$850.00 1 
$850.00 j 
j 2003 
Year 
(2003 
! 1/14/03 $850.00 
Anderson Payment History 
2/13/03 
3/13/03 
4/3/03 
5/6/03 
6/5/03 
7/10/03 
8/3/03 
$850.00 
$850.00 
$850.00 1 
$850.00 1 
$850.00 1 
$850.00 j 
$850.00 j 
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1 2004 
2005 1 
1 9/10/03 
J 10/10/03 
11/4/03 
12/5/03 
1/6/04 
2/10/04 
3/3/04 
4/5/04 
5/5/04 
6/9/04 
7/8/04 
8/5/04 
9/10/04 
10/5/04 
11/2/04 
12/6/04 1 
1/8/05 1 
J $850.00 
J $850.00 
1 $850.00 
$850.00 1 
$850.00 1 
$850.00 1 
$850.00 1 
$850.00 J 
$850.00 J 
$850.00 1 
$850.00 J 
$850.00 J 
$850.00 1 
$850.00 1 
$850.00 J 
$850.00 J 
$850.00 J 
J 2005 2/7/05 
2006 J 
3/8/05 
4/8/05 
5/10/05 
6/4/05 
7/8/05 
8/8/05 
9/2/05 
10/5/05 
11/4/05 
12/7/05 
1/11/06 
Total to Anderson 
$850.00 
$850.00 
$850.00 
$850.00 1 
$850.00 J 
$850.00 | 
$850.00 
$850.00 J 
$850.00 
$850.00 
$850.00 1 
$850.00 | 
$39,950.00 J 
57. Each payment to Anderson was made on a specific date. 
58. The Anderson loan became due and Fisher was required to pay the principal 
balance of $35,000.00 to Anderson. 
59. Fisher did not have the money to pay Anderson and had to borrow $35,000.00 to 
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pay Anderson. 
60. To pay Anderson, Fisher borrowed $35,000 from Sandale at an interest rate of 
20% per annum. 
61. The loan to Fisher from Sandale was a hard money loan. 
62. Fisher could not obtain a conventional loan and his only resource for borrowing 
money was a hard money loan. 
63. Fisher had made several loans from Sandale for the purchase of real properties. 
64. Fisher had paid nearly all of the loans back but has not paid the monies borrowed 
to pay Anderson. 
65. Fisher had to pay interest to Sandale in the amount of twenty percent (20%>) per 
annum. 
66. Fisher paid interest to Sandale beginning in 2006, through April 14, 2009, as 
follows: 
Year 
1 2006 
2007 
J 2008 
SANDALE PAYMENT HISTORY 
09/11/06 
01/17/08 
01/31/08 
09/08/08 
10/07/08 
$4,832.89 
$8,000.00 
$3,736.42 
$5,039.99 
$667.40 
Year 
2008 
2009 
SANDALE PAYMENT HISTORY 
12/10/08 
01/09/09 
02/12/09 
03/16/09 
04/14/09 
Total to Sandale 
$690.41 
$690.96 
$782.47 
$598.36 
$805.48 
$26,626.85 
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Year SANDALE PAYMENT HISTORY 
11/10/08 $782.47 
Year SANDALE PAYMENT HISTORY 
67. In addition, because it was a hard money loan, Fisher had to pay to Sandale a loan 
origination fee of $1,750.00. 
68. Fisher's loss of the principal amount of $35,000.00 was complete on February 27, 
2002, the date that Davidhizer stated that the Agreement was terminated and that he would not 
fulfill the terms and conditions of the Agreement. 
69. The principal amount of $35,000.00 owed to Fisher by Davidhizer was fixed and 
definite on February 27, 2002, by the Agreement of the parties dated February 18, 2002. 
70. Pre-judgment interest on the principal amount of the Anderson loan begins on 
February 27, 2002. 
71. Fisher's loss of the payments to Anderson and Sandale was complete, fixed, and 
definite on the date that Fisher made the payment. 
72. The pre-judgment interest on the payments to Anderson and to Sandale, and the 
loan fee is due from the date on which each payment was made. 
73. The pre-judgment interest on the payments to Anderson and to Sandale, and the 
loan fee has been calculated from the date of each payment through May 30, 2009. 
74. Pre-judgment interest in the amount often percent (10%) on the principal amount 
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of $35,000.00 is the sum of $25,257.53 through May 30, 2009. 
75. Pre-judgment interest in the amount of ten percent (10%) on the payments to 
Anderson is the sum of $21,266.53 through May 30,2009. 
76. Pre-judgment interest in the amount of ten percent (10%) on the payments to 
Sandale is the sum of $3,298.16 through May 30, 2009. 
77. Pre-judgment interest in the amount of ten percent (10%) on the loan fees to 
Sandale is the sum of $1,262.88 through May 30,2009. 
78. The total amount of pre-judgment interest due is the sum of $51,085.10 through 
May 30,2009. 
79. The total amount due on the Anderson loan through May 30,2009, including the 
principal amount, the payments made to Anderson and Sandale, and the pre-judgment interest, is 
the sum of $154,411.95 through May 30,2009. 
80. Fisher is entitled to pre-judgment interest at the rate often percent (10%) from 
May 30,2002 to the date judgment is entered on the principal amount, payments made to 
Anderson, payments made to Sandale, and payment of the loan fees. 
81. Davidhizer failed to present any evidence that Fisher did not make the payments 
to Anderson or Sandale.. 
82. Davidhizer admits and the Court finds that he did not assume and pay the GMAC 
loan. 
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The principal amount of the GMAC loan on February 18,2002 is the sum of 
Fisher made payments to GMAC in the sum of $4,368.70 as follows: 
Year 
(2002 
GMAC PAYMENT HISTORY 
03/13/02 
04/12/02 
05/14/02 
06/09/02 
07/12/02 
08/13/02 | 
19/19/02 
1 Total to GMAC 
$624.10 J 
$624.10 1 
$624.10 1 
$624.10 J 
$624.10 1 
$624.10 J 
$624.10 ( 
$4,368.70 
85. The GMAC loan became due and Fisher did not have the *nonies to pay the 
$60,000-00. 
86. In order to pay the GMAC principal amount of $60,000.00, Fisher borrowed 
money from Barton. 
07. Fisher made interest payments to Barton in the sum of $20,291.50 as follows: 
(See Exhibit 41, at 002) 
27 
83. 
$60,000-
84. 
Year 
1 2002 
[2003 
2004 J 
1 
Barton Payment History 
9/16/02 
10/1/02 
11/20/02 
1/15/03 
4/7/03 
6/12/03 
9/23/03 
11/20/03 
1/9/04 
4/5/04 
$332.65 
$332.65 
$665.30 
$665.30 1 
$665.30 1 
$665.30 J 
$1,330.60 1 
$665.30 1 
$332.65 | 
$997.95 1 
1 2006 
[2007 
1 11/4/05 
1 12/2/05 
1/11/06 
2/6/06 
3/7/06 
4/5/06 
5/5/06 
6/9/06 
7/5/06 
8/3/06 
9/12/06 
10/8/06 
11/17/06 
1/16/07 
3/8/07 
6/5/07 
7/9/07 
9/19/07 
Total to Barton 
$332.65 
$332.65 
$332.65 
$332.65 
$332.65 
$332.65 
$332.65 | 
$332.65 1 
$332.65 | 
$332.65 1 
$332.65 | 
$332.65 1 
$665.30 
$665.30 
$665.30 | 
$665.30 1 
$665.30 1 
$332.65 1 
$20,291.50 J 
2005 
6/18/04 
8/5/04 
9/21/04 
11/2/04 
12/1/04 
2/4/05 
4/8/05 
10/3/05 
$665.30 
$665.30 
$665.30 
$332.65 
$332.65 1 
$665.30 1 
$665.30 1 
$1,995.90 J 
88. Fisher could not make the principal payment to Barton and had to borrow monies 
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from Sandale to pay Barton 
89. The loan from Sandale is a hard money loan. 
90. Fisher's loan from Sandale being a hard money loan, Fisher had to pay loan 
origination fees of $2,500.00 
91. Fisher had to pay interest to Sandale on the principal amount and on the 
origination fee in the amount of twenty percent (20%) per annum. 
92. Fisher made interest payments to Sandale in the total sum of $17,293,15 as 
follows: (See Exhibit 41, at 020) 
Yeax 
j 2008 
2009 
1 SANDALE PAYMENT HISTORY 
03/10/08 
04/03/08 
07/05/08 
10/07/08 
11/10/08 
12/10/08 
01/09/09 
02/12/09 
03/16/09 
04/14/09 
1 $4,043.84 
$821.92 1 
$3,419.19 | 
$2,761.64 1 
$1,117.81 1 
$986.30 
$986.30 J 
$1,117.81 
$887.67 1 
$1,150.68 1 
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Total to Sandale $17,293.16 
93. Fisher's loss of the principal amount of $60,000.00 was complete on February 27, 
2002, the date that Davidhizer stated that the Agreement was terminated and that he would not 
fulfill the terms and conditions of the Agreement. 
93 .a. The principal amount of $60,000.00 owed to Fisher by Davidhizer was fixed and 
definite on February 27, 2002, by the Agreement of the parties dated February 18, 2002. 
93.b. Pre-judgment interest on the principal amount of the GMAC loan begins on 
February 27,2002. 
94. Fisher's loss of the payments to GMAC, Barton, Sandale, and the loan fee paid to 
Sandale were complete, fixed, and definite on the date that Fisher made the payment. 
95. The pre-judgment interest on the payments to GMAC, Barton, Sandale, and the 
loan fee paid to Sandale is due from the date on which each payment was made. 
96. The pre-judgment interest on the payments to GMAC, Barton, and to Sandale, and 
the loan fee is calculated from the date of each payment through May 30,2009. 
97. Pre-judgment interest in the amount often percent (10%) on the principal amount 
of $60,000.00 is the sum of $43,298.63 through May 30,2009. 
98. Pre-judgment interest in the amount of ten percent (10%) on the payments to 
GMAC is the sum of $2,897.70 through May 30, 2009. 
99. Pre-judgment interest in the amount of ten percent (10%) on the payments to 
Barton is the sum of $8,770.83 through May 30, 2009. 
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100. Pre-judgment interest in the amount often percent (10%) on the payments to 
Sandale is the sum of $1,174.06 through May 30,2009. 
101. Pre-judgment interest in the amount of ten percent (10%) on the loan fees is the 
sum of $373.97 through May 30,2009. 
102. The total amount of pre-judgment interest due is the sum of $56,515.19 through 
May 30,2009. 
103. The total amount due on the GMAC loan through May 30, 2009, including the 
principal amount, the interest payments to GMAC, Barton and Sandale, and pre-judgment 
interest, is the sum of $160,968.54 through May 30,2009. 
104. Fisher is entitled to pre-judgment interest in the amount often percent (10%) from 
May 30,2009 to the date judgment is entered on the principal amount, on the payments to 
GMAC, on the payments to Barton, on the payments to Sandale and on the payment of the loan 
fees to Sandale. 
105. Davidhizer failed to present any evidence that Fisher did not make the payments 
to GMAC, to Barton, or to Sandale. 
106. Davidhizer admits and the Court finds that he has not assumed or paid the Far 
West Loan. 
107. The principal amount of the Far West loan as of February 18, 2002, is the sum of 
$40,000.00. 
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108. Fisher made payments to Far West in the sum of $34,511.84 as follows: (See 
Exhibit 41, at 046) 
Year 
(2002 
J 2003 
J 2004 
1 2005 
Far West Payment History j 
2/2/02 
j 
1 6/19/02 
1 7/26/02 
| 2/5/03 
4/22/03 
7/29/03 
10/15/03 
5/11/04 
6/15/04 
7/28/04 
10/25/04 
11/10/04 
12/7/04 
1/19/05 
2/7/05 
3/31/05 1 
5/26/05 j 
6/15/05 1 
7/11/05 j 
8/10/05 j 
$795.61 
$722.55 j 
$721.60 1 
$762,342 1 
$764.38 j 
$772.88 1 
$820.01 1 
$1,693.96 j 
$450.01 j 
$704.93 j 
$480.07 j 
$480.07 j 
$480.07 j 
$480.07 j 
$480.07 1 
$984.14 J 
$480.07 j 
$550.00 1 
$434.13 j 
$480.07 1 
1 2006 
1 2007 
| 10/3/05 
10/24/05 
12/5/05 
1/10/06 
3/6/06 
4/6/06 
5/8/06 
6/9/06 
7/12/06 
8/8/06 
9/6/06 
9/26/06 
11/7/06 
12/12/06 
1/16/07 
2/13/07 
2/27/07 i 
5/14/07 
7/9/07 
8/15/07 
10/4/07 
$1,000.00 
$1,000.00 j 
$500.00 
$1,000.00 | 
$500.00 j 
$500.00 j 
$500.00 1 
$500.00 j 
$500.00 j 
$500.00 j 
$500.00 1 
$500.00 1 
$500.00 j 
$500.00 1 
$500.00 | 
$500.00 1 
$500.00 1 
$500.00 1 
$1,000.00 1 
$500.00 j 
$500.00 1 
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| 2009 
05/01/08 
! 05/19/08 
07/21/08 
08/20/08 
09/12/08 
10/10/08 
11/05/08 
12/19/08 
01/13/09 
02/23/09 
03/13/09 
04/17/09 
Total to Far West 
$500.00 
$500.00 1 
$500.00 J 
$200.00 J 
$500.00 J 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$274.82 
$500.00 1 
$500.00 J 
$34,511.84 1 
109. The amount of payments made by Fisher can be determined with a reasonable 
certainty. 
110. Fisher's loss of the principal amount of $40,000.00 was complete on February 27, 
2002, the date that Davidhizer stated that the Agreement was terminated and that he would not 
fulfill the terms and conditions of the Agreement. 
111. The principal amount of $40,000.00 owed to Fisher by Davidhizer was fixed and 
[2008 
11/14/07 
11/2907 
01/10/08 
02/12/08 
03/11/08 
03/31/08 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 
$500.00 J 
$500.00 
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definite on February 27, 2002, by the Agreement of the parties dated February 18, 2002. 
112. Pre-judgment interest on the principal amount of the Far West Bank Loan begins 
on February 27, 2002. 
113. Fisher's loss of the payments to Far West Bank were complete, fixed, and definite 
on the date that Fisher made the payment. 
114. The pre-judgment interest on the payments to Far West Bank is due from the date 
on which each payment was made. 
115. The pre-judgment interest on the payments to Far West Bank is calculated from 
the date of each payment through May 30, 2009. 
116. Pre-judgment interest in the amount of ten percent (10%) on the principal amount 
of $40,000.00 is the sum of $28,865.75 through May 30,2009. 
117. Pre-judgment interest in the amount often percent (10%) on the payments to Far 
West Bank is the sum of $11,904.34 through May 30, 2009. 
118. The total amount due on the Far West Bank loan through May 30, 2009, including 
the principal amount and pre-judgment interest, is the sum of $115,281.93 through May 30, 
2009. 
119. Fisher is entitled to pre-judgment interest on the principal amount and the 
payments made to Fax West Bank from May 30, 2009 to the date that judgment is entered. 
120. Davidhizer failed to present any evidence that Fisher did not make the payments 
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to Far West Bank. 
121. Davidhizer admits and the Court finds that he did not assume and pay the 
payments to Eaglecrest for the lease of the office space. 
122. The payments made by Fisher to Eaglecrest is the sum of $18,676.36, as follows: 
(See Exhibit 41, at 081) 
Year 
1 2002 
2003 
1 
! EAGLECREST PAYMENT HISTORY 
03/21/02 
04/15/02 
06/24/02 
08/02/02 
08/30/02 
11/27/02 
01/28/03 
05/20/03 
10/06/03 
$1,000.00 
$800.00 
$800.00 
$900.00 
$800.00 
$1,800.00 
$1,000.00 
$600.00 | 
800.00 
Year 
2004 
2005 
EAGLECREST PAYMENT HISTORY 
01/16/04 
04/22/04 
08/19/04 
08/19/04 
01/13/05 
10/25/05 
10/25/05 
Total to Eagle Crest 
$1,200.00 
$1,000.00 
$526.36 
$1,350.00 1 
$2,100.00 J 
$2,267.73 1 
$1,732.27 1 
$18,676.36 1 
123. The amount of payments made by Fisher can be determined with a reasonable 
certainty. 
124. Fisher's loss of the payments to Eagle Crest in the amount of $18,676.36 was 
complete on the date that each payment was made. 
125. Fisher's loss of the payments to Eagle Crest were complete, fixed, and definite on 
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the date that Fisher made the payment. 
126. The pre-judgment interest on the payments to Eagle Crest is due from the date on 
which each payment was made. 
127. The pre-judgment interest on the payments to Eagle Crest is calculated from the 
date of each payment through May 30, 2009. 
128. Pre-judgment interest in the amount often percent (10%) on the payments to 
Eagle Crest is the sum of $9,913.03 through May 30, 2009. 
129. The total amount due on the Eagle Crest Building lease through May 30, 2009, is 
the sum of $28,590.03 through May 30, 2009. 
130. Fisher is entitled to pre-judgment interest in the amount often percent (10%) from 
May 30,2009 to the date judgment is entered. 
131. Davidhizer failed to present any evidence that Fisher did not make the payments 
to Eagle Crest. 
132. Davidhizer admits and the Court finds that he did not assume or pay the North 
American Medical loan. 
133. The principal amount of the North American Medical loan as of February 18, 
2002 is the sum of $45,000.00 
134. Fisher made payments to North American Medical in the sum of $4,387.50 as 
follows: (See Exhibit 41, at 109) 
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Year 
1 2002 
1 2003 
NORTH AMERICAN MEDICAL 
PAYMENT HISTORY 
04/15/02 
06/27/02 
01/28/03 
06/13/03 
Total 
$1,012.50 
$675.00 ] 
$2,025.00 1 
$675.00 
$4,387.50 
135. The amount of payments made by Fisher on the loans to North American Medical 
can be determined with a reasonable certainty. 
136. Fisher's loss of the principal amount of $45,000.00 was complete on February 27, 
2002, the date that Davidhizer stated that the Agreement was terminated and that he would not 
fulfill the terms and conditions of the Agreement. 
137. The principal amount of $45,000.00 owed to Fisher by Davidhizer was fixed and 
definite on February 27, 2002, by the Agreement of the parties dated February 18,2002. 
138. Pre-j udgment interest on the principal amount of the North American Medical 
Loan begins on February 27,2002. 
139. Fisher's loss of the payments to North American Medical were complete, fixed, 
and definite on the date that Fisher made the payment. 
140. The pre-judgment interest on the payments to North American Medical is due 
from the date on which each payment was made. 
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141. The pre-judgment interest on the payments to North American Medical is 
calculated from the date of each payment through May 30,2009. 
142. Pre-judgment interest on the principal amount at ton percent (10 %) is the sum of 
$32,473,967 through May 30,2009. 
143. Pre-judgment interest in the amount often percent (10%) on the payments to 
North American Medical is the sum of $2,849.60.03 through May 30,2009. 
144. The total amount due on the North American Medical through May 30,2009, is 
the sum of $84,711.07 through May 30, 2009. 
145. Fisher is entitled to pre-judgment interest on the principal balance and the 
payments made to North American Medical in the amount often percent (10%) per annum from 
May 30, 2009 to the date judgment is entered. 
146. Davidhizer failed to present any evidence that Fisher did not make the payments 
to North American Medical. 
147. But for the breach of the contract by Davidhizer, Fisher would not have had to pay 
the interest payments on the Anderson, GMAC, Far West, and North American Medical loans. 
148. But for the breach of the contract by Davidhizer, Fisher would not have had to pay 
the payments to Eagle Crest. 
149. But for the breach of the contract by Davidhizer, Fisher would not have had to 
borrow monies from Barton and Sandale to make payments on the Anderson and GMAC loans. 
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150. Davidhizer admitted and the Court finds thai it was foreseeable at ihe ikne that the 
parties contracted that if Davidhizer did not fulfill the terms and conditions of the contract that 
Fisher would have to pay the principal amounts owed on the loans and to make payments on the 
loans and payments to Eagle Crest. 
151. Fisher is entitled to recover from Davidhizer the amount of payments that he made 
on the loans and to Eagle Crest and is entitled to pre-judgment interest on those payments. 
152. Fisher paid the following expenses to continue the operation of OMC after 
Davidhizer breached the Agreement. (See Exhibit 41, at 148) 
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Year 
2002 
1 2003 J 
OPERATING EXPENSES AFTER 
| 2/18/02 
02/18/02 
J 02/26/02 
1 03/01/02 
1 03/04/02 
1 03/25/02 
03/26/02 
| 03/26/02 
:
 03/26/02 
04/01/02 
04/16/02 
04/18/02 
04/18/02 
05/01/02 
11/15/02 
12/01/02 
12/09/02 
01/01/03 1 
01/10/03 1 
02/01/03 J 
02/14/03 1 
Qwest 
Nextel 
[Rent 
Coder Wages 
Counterchecks 
MCI 
Qwest 
Nextel 
Rent 
Postage 
Counter Checks 
St. George City 
Rent 
St. George City 
Rent 
St. George City 
Rent 
St. George City 
Rent J 
St. George City 
$38.60 
J $144.12 
1 $900.00 
1 $113.49 
$1.00 
$67.88 
$131.56 
$380.86 
$900.00 
$34.00 
$1.00 
$126.26 | 
$900.00 1 
$173.34 1 
$900.00 j 
$145.65 1 
$900.00 j 
$155.48 j 
$900.00 1 
$144.07 j 
1 
J Year 
[2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 1 
OPERATING EXPENSES AFTER 2/18/02 
1 05/03/02 
1 05/17/02 
06/01/02 
06707/02 
07/01/02 
07/03/02 
08/01/02 
08/17/02 
09/01/02 
09/06/02 
10/01/02 
10/03/02 
11/01/02 , 
03/05/03 
03/04/04 
08/18/04 
01/20/05 
01/13/06 
12/15/06 
Total 
St. George City 
Office Supplies 
Rent 
St. George City 
Rent 
St. George City 
Rent 
St. George City 
Rent • 
St. George City 
Rent 
St. George City 
Rent 
St. George City 
Accounting Fees 
Counter Checks j 
Accounting Fees ] 
Accounting Fees 
Accounting Fees 
$143.53 
$252.24 
$900.00 j 
$131.30 J 
$900.00 j 
$136.86 J 
$900.00 j 
$213.25 1 
$900.00 1 
$189.49 
$900.00 1 
$195.40 1 
$900.00 | 
$136.13 j 
$185.00 1 
$1.00 j 
$100.00 1 
$100.00 1 
$100.00 1 
$14,346.51 1 
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153. But for the breach of the Agreement by Davidhizer, Fisher would not have had to 
pay the operating expenses of OMC. 
154. Davidhizer admitted and the Court finds that it was foreseeable at the time that the 
parties contracted that if Davidhizer did not fulfill the terms and conditions of the contract that 
Fisher would have to pay the operational expenses of OMC after February 18,2002. 
155. The amount of money earned by OMC was deducted from the expenses and the 
amount of $14,346.51 represents the expenses that were not paid because there was insufficient 
income to pay them. 
156. The amount of payments made by Fisher can be determined with a reasonable 
certainty. 
157. Fisher's loss of the payments for expenses were complete, fixed, and definite on 
the date that Fisher made the payment. 
158. The pre-judgment interest on the payments for operating expenses is due from the 
date on which each payment was made. 
159. Fisher is entitled to pre-judgment interest in the amount often percent (10%) from 
the date the expense was made to the date judgment is entered. 
160. The Agreement provides that "if any party brings any legal action to enforce the 
terms of this agreement, the prevailing party shall be paid reasonable attorneys fees and costs." 
161. Fisher is the prevailing party. 
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162. Fisher has presented affidavits of attorneys fees (see Exhibits 3, 4, 5, 21 
(Supplemental Affidavait -Ronnow 12/15/08) and affidavits presented at the 5/7/09 hearing 
(Supplemental Affidavit-Darwin Fisher, Corrected Affidavit - William D. Ronnow)) 
163. The affidavits set forth the legal work that was actually performed. 
164. The legal work set forth by the affidavits was reasonably necessary to adequately 
prosecute Fisher's causes of action against Davidhizer and performed in defending against 
Davidhizers' defenses and counterclaims. 
165. The attorneys' billing rate set forth in the affidavits are consistent with the rates 
customarily charged in Washington County, State of Utah. 
166. Davidhizer has failed to present any evidence that the legal work performed was 
not actually performed in prosecuting Fisher's causes of action against Davidhizer and performed 
in defending against Davidhizers' defenses and counterclaims, and was reasonably necessary to 
adequately prosecute this lawsuit. 
167. Davidhizer has failed to present any evidence that the attorneys' billing rates are 
inconsistent with the rates customarily charged in Washington County, State of Utah. 
168. Fisher has expended or has incurred the sum of $200,253.61 for attorneys fees 
and the sum of $12,087.60 for costs. (See Exhibit 41, at 098, and affidavits [Exh 3, 4, 5, 21 and 
affidavits presented in trial and filed May 7, 2009.]) 
169. Fisher has paid attorneys fees and costs in the sum of $ 133,762,06. (See Exhibit 
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41, at 098) 
170. The amount Fisher paid for attorney fees and costs can be determined with a 
reasonable certainty. 
171. Fisher's loss for the payments for attorney fees and costs were complete, fixed, 
and definite on the date that Fisher made the payment. 
172. The pre-judgment interest on the payments for attorney fees and costs is due from 
the date on which each payment was made. 
173. Fisher is entitled to pre-judgment interest in the amount often percent (10%) from 
the date on which payment for attorney fees and/or costs was made to the date judgment is 
entered. 
174. Pre-judgment interest calculated at the rate often percent (10%) per annum from 
the date on which each payment was made through May 30,2009, is the sum of $49,160.23. (See 
Exhibit 41, at 098) 
175. The total amount of attorney fees and costs including pre-judgment interest 
through May 30, 2009, is the sum of $261,501.44. (See Exhibit 41, at 098 and affidavits) 
176. Fisher is entitled to pre-judgment interest on the payments made for attorney fees 
and costs at the rate often percent (10%) per annum from May 30, 2009 to the date judgment is 
entered.. 
177. Davidhizer has failed to present any evidence to meet the requisite burden of 
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proof that he is entitled to an offset or mitigation of damages. 
178. Fisher continued to operate OMC on a full time basis for approximately one year 
after the breach of the contract by Davidhizer. 
179. Fisher placed into OMC more than $246,000.00 to pay the loans, to pay Eagle-
Crest, and to pay the operating expenses of OMC that Davidhizer was to assume and pay. 
180. After February 18, 2002, Fisher continued efforts to place the DRS tables. 
181. Davidhizer, on approximately April 11, 2002, took one of the DRS tables, 
depriving" Fisher of the income from that table to use in paying the loans, Eagle Crest, and the 
operating expenses. 
182. Davidhizer took the table, and with Gene Coder and Dennis McOmber started a 
new business which deprived Fisher of income to pay the loans as found above. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Breach of Contract 
1. The parties entered into a written Agreement on February 18, 2002. 
2. Fisher performed each and every term and condition required of him under the 
agreement. 
3. Davidhizer breached the contract by failing to assume and pay the loans, by failing 
to pay Eagle Crest, by failing to assume the operation of OMC, and by failing to pay the debts of 
OMC after February 18, 2002. 
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4. As a direct iesult of Davidhizer's breach of ihe contract, Fisher has been damaged. 
5. But for Davidhizer's breach of the Agreement, Fisher would not have to pay the 
principal amount of the loans. 
6. But for Davidhizer's breach of the Agreement, Fisher would not have had to make 
payments on the loans, or make payments to Eagle Crest, or pay the operational expenses. 
7. But for Davidhizer's breach of the Agreement, Fisher would not have had to borrow 
money to pay the principal balances on some of the loans. 
8. The payments made on the loans, to Eagle Crest, and on the operational expenses are 
consequential damages 
9. Fisher is entitled to judgment against Davidhizer for the payments he made on the 
loans, to Eagle Crest and on the operational expenses. 
10. The amount of payments made by Fisher can be determined with a reasonable 
certainty. 
11. Fisher's loss of the principal amounts of the loans was complete on February 27, 
2002, the date that Davidhizer stated that the Agreement was terminated and that he would not fulfill 
the terms and conditions of the Agreement. 
12. The principal amounts owed to Fisher by Davidhizer was fixed and definite on 
February 27, 2002, by the Agreement of the parties dated February 18,2002. 
13. Pre-judgment interest on the principal amounts of the of the loans begins on February 
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27,2002. 
14. Fisher's loss of the payments on the loans, Eagle Crest, attorney fees and costs, and 
the operating expenses were complete, fixed, and definite on the date that Fisher made the payment. 
15. The pre-judgment interest on the payments is due from the date on which each 
payment was made. 
16. Fisher is entitled to pre-judgment interest on the principal amount of the loans, on the 
payments to Eagle Crest, on payments on the loans including payments of interest, on the payments 
for attorney fees and costs, and on payments for operating expenses. 
17. The Agreement provides that "if any party brings any legal action to enforce the terms 
of this agreement, the prevailing party shall be paid reasonable attorneys fees and costs." 
18. Fisher is the prevailing party. 
19. The legal work set forth in the attorney's affidavits was reasonably necessary to 
adequately prosecute Fisher's causes of action against Davidhizer and reasonably necessary in 
defending against Davidhizers' defenses and counterclaims. 
20. The attorneys' billing rates set forth in the affidavits are consistent with the rates 
customarily charged in Washington County, State of Utah. 
21. Davidhizer has failed to present any evidence that the legal work performed was not 
actually performed in prosecuting Fisher's causes of action against Davidhizer and performed in 
defending against Davidhizers' defenses and counterclaims, and was reasonably necessary to 
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adequately prosecute this lawsuit. 
22. Davidhizer has failed to present any evidence that the attorneys3 billing rates are 
inconsistent with the rates customarily charged in Washington County, State of Utah. 
Motion ia Limine 
23. URCP 9(b) requires, "in all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances 
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity." 
24. Defendant's cause of action for negligent misrepresentation is a form of fraud under 
Utah law and must also meet the particularity requirement of URCP 9(b); therefore, Defendant's 
allegations of fraud or negligent misrepresentation must be plead with particularity. 
25. The general rule that allegations in a complaint should be construed liberally does not 
apply to allegations in actions for fraud. 
26. In order for Defendant5 s allegations of fraud to satisfy URCP 9, Defendant must state 
with particularity the circumstances supporting each of the elements of fraud for each and every 
allegation. 
27. Under Utah law, there are nine such common law elements of fraud: (i) a 
representation; (ii) concerning a presently existing fact; (iii) which was false; (iv) which the 
representer either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient 
knowledge upon which to base such representation; (v) for the purpose of inducing the other party 
to act upon it; (vi) that the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; (vii) did in 
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fact rely upon it; (viii) and was thereby induced to act; and (ix) to his injury and damage. 
28. Defendant failed to state with particularity in the Answer and Counterclaim the 
specific circumstances supporting each of the elements of fraud under Utah law, and failed to either 
plead or proffer any allegation of fraudulent misstatements or conduct with sufficient particularity 
as required under URCP 9 (b) as to the time, place, content, and manner of Plaintiff s alleged material 
misrepresentations or other fraudulent conduct. 
29. Additionally, Defendant failed to proffer any evidence which, if accepted as true, 
would clearly and convincingly support each element of a fraud claim against Plaintiff. Specifically, 
the statements offered in Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion in Limine taken from 
various depositions and Defendant's affidavit are not sufficiently specific to meet the URCP 9(b) 
requirement. Even applying the standard urged by Defendant, that he need only provide the Court 
"with evidence which, if accepted by the trier of fact as true, would meet the clear and convincing 
standard required to establish a fraud claim", see, Republic Grp. Inc. v. Won~Door Corp., 883 P.2d 
285,292 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); and assuming the statements abstracted from various depositions and 
Defendant's affidavit as true, they do not meet the clear and convincing standard required to prove 
fraud. Taken in total, the statements urged by Defendant are ambiguous and contradictory and 
therefore cannot sustain the clear and convincing burden of proof. 
30. Defendant also failed to state with particularity in his Answer and Counterclaim any 
misrepresentations which Defendant alleges Plaintiff negligently made or failed to make when they 
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had a duly to do so. 
31. Defendant's Motion to Amend filed just three days prior to trial, more than five years 
after filing Defendant's original Answer and Counterclaim, and more than three years after the 
discovery cutoff established by the Court in the Fourth Amended Scheduling Order, is untimely. 
32. Defendant failed to demonstrate any valid reason for the considerable delay in 
requesting leave to amend the Answer and Counterclaim and the untimely filing. 
3 3. Requiring Plaintiff to address an amended counterclaim after more than five years of 
litigation, including an extensive discovery and motion phase, would be unreasonably prejudicial to 
the Plaintiff. 
34. Defendant's failure to amend the Answer and Counterclaim, or file a motion for leave 
to amend prior to the motion cutoff date in compliance with the Court's Fourth Amended Scheduling 
Order; and Defendant's failure to properly frame the allegations of fraud, are subject to sanctions 
under Rule 3 7 for failure to comply with the Scheduling Order; and under URCP 16 pursuant to the 
Court's authority to form and simplify issues and eliminate frivolous claims and defenses. 
35. Whether the violation of a scheduling order warrants sanctions in the first place, and 
the appropriate sanctions to follow, are clearly within the Court's discretion to invoke in the pretrial 
heaiing pursuant to URCP 16. 
36. The sanctions provided under UCRP 37 apply and are appropriate in these 
circumstances, including an order refusing to allow the noncompliant party to support or oppose 
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designated claims or defenses, or striking and dismissing the noncompliant party's counterclaim. 
37. Fisher did not fail to mitigate his damages. 
38. Davidhizer is not entitled to an offset for the tables. 
39* The court accepts the calculation of damages prepared by Fisher. 
JUDGMENT 
40. Fisher is entitled to judgment against Davidhizer including interest through May 3 0, 
2009, in the total sum of $819,811.47, as follows: 
a. For the Anderson loan in the sum of $ 154,411.95; 
b. For the GMAC loan in the sum of $160,968.54; 
c. For the Farwest Bank loan in the sum of $115,281.93; 
d. For the payments to Eagle Crest in the sum of $28,590.03; 
e. For the North American Medical loan in the sum of $84,711.07; 
f. For attorney fees and costs in the sum of $261,501.44; 
g. For operating expenses in the sum of $14,346.51. (See Exhibit 41, at 001) 
Dated this 28th day of July, 2009. 
By the Court: . 
JAMES L. SHUMATE \ 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
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Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. 
United States District Court, 
N.D. California. 
Eniko PRAKASH, Plaintiff, 
v. 
PULSENT CORPORATION EMPLOYEE LONG 
TERM DISABILITY PLAN, Defendant. 
Sun Life Financial and Sun Life Assurance Com-
pany of Canada, Real Parties in Interest. 
No. C-06-7592 SC. 
Aug. 20, 2008. 
Laurence Fred Padway, Law Offices of Laurence F. 
Padway, Alameda, CA, for Plaintiff. 
Kathleen Elizabeth Hackett, John Russell Stedman, 
Travis Richard Wall, Barger & Wolen LLP, San 
Francisco, CA, for Defendant. 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO STRIKE AF-
FIRMATIVE DEFENSES; DENYING MOTION TO 
STRIKE JURY DEMAND 
SAMUEL CONT1, District Judge. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
*1 Real Party in Interest and Counterclaimant Sun 
Life Assurance of Canada (aSun Life") moves to 
strike the affirmative defenses and jury demand 
filed by Plaintiffs Eniko and Adityo Prakash. Dock-
et Nos. 203 ("Jury Mot."), 206 ("Defenses Mot."). 
Plaintiffs and Counterclaim-Defendants Eniko 
Prakash and Adityo Prakash ("Plaintiffs" or 
"Prakashes") opposed both motions, and Sun Life 
replied. Docket Nos. 227 ("Defenses Opp'n"), 229 
("Jury Opp 'n"), 231 ("Jury Reply"), 232 
("Defenses Reply"). Having considered all of the 
parties' submissions, the Court GRANTS Sun Life's 
Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Affirmative Defenses 
and DENIES Sun Life's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' 
Jury Demand. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The basic facts underlying this case are known to 
all involved. Therefore, the Court only addresses 
here the procedural background relevant to the 
pending motions. 
Sun Life filed its Answer and Counterclaim (the 
"Counterclaim") on February 26, 2007. Docket No. 
8. Plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss the Counter-
claim on April 10, 2007. Docket No. 16. The Court 
denied that motion on June 28, 2007. Docket No. 
28. Trial was scheduled for April 7, 2008. Nine 
months after the Court ruled on Plaintiffs' motion to 
dismiss the Counterclaims, and less than three 
weeks before trial was set to start, the Court in-
formed the parties that it had not received an An-
swer to Counterclaim from Plaintiffs. Sun Life said 
it would object to any Answer filed at that point. 
Docket No. 188. On March 24, 2008, Plaintiffs 
filed their Answer to Counterclaim and their De-
mand for Trial by Jury. Docket Nos. 192 
("Answer"), 193 ("Jury Demand"). 
The parties appeared before the Court on March 25. 
At that hearing, the Court vacated the trial date, ac-
cepted the late filing of the Answer, and ordered 
Sun Life to file any motions in response to the An-
swer and Jury Demand by June 6, 2008. Sun Life 
filed the instant motions in a timely manner. 
III. AFFIRMA TIVE DEFENSES 
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), 
the Court "may strike from a pleading an insuffi-
cient defense or any redundant, immaterial, imper-
tinent, or scandalous matter." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). 
The Court may do this on its own or on a timely 
motion filed by a party. Id Sun Life brought this 
motion in a timely manner, objecting to each of 
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Plaintiffs' five affirmative defenses. The Court con-
siders each objection in turn. 
A. First Affirmative Defense: Failure to State a 
Claim 
In the First Affirmative Defense, Plaintiffs argue 
that the Counterclaim "does not state facts suffi-
cient to state a claim for relief ...." Answer at 8. In 
their Opposition, Plaintiffs assert that the basis for 
this defense is that Sun Life's Counterclaim fails to 
meet the particularity requirements and heightened 
pleading standards of Rule 9(b). See Defense Opp'n 
at 2-6. Plaintiffs spend a good deal of their brief ar-
guing the merits and substance of the Counterclaim. 
The merits are not before the Court; rather, the is-
sue at present is whether Plaintiffs should even 
have the opportunity to attack the merits. Rule 9(b) 
is basis for attacking the pleading, not an affirmat-
ive defense on which Plaintiffs will offer evidence 
at trial. See SEC v. Sands, 902 F.Supp. 1149, 
1166-67, (C.D.Cal.1995). As an affirmative de-
fense, it is therefore legally insufficient. 
*2 To the extent failure to plead fraud with spe-
cificity could be an affirmative defense, Plaintiffs 
did not assert this defense in a timely manner. 
Plaintiffs previously filed a motion to dismiss the 
Counterclaim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), but did not 
raise the specificity issue at that time. By waiting 
until after they filed both a Rule 12 motion and a 
summary judgment motion, Plaintiffs waived their 
objections under Rule 9(b). See Fed.R.Civ.P. 
12(h)(1); Todaro v. Orbit Int'l Travel, Ltd, 755 
F.Supp. 1229, 1234 (S.D.N.Y.1991); United Nat'l 
Records, Inc. v. MCA, Inc. ., 609 F.Supp. 33, 39 
(N.D.I11.1984) (Rule 12(h)(1) waiver provisions ap-
ply to Rule 9(b) motion). The purpose of Rule 9(b) 
is to assure that defendants are apprised of the al-
legations against them in sufficient detail to frame 
an adequate responsive pleading. See Todaro, 755 
F.Supp. at 1234. Where, as here, Plaintiffs have ex-
tensively litigated the Counterclaim, any concern 
that they did not adequately understand the allega-
tions against them is unwarranted. 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No 
The Court therefore strikes Plaintiffs' First Affirm-
ative Defense because it is both legally insufficient 
and untimely. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f); Todaro, 755 
F.Supp. at 1234; Sands, 902 F.Supp. at 1166-67 
(striking Rule 9(b) affirmative defense). 
B. Second Affirmative Defense: ERISA Preemp-
tion 
In the Second Affirmative Defense, Plaintiffs argue 
that the Counterclaim is preempted by the Employ-
ee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq. Answer at 9. 
The Court previously rejected this exact argument 
in ruling on Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the Coun-
terclaim. See Docket No. 28. The Court therefore 
strikes the Second Affirmative Defense because it 
is legally insufficient and redundant. See 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f); Sands, 902 F.Supp. at 1166-67. 
C. Third Affirmative Defense: Failure to Join 
Pulsent 
In the Third Affirmative Defense, Plaintiffs argue 
that Sun Life failed to join an essential party, De-
fendant Pulsent Corporation Employee Long Term 
Disability Plan ("Pulsent"). Answer at 9. Plaintiffs 
argue that because Sun Life is not an ERISA bene-
fit plan, but rather the insurer of such a plan, Sun 
Life cannot have been the victim of fraud, and 
therefore cannot sue Plaintiffs for fraud. See De-
fenses Opp57Dn at 7-8. Plaintiffs rely on Ford v. 
MCI Communications Corp. Health & Welfare 
Plan, 399 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir.2005). Under Ford, an 
individual beneficiary may not bring an ERISA 
claim against the insurer of a benefits plan, even 
where the insurer has discretionary control over the 
plan. Id. at 1081-82. Whether or not Plaintiffs could 
have sued Sun Life for breach of fiduciary duty un-
der ERISA is entirely irrelevant to whether Sun 
Life was defrauded by Plaintiffs. Sun Life did not 
bring its fraud claim under ERISA and ERISA does 
not govern the claim. See Docket No. 28. The Third 
Affirmative Defense is therefore legally insuffi-
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cient. 
*3 Additionally, Plaintiffs previously stipulated that 
Pulsent's involvement in this case is unnecessary. In 
the early stages of this litigation, Plaintiffs agreed 
that Pulsent "need not be served, file an appearance 
in this action, or actively participate in this action 
in any way ...." See Docket No. 19. Plaintiffs now 
claim that the foregoing stipulation had "nothing to 
do" with the Counterclaim. Defenses Opp'n at 8. 
However, the parties reached this agreement after 
Sun Life had filed the Counterclaim and after 
Plaintiffs had filed their motion to dismiss, so 
Plaintiffs' claim rings hollow. 
The Court therefore strikes the Third Affirmative 
Defense because it is both legally insufficient and 
contrary to Plaintiffs' previous stipulation and ad-
mission. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). 
D. Fourth Affirmative Defense: Failure to Allege 
Lack of Knowledge and Reliance 
In the Fourth Affirmative Defense, Plaintiffs argue 
that Sun Life failed to plead that Pulsent was un-
aware of the true facts and failed to plead that 
Pulsent relied on the allegedly false representations. 
See Answer at 8. This is essentially a repetition of 
the Third Affirmative Defense, and is equally mer-
itless. Even if, as Plaintiffs allege, the payments 
Sun Life made to Plaintiffs were made on Pulsent's 
behalf, see Answer at 9, that is not a reason why 
Sun Life cannot recover. Sun Life is not suing on 
the grounds that Pulsent was injured, or otherwise 
trying to recover for Pulsent's injury. The Counter-
claim clearly alleges that Plaintiffs knowingly made 
false representations directly to Sun Life with the 
intention of defrauding Sun Life, and that Sun Life 
itself justifiably relied on those misrepresentations 
to its detriment. See Counterclaim 1ffl 24-52. What's 
more, Plaintiff has alleged from the outset that Sun 
Life made all decisions for Pulsent regarding disab-
ility benefits, so Sun Life would have been the one 
to rely on any statements from Plaintiffs. See Com-
pl. Tf 3. Sun Life is suing on its own behalf. Wheth-
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er it can carry its burden of proving its claims will 
be decided at trial, but its failure to allege that 
Pulsent was defrauded is immaterial. 
The Court therefore strikes the Fourth Affirmative 
defense because it is both redundant and immateri-
al. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). 
E. Fifth Affirmative Defense: Breach of Fiduciary 
Duty 
In the Fifth Affirmative Defense, Plaintiffs allege 
that Sun Life violated certain provisions of ERISA 
requiring a plan to explain its reasons for denying 
benefits and to provide a claimant the opportunity 
to respond. See Answer at 9. In denying Plaintiffs 
the opportunity to respond, Plaintiffs allege, Sun 
Life violated its fiduciary duty. See Defenses Opp'n 
at 8-9. Finally, Plaintiffs argue that had Sun Life 
followed the mandated procedures, it would have 
learned all of the material facts necessary to resolve 
this matter, so it should not be allowed to conduct 
discovery to support the Counterclaim. See id. 
*4 This purported defense lacks any legal founda-
tion. Plaintiffs' sole legal authority, Saffon v. Wells 
Fargo & Co. Long Term Disability Plan, 522 F.3d 
863 (9th Cir.2008), does not support their position. 
Under Saffon, where a plan administrator fails to 
explain its reason for denying benefits, a district 
court reviewing that decision should be less defer-
ential to the administrator, and the claimant should 
be allowed to present new evidence before the dis-
trict court. Id. at 873-84. This may be relevant to 
the Court's review of the denial of benefits underly-
ing the Complaint in this case, but it is immaterial 
to the Counterclaim. Nothing in Saffon suggests 
that a plan administrator's failure to provide the op-
portunity to respond should insulate a claimant 
from a charge of fraud. 
Plaintiffs' attempts to frame this defense as a dis-
covery issue are also inappropriate. As the docket 
makes abundantly clear, discovery in this matter 
has been both extensive and contentious. Sun Life 
im to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
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has propounded numerous discovery requests re-
lated to its fraud allegations, many of which have 
already been the subject of motion practice before 
the Magistrate Judge. If Plaintiffs believed that this 
alleged breach of fiduciary duty precluded discov-
ery related to the Counterclaim, they should have 
raised it earlier than three weeks before the sched-
uled trial date. 
The Court therefore strikes the Fifth Affirmative 
Defense because it is both legally insufficient and 
untimely. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f); Sands, 902 
F.Supp. at 1166-67. 
IV. JURY DEMAND 
Sun Life also moves to strike Plaintiffs' Jury De-
mand. See Jury Mot. On any issue triable by a jury, 
a party may demand a jury trial by "serving the oth-
er parties with a written demand-which may be in-
cluded in a pleading-no later than 10 days after the 
last pleading directed to the issue is served." 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 38(b) (1). "A party waives a jury trial 
unless its demand is properly served and filed." 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 38(d). 
Sun Life concedes in its moving papers that the last 
pleading addressing the issues to be tried by jury in 
this matter was Plaintiffs' Answer, filed on March 
24, 2008. See Jury Mot. at 3. Plaintiffs filed their 
Jury Demand on the same date they filed the An-
swer. Plaintiffs therefore satisfied the requirement 
of Rule 38(b)(1) that they make their demand for 
jury trial no later than 10 days after the last plead-
ing was served. 
Sun Life argues that because Plaintiffs were delin-
quent in filing the Answer, they should not be al-
lowed to rely on that filing date to excuse the tardi-
ness of the Jury Demand. See Jury Mot. at 4. Ac-
cording to Sun Life, the Jury Demand should have 
been filed no later than 10 days following the dead-
line for timely filing of the Answer. Id. at 3-4. The 
Answer would have been due on or before July 13, 
2007, 20 days following the Court's ruling on 
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Plaintiffs' Rule 12 motion. Therefore, Sun Life 
claims that the Jury Demand should have been filed 
on or before July 27, 2007. 
*5 The authorities on which Sun Life relies are dis-
tinguishable. In all but one of those cases, the jury 
demand was filed more than 10 days following the 
last pleading, so the party had violated Rule 
38(b)(1). See, e.g., Pac. Fisheries Corp. v. HIH 
Cas. & Gen. Ins., Ltd., 239 F.3d 1000, 1002 (9th 
cir.2001); Russ v. Standard Ins. Co., 120 F.3d 988, 
989 (9th Cir.1997); Ray a v. Maryatt Indus., 829 
F.Supp. 1169, 1170, 1175 (N.D.Cal. 1993). Sun Life 
places a great deal of emphasis on Larson v. Gener-
al Motors Corp., 134 F.2d 450 (2d Cir.1943). In 
that case, however, when the plaintiffs did not re-
spond to the defendant's counterclaim within 20 
days, plaintiffs were in default under Rule 55(a) 
and the clerk set the case for a non-jury trial. Id. at 
452. Here, although Plaintiffs went months after the 
Court's order on the Rule 12 motion without filing 
the Answer, Sun Life never sought entry of default. 
Both parties ignored Plaintiffs' failure to file their 
Answer for months on end, even as the case ap-
proached trial. Only when the Court raised the issue 
and gave Plaintiffs leave to file the Answer did Sun 
Life complain. During that entire period, the parties 
and the Court prepared for a trial that all involved 
assumed would include a jury portion. See Docket 
Nos. 13, 21, 151, 153. As the Court permitted the 
Answer to be filed on March 24, 2008, the simul-
taneous filing of the Jury Demand was timely under 
Rule 38(b) (1). Sun Life's motion to strike the Jury 
Demand is therefore DENIED. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS 
Sun Life's motion to strike Plaintiffs' affirmative 
defenses and DENIES Sun Life's motion to strike 
Plaintiffs' Jury Demand. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
N.D.Cal.,2008. 
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